

PSA Certified Crypto API 1.3

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Abstract

This document is part of the PSA Certified API specifications. It defines interfaces to provide cryptographic operations and key storage services.

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About this document

Release information

The change history table lists the changes that have been made to this document.

Table 1 Document revision history

| Date | Version | Confidentiality | Change |
|----------------|-------------|------------------|--|
| January 2019 | 1.0 Beta 1 | Non-confidential | First public beta release. |
| February 2019 | 1.0 Beta 2 | Non-confidential | Update for release with other PSA Certified API specifications. |
| May 2019 | 1.0 Beta 3 | Non-confidential | Update for release with other PSA Certified API specifications. |
| February 2020 | 1.0 Final | Non-confidential | 1.0 API finalized. |
| August 2020 | 1.0.1 Final | Non-confidential | Update to fix errors and provide clarifications. |
| February 2022 | 1.1.0 Final | Non-confidential | New API for EdDSA, password hashing and key stretching. |
| | | | Many significant clarifications and improvements across the documentation. |
| October 2022 | 1.1.1 Final | Non-confidential | Relicensed as open source under CC BY-SA 4.0. |
| | | | Improve support for TLS. |
| March 2023 | 1.1.2 Final | Non-confidential | Clarifications and fixes |
| February 2024 | 1.2.0 Final | Non-confidential | Better support for key agreement. |
| | | | New algorithms for Zigbee, XChaCha, TLS 1.2, and key derivation. |
| March 2024 | 1.2.1 Final | Non-confidential | Clarifications and fixes |
| March 2025 | 1.3.0 Final | Non-confidential | Integrated the PAKE extension. |
| | | | New API for key encapsulation. |
| | | | Support for additional key generation parameters. |
| June 2025 | 1.3.1 Final | Non-confidential | Clarifications and fixes |
| September 2025 | 1.3.2 Final | Non-confidential | GlobalPlatform governance of PSA Certified evaluation scheme. |

The detailed changes in each release are described in *Document change history* on page 390.

PSA Certified Crypto API

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Terms and abbreviations

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations.

Table 4 Terms and abbreviations

| Term | Meaning |
|--|--|
| AEAD | See Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. |
| Algorithm | A finite sequence of steps to perform a particular operation. In this specification, an algorithm is a <i>cipher</i> or a related function. Other texts call this a cryptographic mechanism. |
| API | Application Programming Interface. |
| Asymmetric | See Public-key cryptography. |
| Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) | A type of encryption that provides confidentiality and authenticity of data using <i>symmetric</i> keys. |
| Byte | In this specification, a unit of storage comprising eight bits, also called an octet. |
| Caller isolation | Property of an implementation in which there are multiple application instances, with a security boundary between the application instances, as well as between the cryptoprocessor and the application instances. See Optional isolation on page 19. |
| Cipher | An algorithm used for encryption or decryption with a symmetric key. |
| Cryptoprocessor | The component that performs cryptographic operations. A cryptoprocessor might contain a <i>keystore</i> and countermeasures against a range of physical and timing attacks. |
| Cryptoprocessor isolation | Property of an implementation in which there is a security boundary between the application and the cryptoprocessor, but the cryptoprocessor does not communicate with other applications. See Optional isolation on page 19. |
| Hash | A cryptographic hash function, or the value returned by such a function. |
| HMAC | A type of MAC that uses a cryptographic key with a hash function. |
| | Behavior that is not defined by the architecture, but is defined and |
| IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED | documented by individual implementations. |

Table 4 – continued from previous page

| Term | Meaning |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| Initialization vector (IV) | An additional input that is not part of the message. It is used to prevent an attacker from making any correlation between cipher text and plain text. |
| | This specification uses the term for such initial inputs in all contexts. For example, the initial counter in CTR mode is called the IV. |
| Isolation | Property of an implementation in which there is a security boundary between the application and the cryptoprocessor. |
| | See Optional isolation on page 19. |
| IV | See Initialization vector. |
| KDF | See Key Derivation Function. |
| Key agreement | An algorithm for two or more parties to establish a common secret key. |
| Key Derivation Function (KDF) | Key Derivation Function. An algorithm for deriving keys from secret material. |
| Key identifier | A reference to a cryptographic key. Key identifiers in the Crypto API are 32-b integers. |
| Key policy | Key metadata that describes and restricts what a key can be used for. |
| Key size | The size of a key as defined by common conventions for each key type. For keys that are built from several numbers of strings, this is the size of a particular one of these numbers or strings. |
| | This specification expresses key sizes in bits. |
| Key type | Key metadata that describes the structure and content of a key. |
| Keystore | A hardware or software component that protects, stores, and manages cryptographic keys. |
| Lifetime | Key metadata that describes when a key is destroyed. |
| MAC | See Message Authentication Code. |
| Message Authentication Code (MAC) | A short piece of information used to authenticate a message. It is created and verified using a <i>symmetric</i> key. |
| Message digest | A <i>hash</i> of a message. Used to determine if a message has been tampered. |
| Multi-part operation | An API which splits a single cryptographic operation into a sequence of separate steps. |
| No isolation | Property of an implementation in which there is no security boundary between the application and the cryptoprocessor. |
| | See Optional isolation on page 19. |
| Non-extractable key | A key with a key policy that prevents it from being read by ordinary means. |
| Nonce | Used as an input for certain AEAD algorithms. Nonces must not be reused with the same key because this can break a cryptographic protocol. |

Table 4 - continued from previous page

| Term | Meaning |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Persistent key | A key that is stored in protected non-volatile memory. See <i>Key lifetimes</i> on page 83. |
| Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) | A cryptographic scheme that relies on mathematical problems that do not have efficient algorithms for either classical or quantum computing. |
| PQC | See Post-Quantum Cryptography. |
| PSA | Platform Security Architecture |
| Public-key cryptography | A type of cryptographic system that uses key pairs. A keypair consists of a (secret) private key and a public key (not secret). A public-key cryptographic algorithm can be used for key distribution and for digital signatures. |
| Salt | Used as an input for certain algorithms, such as key derivations. |
| Signature | The output of a digital signature scheme that uses an <i>asymmetric</i> keypair. Used to establish who produced a message. |
| Single-part function | An API that implements the cryptographic operation in a single function call. |
| SPECIFICATION DEFINED | Behavior that is defined by this specification. |
| Symmetric | A type of cryptographic algorithm that uses a single key. A symmetric key can be used with a block cipher or a stream cipher. |
| Volatile key | A key that has a short lifespan and is guaranteed not to exist after a restart of an application instance. |
| | See Key lifetimes on page 83. |

Potential for change

The contents of this specification are stable for version 1.3.

The following may change in updates to the version 1.3 specification:

- Small optional feature additions.
- Clarifications.

Significant additions, or any changes that affect the compatibility of the interfaces defined in this specification will only be included in a new major or minor version of the specification.

Conventions

Typographical conventions

The typographical conventions are:

italic Introduces special terminology, and denotes citations.

monospace Used for assembler syntax descriptions, pseudocode, and source code examples.

Also used in the main text for instruction mnemonics and for references to other items appearing in assembler syntax descriptions, pseudocode, and source code examples.

SMALL CAPITALS

Used for some common terms such as IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

Used for a few terms that have specific technical meanings, and are included in the *Terms* and abbreviations.

Red text Indicates an open issue.

Blue text Indicates a link. This can be

- A cross-reference to another location within the document
- A URL, for example example.com

Numbers

Numbers are normally written in decimal. Binary numbers are preceded by 0b, and hexadecimal numbers by 0x.

In both cases, the prefix and the associated value are written in a monospace font, for example <code>0xffff0000</code>. To improve readability, long numbers can be written with an underscore separator between every four characters, for example <code>0xffff_0000_0000_0000</code>. Ignore any underscores when interpreting the value of a number.

Feedback

We welcome feedback on the PSA Certified API documentation.

If you have comments on the content of this book, visit github.com/arm-software/psa-api/issues to create a new issue at the PSA Certified API GitHub project. Give:

- The title (Crypto API).
- The number and issue (IHI 0086 1.3.2).
- The location in the document to which your comments apply.
- A concise explanation of your comments.

We also welcome general suggestions for additions and improvements.

1 Introduction

1.1 About Platform Security Architecture

This document is one of a set of resources provided by Arm that can help organizations develop products that meet the security requirements of GlobalPlatform's PSA Certified evaluation scheme on Arm-based platforms. The PSA Certified scheme provides a framework and methodology that helps silicon manufacturers, system software providers and OEMs to develop more secure products. Arm resources that support PSA Certified range from threat models, standard architectures that simplify development and increase portability, and open-source partnerships that provide ready-to-use software. You can read more about PSA Certified here at www.psacertified.org and find more Arm resources here at developer.arm.com/platform-security-resources and www.trustedfirmware.org.

1.2 About the Crypto API

The interface described in this document is a PSA Certified API, that provides a portable programming interface to cryptographic operations, and key storage functionality, on a wide range of hardware.

The interface is user-friendly, while still providing access to the low-level primitives used in modern cryptography. It does not require that the user has access to the key material. Instead, it uses opaque key identifiers.

You can find additional resources relating to the Crypto API here at arm-software.github.io/psa-api/crypto, and find other PSA Certified APIs here at arm-software.github.io/psa-api.

This document includes:

- A rationale for the design. See *Design goals* on page 19.
- A high-level overview of the functionality provided by the interface. See *Functionality overview* on page 22.
- A description of typical architectures of implementations for this specification. See *Sample architectures* on page 28.
- General considerations for implementers of this specification, and for applications that use the interface defined in this specification. See *Implementation considerations* on page 37 and *Usage considerations* on page 41.
- A detailed definition of the API. See *Library management reference* on page 43, Key management reference on page 47, and *Cryptographic operation reference* on page 117.

PSA Certified Crypto API 1.3 PQC Extension [PSA-PQC] is a companion document for version 1.3 of this specification. [PSA-PQC] defines an API for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The PQC API is a proposal at BETA status. The API defined by [PSA-PQC] is provided in a separate specification to reflect the different status of this API, and indicate that a future version can include incompatible changes to the PQC API. When the PQC API is stable, it will be included in a future version of the Crypto API specification.

In future, companion documents will define *profiles* for this specification. A profile is a minimum mandatory subset of the interface that a compliant implementation must provide.

2 Design goals

2.1 Suitable for constrained devices

The interface is suitable for a vast range of devices: from special-purpose cryptographic processors that process data with a built-in key, to constrained devices running custom application code, such as microcontrollers, and multi-application devices, such as servers. Consequentially, the interface is scalable and modular.

- Scalable: devices only need to implement the functionality that they will use.
- *Modular*: larger devices implement larger subsets of the same interface, rather than different interfaces.

In this interface, all operations on unbounded amounts of data allow *multi-part* processing, as long as the calculations on the data are performed in a streaming manner. This means that the application does not need to store the whole message in memory at one time. As a result, this specification is suitable for very constrained devices, including those where memory is very limited.

Memory outside the keystore boundary is managed by the application. An implementation of the interface is not required to retain any state between function calls, apart from the content of the keystore and other data that must be kept inside the keystore security boundary.

The interface does not expose the representation of keys and intermediate data, except when required for interchange. This allows each implementation to choose optimal data representations. Implementations with multiple components are also free to choose which memory area to use for internal data.

2.2 A keystore interface

The specification allows cryptographic operations to be performed on a key to which the application does not have direct access. Except where required for interchange, applications access all keys indirectly, by an identifier. The key material corresponding to that identifier can reside inside a security boundary that prevents it from being extracted, except as permitted by a policy that is defined when the key is created.

2.3 Optional isolation

Implementations can isolate the cryptoprocessor from the calling application, and can further isolate multiple calling applications. The interface allows the implementation to be separated between a frontend and a backend. In an isolated implementation, the frontend is the part of the implementation that is located in the same isolation boundary as the application, which the application accesses by function calls. The backend is the part of the implementation that is located in a different environment, which is protected from the frontend. Various technologies can provide protection, for example:

- Process isolation in an operating system.
- Partition isolation, either with a virtual machine or a partition manager.
- Physical separation between devices.

Communication between the frontend and backend is beyond the scope of this specification.

In an isolated implementation, the backend can serve more than one implementation instance. In this case, a single backend communicates with multiple instances of the frontend. The backend must enforce *caller*

isolation: it must ensure that assets of one frontend are not visible to any other frontend. The mechanism for identifying callers is beyond the scope of this specification. An implementation that provides caller isolation must document the identification mechanism. An implementation that provides caller isolation must document any implementation-specific extension of the API that enables frontend instances to share data in any form.

An isolated implementation that only has a single frontend provides *cryptoprocessor isolation*.

In summary, there are three types of implementation:

- *No isolation*: there is no security boundary between the application and the cryptoprocessor. For example, a statically or dynamically linked library is an implementation with no isolation.
- Cryptoprocessor isolation: there is a security boundary between the application and the cryptoprocessor, but the cryptoprocessor does not communicate with other applications. For example, a cryptoprocessor chip that is a companion to an application processor is an implementation with cryptoprocessor isolation.
- Caller isolation: there are multiple application instances, with a security boundary between the application instances among themselves, as well as between the cryptoprocessor and the application instances. For example, a cryptography service in a multiprocess environment is an implementation with caller and cryptoprocessor isolation.

2.4 Choice of algorithms

The specification defines a low-level cryptographic interface, where the caller explicitly chooses which algorithm and which security parameters they use. This is necessary to implement protocols that are inescapable in various use cases. The design of the interface enables applications to implement widely-used protocols and data exchange formats, as well as custom ones.

As a consequence, all cryptographic functionality operates according to the precise algorithm specified by the caller. However, this does not apply to device-internal functionality, which does not involve any form of interoperability, such as random number generation. The specification does not include generic higher-level interfaces, where the implementation chooses the best algorithm for a purpose. However, higher-level libraries can be built on top of the Crypto API.

Another consequence is that the specification permits the use of algorithms, key sizes and other parameters that, while known to be insecure, might be necessary to support legacy protocols or legacy data. Where major weaknesses are known, the algorithm descriptions give applicable warnings. However, the lack of a warning both does not and cannot indicate that an algorithm is secure in all circumstances. Application developers need to research the security of the protocols and algorithms that they plan to use to determine if these meet their requirements.

The interface facilitates algorithm agility. As a consequence, cryptographic primitives are presented through generic functions with a parameter indicating the specific choice of algorithm. For example, there is a single function to calculate a message digest, which takes a parameter that identifies the specific hash algorithm.

2.5 Ease of use

The interface is designed to be as user-friendly as possible, given the aforementioned constraints on suitability for various types of devices and on the freedom to choose algorithms.

In particular, the code flows are designed to reduce the risk of dangerous misuse. The interface is designed in part to make it harder to misuse. Where possible, it is designed so that typical mistakes result in test failures, rather than subtle security issues. Implementations avoid leaking data when a function is called with invalid parameters, to the extent allowed by the C language and by implementation size constraints.

2.6 Example use cases

This section lists some of the use cases that were considered during the design of the Crypto API. This list is not exhaustive, nor are all implementations required to support all use cases.

2.6.1 Network Security (TLS)

The API provides all of the cryptographic primitives needed to establish TLS connections.

2.6.2 Secure Storage

The API provides all primitives related to storage encryption, block or file-based, with master encryption keys stored inside a key store.

2.6.3 Network Credentials

The API provides network credential management inside a key store, for example, for X.509-based authentication or pre-shared keys on enterprise networks.

2.6.4 Device Pairing

The API provides support for key-agreement protocols that are often used for secure pairing of devices over wireless channels. For example, the pairing of an NFC token or a Bluetooth device might use key-agreement protocols upon first use.

2.6.5 Secure Boot

The API provides primitives for use during firmware integrity and authenticity validation, during a secure or trusted boot process.

2.6.6 Attestation

The API provides primitives used in attestation activities. Attestation is the ability for a device to sign an array of bytes with a device private key and return the result to the caller. There are several use cases; ranging from attestation of the device state, to the ability to generate a key pair and prove that it has been generated inside a secure key store. The API provides access to the algorithms commonly used for attestation.

2.6.7 Factory Provisioning

Most IoT devices receive a unique identity during the factory provisioning process, or once they have been deployed to the field. This API provides the APIs necessary for populating a device with keys that represent that identity.

3 Functionality overview

This section provides a high-level overview of the functionality provided by the interface defined in this specification. Refer to the API definition for a detailed description, which begins with *Library management reference* on page 43.

Future additions on page 407 describes features that might be included in future versions of this specification.

Due to the modularity of the interface, almost every part of the library is optional. The only mandatory function is psa_crypto_init().

3.1 Library management

Applications must call psa_crypto_init() to initialize the library before using any other function.

3.2 Key management

Applications always access keys indirectly via an identifier, and can perform operations using a key without accessing the key material. This allows keys to be *non-extractable*, where an application can use a key but is not permitted to obtain the key material. Non-extractable keys are bound to the device, can be rate-limited and can have their usage restricted by policies.

Each key has a set of attributes that describe the key and the policy for using the key. A psa_key_attributes_t object contains all of the attributes, which is used when creating a key and when querying key attributes.

The kev attributes include:

- A type and size that describe the key material. See *Key types* on page 23.
- The key identifier that the application uses to refer to the key. See Key identifiers on page 23.
- A lifetime that determines when the key material is destroyed, and where it is stored. See *Key lifetimes* on page 23.
- A policy that determines how the key can be used. See Key policies on page 24.

Keys are created using one of the key creation functions:

- psa_import_key()
- psa_generate_key()
- psa_generate_key_custom()
- psa_key_derivation_output_key()

- psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
- psa_key_agreement()
- psa_encapsulate()
- psa_decapsulate()
- psa_pake_get_shared_key()
- psa_copy_key()

These output the key identifier, that is used to access the key in all other parts of the API.

All of the key attributes are set when the key is created and cannot be changed without destroying the key first. If the original key permits copying, then the application can specify a different lifetime or restricted policy for the copy of the key.

A call to psa_destroy_key() destroys the key material, and will cause any active operations that are using the key to fail. Therefore an application must not destroy a key while an operation using that key is in progress, unless the application is prepared to handle a failure of the operation.

3.2.1 Key types

Each cryptographic algorithm requires a key that has the right form, in terms of the size of the key material and its numerical properties. The key type and key size encode that information about a key, and determine whether the key is compatible with a cryptographic algorithm.

Additional non-cryptographic key types enable applications to store other secret values in the keystore.

See Key types on page 51.

3.2.2 Key identifiers

Key identifiers are integral values that act as permanent names for persistent keys, or as transient references to volatile keys. Key identifiers are defined by the application for persistent keys, and by the implementation for volatile keys and for built-in keys.

Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key creation functions.

Valid key identifiers must have distinct values within the same application. If the implementation provides *caller isolation*, then key identifiers are local to each application.

See Key identifiers on page 91.

3.2.3 Key lifetimes

The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and which application and system actions will create and destroy it.

There are two main types of lifetimes: volatile and persistent.

Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance terminates or on a power reset of the device. Volatile key identifiers are allocated by the implementation when the key is created. Volatile keys can be explicitly destroyed with a call to psa_destroy_key().

Persistent keys are preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an implementation-specific device management event occurs, for example, a factory reset. The key identifier

for a persistent key is set by the application when creating the key, and remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, even if the application instance that created the key terminates.

See Key lifetimes on page 83.

3.2.4 Key policies

All keys have an associated policy that regulates which operations are permitted on the key. Each key policy is a set of usage flags and a specific algorithm that is permitted with the key. See *Key policies* on page 93.

3.2.5 Recommendations of minimum standards for key management

Most implementations provide the following functions:

- psa_import_key(). The exceptions are implementations that only give access to a key or keys that are provisioned by proprietary means, and do not allow the main application to use its own cryptographic material.
- psa_get_key_attributes() and the psa_get_key_xxx() accessor functions. They are easy to implement, and it is difficult to write applications and to diagnose issues without being able to check the metadata.
- psa_export_public_key(). This function is usually provided if the implementation supports any asymmetric algorithm, since public-key cryptography often requires the delivery of a public key that is associated with a protected private key.
- psa_export_key(). However, highly constrained implementations that are designed to work only with short-term keys, or only with long-term non-extractable keys, do not need to provide this function.

3.3 Cryptographic operations

The API supports cryptographic operations through two kinds of interfaces:

- A *single-part* function performs a whole operation in a single function call. For example, compute, verify, encrypt or decrypt. See *Single-part Functions*.
- A multi-part operation is a set of functions that work with a stored operation state. This provides more control over operation configuration, piecewise processing of large input data, or handling for multi-step processes. See Multi-part operations on page 25.

Depending on the mechanism, one or both kind of interfaces may be provided.

3.3.1 Single-part Functions

Single-part functions are APIs that implement the cryptographic operation in a single function call. This is the easiest API to use when all of the inputs and outputs fit into the application memory.

Single-part functions do not meet the needs of all use cases:

• Some use cases involve messages that are too large to be assembled in memory, or require non-default configuration of the algorithm. These use cases require the use of a multi-part operation.

3.3.2 Multi-part operations

Multi-part operations are APIs which split a single cryptographic operation into a sequence of separate steps. This enables fine control over the configuration of the cryptographic operation, and allows the message data to be processed in fragments instead of all at once. For example, the following situations require the use of a multi-part operation:

- Processing messages that cannot be assembled in memory.
- Using a deterministic IV for unauthenticated encryption.
- Providing the IV separately for unauthenticated encryption or decryption.
- Separating the AEAD authentication tag from the cipher text.
- Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) is a multi-step process.

Each multi-part operation defines a specific object type to maintain the state of the operation. These types are implementation-defined.

All multi-part operations follow the same pattern of use, which is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1 General state model for a multi-part operation

The typical sequence of actions with a multi-part operation is as follows:

- 1. **Allocate:** Allocate memory for an operation object of the appropriate type. The application can use any allocation strategy: stack, heap, static, etc.
- 2. **Initialize:** Initialize or assign the operation object by one of the following methods:
 - Set it to logical zero. This is automatic for static and global variables. Explicit initialization must use the associated PSA_XXX_OPERATION_INIT macro as the type is implementation-defined.
 - Set it to all-bits zero. This is automatic if the object was allocated with calloc().
 - Assign the value of the associated macro PSA_XXX_OPERATION_INIT.
 - Assign the result of calling the associated function psa_xxx_operation_init().

The resulting object is now inactive.

It is an error to initialize an operation object that is in *active* or *error* states. This can leak memory or other resources.

- 3. **Setup:** Start a new multi-part operation on an *inactive* operation object. Each operation object will define one or more setup functions to start a specific operation.
 - On success, a setup function will put an operation object into an *active* state. On failure, the operation object will remain *inactive*.
- 4. **Update:** Update an *active* operation object. Each operation object defines one or more update functions, which are used to provide additional parameters, supply data for processing or generate outputs.
 - On success, the operation object remains *active*. On failure, the operation object will enter an *error* state.
- 5. **Finish:** To end the operation, call the applicable finishing function. This will take any final inputs, produce any final outputs, and then release any resources associated with the operation. On success, the operation object returns to the *inactive* state. On failure, the operation object will enter an *error* state.
- 6. **Abort:** An operation can be aborted at any stage during its use by calling the associated psa_xxx_abort() function. This will release any resources associated with the operation and return the operation object to the *inactive* state.
 - Any error that occurs to an operation while it is in an *active* state will result in the operation entering an *error* state. The application must call the associated psa_xxx_abort() function to release the operation resources and return the object to the *inactive* state.
 - psa_xxx_abort() can be called on an *inactive* operation, and this has no effect.

Once an operation object is returned to the *inactive* state, it can be reused by calling one of the applicable setup functions again.

If a multi-part operation object is not initialized before use, the behavior is undefined.

If a multi-part operation function determines that the operation object is not in any valid state, it can return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED.

If a multi-part operation function is called with an operation object in the wrong state, the function will return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE and the operation object will enter the *error* state.

It is safe to move a multi-part operation object to a different memory location, for example, using a bitwise copy, and then to use the object in the new location. For example, an application can allocate an operation object on the stack and return it, or the operation object can be allocated within memory managed by a garbage collector. However, this does not permit the following behaviors:

- Moving the object while a function is being called on the object. This is not safe. See also *Concurrent calls* on page 36.
- Working with both the original and the copied operation objects. This requires cloning the operation, which is only available for hash operations using psa_hash_clone().

Each type of multi-part operation can have multiple *active* states. Documentation for the specific operation describes the configuration and update functions, and any requirements about their usage and ordering.

3.3.3 Symmetric cryptography

This specification defines interfaces for the following types of symmetric cryptographic operation:

- Message digests, commonly known as hash functions. See Message digests (Hashes) on page 123.
- Message authentication codes (MAC). See Message authentication codes (MAC) on page 143.
- Symmetric ciphers. See *Unauthenticated ciphers* on page 159.
- Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD). See Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) on page 185.
- Key derivation. See Key derivation on page 214.

Key derivation only provides multi-part operation, to support the flexibility required by these type of algorithms.

Example of the symmetric cryptography API

Here is an example of a use case where a master key is used to generate both a message encryption key and an IV for the encryption, and the derived key and IV are then used to encrypt a message.

- 1. Derive the message encryption material from the master key.
 - a. Initialize a psa_key_derivation_operation_t object to zero or to PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT.
 - b. Call psa_key_derivation_setup() with PSA_ALG_HKDF as the algorithm.
 - c. Call psa_key_derivation_input_key() with the step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET and the master key.
 - d. Call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() with the step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO and a public value that uniquely identifies the message.
 - e. Populate a psa_key_attributes_t object with the derived message encryption key's attributes.
 - f. Call psa_key_derivation_output_key() to create the derived message key.
 - g. Call psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() to generate the derived IV.
 - h. Call psa_key_derivation_abort() to release the key-derivation operation memory.
- 2. Encrypt the message with the derived material.
 - a. Initialize a psa_cipher_operation_t object to zero or to PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
 - b. Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() with the derived message encryption key.
 - c. Call psa_cipher_set_iv() using the derived IV retrieved above.
 - d. Call psa_cipher_update() one or more times to encrypt the message.
 - e. Call psa_cipher_finish() at the end of the message.
- 3. Call psa_destroy_key() to clear the generated key.

3.3.4 Asymmetric cryptography

This specification defines interfaces for the following types of asymmetric cryptographic operation:

- Asymmetric encryption (also known as public-key encryption). See Asymmetric encryption on page 269.
- Asymmetric signature. See Asymmetric signature on page 247.
- Two-way key agreement (also known as key establishment). See Key agreement on page 275.
- Key encapsulation. See *Key encapsulation* on page 287.
- Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE). See *Password-authenticated key exchange* (PAKE) on page 296.

For asymmetric encryption, the API provides single-part functions.

For asymmetric signature, the API provides single-part functions.

For key agreement, the API provides single-part functions and an additional input method for a key-derivation operation.

For key encapsulation, the API provides single-part functions.

For PAKE, the API provides a multi-part operation.

3.4 Randomness and key generation

We strongly recommended that implementations include a random generator, consisting of a cryptographically secure pseudorandom generator (CSPRNG), which is adequately seeded with a cryptographic-quality hardware entropy source, commonly referred to as a true random number generator (TRNG). Constrained implementations can omit the random generation functionality if they do not implement any algorithm that requires randomness internally, and they do not provide a key-generation functionality. For example, a special-purpose component for signature verification can omit this.

It is recommended that applications use psa_generate_key(), psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_aead_generate_nonce() to generate suitably-formatted random data, as applicable. In addition, the API includes a function psa_generate_random() to generate and extract arbitrary random data.

4 Sample architectures

This section describes some example architectures that can be used for implementations of the interface described in this specification. This list is not exhaustive and the section is entirely non-normative.

4.1 Single-partition architecture

In the single-partition architecture, there is no security boundary inside the system. The application code can access all the system memory, including the memory used by the cryptographic services described in this specification. Thus, the architecture provides *no isolation*.

This architecture does not conform to the Arm *Platform Security Architecture Security Model*. However, it is useful for providing cryptographic services that use the same interface, even on devices that cannot

support any security boundary. So, while this architecture is not the primary design goal of the API defined in the present specification, it is supported.

The functions in this specification simply execute the underlying algorithmic code. Security checks can be kept to a minimum, since the cryptoprocessor cannot defend against a malicious application. Key import and export copy data inside the same memory space.

This architecture also describes a subset of some larger systems, where the cryptographic services are implemented inside a high-security partition, separate from the code of the main application, though it shares this high-security partition with other platform security services.

4.2 Cryptographic token and single-application processor

This system is composed of two partitions: one is a cryptoprocessor and the other partition runs an application. There is a security boundary between the two partitions, so that the application cannot access the cryptoprocessor, except through its public interface. Thus, the architecture provides *cryptoprocessor isolation*. The cryptoprocessor has some non-volatile storage, a TRNG, and possibly, some cryptographic accelerators.

There are a number of potential physical realizations: the cryptoprocessor might be a separate chip, a separate processor on the same chip, or a logical partition using a combination of hardware and software to provide the isolation. These realizations are functionally equivalent in terms of the offered software interface, but they would typically offer different levels of security guarantees.

The Crypto API in the application processor consists of a thin layer of code that translates function calls to remote procedure calls in the cryptoprocessor. All cryptographic computations are, therefore, performed inside the cryptoprocessor. Non-volatile keys are stored inside the cryptoprocessor.

4.3 Cryptoprocessor with no key storage

As in the *Cryptographic token and single-application processor* architecture, this system is also composed of two partitions separated by a security boundary and also provides *cryptoprocessor isolation*. However, unlike the previous architecture, in this system, the cryptoprocessor does not have any secure, persistent storage that could be used to store application keys.

If the cryptoprocessor is not capable of storing cryptographic material, then there is little use for a separate cryptoprocessor, since all data would have to be imported by the application.

The cryptoprocessor can provide useful services if it is able to store at least one key. This might be a hardware unique key that is burnt to one-time programmable memory during the manufacturing of the device. This key can be used for one or more purposes:

- Encrypt and authenticate data stored in the application processor.
- Communicate with a paired device.
- Allow the application to perform operations with keys that are derived from the hardware unique key.

4.4 Multi-client cryptoprocessor

This is an expanded variant of *Cryptographic token and single-application processor* on page 29. In this variant, the cryptoprocessor serves multiple applications that are mutually untrustworthy. This architecture provides *caller isolation*.

In this architecture, API calls are translated to remote procedure calls, which encode the identity of the client application. The cryptoprocessor carefully segments its internal storage to ensure that a client's data is never leaked to another client.

4.5 Multi-cryptoprocessor architecture

This system includes multiple cryptoprocessors. There are several reasons to have multiple cryptoprocessors:

- Different compromises between security and performance for different keys. Typically, this means a cryptoprocessor that runs on the same hardware as the main application and processes short-term secrets, a secure element or a similar separate chip that retains long-term secrets.
- Independent provisioning of certain secrets.
- A combination of a non-removable cryptoprocessor and removable ones, for example, a smartcard or HSM.
- Cryptoprocessors managed by different stakeholders who do not trust each other.

The keystore implementation needs to dispatch each request to the correct processor. For example:

- All requests involving a non-extractable key must be processed in the cryptoprocessor that holds that key.
- Requests involving a persistent key must be processed in the cryptoprocessor that corresponds to the key's lifetime value.
- Requests involving a volatile key might target a cryptoprocessor based on parameters supplied by the application, or based on considerations such as performance inside the implementation.

5 Library conventions

5.1 Header files

The header file for the Crypto API has the name psa/crypto.h. All of the API elements that are provided by an implementation must be visible to an application program that includes this header file.

#include "psa/crypto.h"

Implementations must provide their own version of the psa/crypto.h header file. Implementations can provide a subset of the API defined in this specification and a subset of the available algorithms. *Example header file* on page 340 provides an incomplete, example header file which includes all of the API elements. See also *Implementation considerations* on page 37.

The Crypto API uses the status code definitions that are shared with the other PSA Certified APIs. PSA Certified Status code API [PSA-STAT] defines these status codes in the psa/error.h header file. Applications

are not required to explicitly include the psa/error.h header file when using these status codes with the Crypto API. See *Status codes* on page 43.

5.2 API conventions

The interface in this specification is defined in terms of C macros, data types, and functions.

5.2.1 Identifier names

All of the identifiers defined in the Crypto API begin with the prefix psa_, for types and functions, or PSA_ for macros.

Future versions of this specification will use the same prefix for additional API elements. It is recommended that applications and implementations do not use this prefix for their own identifiers, to avoid a potential conflict with a future version of the Crypto API.

5.2.2 Basic types

This specification makes use of standard C data types, including the fixed-width integer types from the ISO C99 specification update [C99]. The following standard C types are used:

```
int32_ta 32-bit signed integeruint8_tan 8-bit unsigned integeruint16_ta 16-bit unsigned integeruint32_ta 32-bit unsigned integeruint64_ta 64-bit unsigned integersize_tan unsigned integer large enough to hold the size of an object in memory
```

5.2.3 Data types

Integral types are defined for specific API elements to provide clarity in the interface definition, and to improve code readability. For example, psa_algorithm_t and psa_status_t.

For enum-like integral types, the value ø is usually reserved by the API to indicate an unspecified or invalid value.

Structure types are declared using typedef instead of a struct tag, also to improve code readability.

Fully-defined types must be declared exactly as defined in this specification. Types that are not fully defined in this specification must be defined by an implementation. See *Implementation-specific types* on page 37.

5.2.4 Constants

Constant values are defined using C macros. Constants defined in this specification have names that are all upper-case.

A constant macro evaluates to a compile-time constant expression.

5.2.5 Function-like macros

Function-like macros are C macros that take parameters, providing supporting functionality in the API. Function-like macros defined in this specification have names that are all upper-case.

Function-like macros are permitted to evaluate each argument multiple times or zero times. Providing arguments that have side effects will result in IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED behavior, and is non-portable.

If all of the arguments to a function-like macro are compile-time constant expressions, the then result evaluates to a compile-time constant expression.

If an argument to a function-like macro has an invalid value (for example, a value outside the domain of the function-like macro), then the result is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

5.2.6 Functions

Functions defined in this specification have names that are all lower-case.

An implementation is permitted to declare any API function with static inline linkage, instead of the default extern linkage.

An implementation is permitted to also define a function-like macro with the same name as a function in this specification. If an implementation defines a function-like macro for a function from this specification, then:

- The implementation must also provide a definition of the function. This enables an application to take the address of a function defined in this specification.
- The function-like macro must expand to code that evaluates each of its arguments exactly once, as if the call was made to a C function. This enables an application to safely use arbitrary expressions as arguments to a function defined in this specification.

If a non-pointer argument to a function has an invalid value (for example, a value outside the domain of the function), then the function will normally return an error, as specified in the function definition. See also *Error handling*.

If a pointer argument to a function has an invalid value (for example, a pointer outside the address space of the program, or a null pointer), the result is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. See also *Pointer conventions* on page 34.

5.3 Error handling

5.3.1 Return status

Almost all functions return a status indication of type psa_status_t. This is an enumeration of integer values, with Ø (PSA_SUCCESS) indicating successful operation and other values indicating errors. The exceptions are functions which only access objects that are intended to be implemented as simple data structures. Such functions cannot fail and either return void or a data value.

Unless specified otherwise, if multiple error conditions apply, an implementation is free to return any of the applicable error codes. The choice of error code is considered an implementation quality issue. Different implementations can make different choices, for example to favor code size over ease of debugging or vice versa.

In particular, in the Crypto API, there are many conditions where the specification permits a function to return either PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED. For example, psa_hash_compute() is passed a hash algorithm that the implementation does not support, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is returned.

Note:

This flexibility supports the scalability design goal. It permits implementations to not check whether unsupported algorithm identifier and key type values are valid or invalid.

If the behavior is undefined, for example, if a function receives an invalid pointer as a parameter, this specification makes no guarantee that the function will return an error. Implementations are encouraged to return an error or halt the application in a manner that is appropriate for the platform if the undefined behavior condition can be detected. However, application developers need to be aware that undefined behavior conditions cannot be detected in general.

5.3.2 Behavior on error

In general, function calls must be implemented atomically:

- When a function returns a type other than psa_status_t, the requested action has been carried out.
- When a function returns the status PSA_SUCCESS, the requested action has been carried out.
- When a function returns another status of type psa_status_t, no action has been carried out. Unless otherwise documented by the API or the implementation, the content of output parameters is not defined. The state of the system has not changed, except as described below.

In general, functions that modify the system state, for example, creating or destroying a key, must leave the system state unchanged if they return an error code. There are specific conditions that can result in different behavior:

- The status PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE indicates that a parameter was not in a valid state for the requested action. This parameter might have been modified by the call and is now in an error state. The only valid action on an object in an error state is to abort it with the appropriate psa_xxx_abort() function. See Multi-part operations on page 25.
- The status PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA indicates that a key derivation object has reached its maximum capacity. The key derivation operation might have been modified by the call. Any further attempt to obtain output from the key-derivation operation will return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA.
- The status PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE indicates that the communication between the application and the cryptoprocessor has broken down. In this case, the cryptoprocessor must either finish the requested action successfully, or interrupt the action and roll back the system to its original state. Because it is often impossible to report the outcome to the application after a communication failure, this specification does not provide a way for the application to determine whether the action was successful.
- The statuses PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT, PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE and PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED might indicate data corruption in the system state. When a function returns one of these statuses, the system state might have changed from its previous state before the function call, even though the function call failed.
- Some system states cannot be rolled back, for example, the internal state of the random number generator or the content of access logs.

Implementation note

When a function returns an error status, it is recommended that implementations set output parameters to safe defaults to avoid leaking confidential data and limit risk, in case an application does not properly handle all errors.

5.4 Parameter conventions

5.4.1 Pointer conventions

Unless explicitly stated in the documentation of a function, all pointers must be valid pointers to an object of the specified type.

A parameter is considered a **buffer** if it points to an array of bytes. A buffer parameter always has the type uint8_t * or const uint8_t *, and always has an associated parameter indicating the size of the array. Note that a parameter of type void * is never considered a buffer.

All parameters of pointer type must be valid non-null pointers, unless the pointer is to a buffer of length 0 or the function's documentation explicitly describes the behavior when the pointer is null. Passing a null pointer as a function parameter in other cases is expected to abort the caller on implementations where this is the normal behavior for a null pointer dereference.

Pointers to input parameters can be in read-only memory. Output parameters must be in writable memory. Output parameters that are not buffers must also be readable, and the implementation must be able to write to a non-buffer output parameter and read back the same value, as explained in *Stability of parameters* on page 35.

5.4.2 Input buffer sizes

For input buffers, the parameter convention is:

```
const uint8_t *foo
Pointer to the first byte of the data. The pointer can be invalid if the buffer size is 0.

size_t foo_length
Size of the buffer in bytes.
```

The interface never uses input-output buffers.

5.4.3 Output buffer sizes

For output buffers, the parameter convention is:

```
uint8_t *foo
Pointer to the first byte of the data. The pointer can be invalid if the buffer size is 0.

size_t foo_size
The size of the buffer in bytes.

size_t *foo_length
On successful return, contains the length of the output in bytes.
```

The content of the data buffer and of *foo_length on errors is unspecified, unless explicitly mentioned in the function description. They might be unmodified or set to a safe default. On successful completion, the content of the buffer between the offsets *foo_length and foo_size is also unspecified.

Functions return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the buffer size is insufficient to carry out the requested operation. The interface defines macros to calculate a sufficient buffer size for each operation that has an output buffer. These macros return compile-time constants if their arguments are compile-time constants, so they are suitable for static or stack allocation. Refer to an individual function's documentation for the associated output size macro.

Some functions always return exactly as much data as the size of the output buffer. In this case, the parameter convention changes to:

uint8_t *foo

Pointer to the first byte of the output. The pointer can be invalid if the buffer size is 0.

size_t foo_length

The number of bytes to return in foo if successful.

5.4.4 Overlap between parameters

Output parameters that are not buffers must not overlap with any input buffer or with any other output parameter. Otherwise, the behavior is undefined.

Output buffers can overlap with input buffers. In this event, the implementation must return the same result as if the buffers did not overlap. The implementation must behave as if it had copied all the inputs into temporary memory, as far as the result is concerned. However, it is possible that overlap between parameters will affect the performance of a function call. Overlap might also affect memory management security if the buffer is located in memory that the caller shares with another security context, as described in *Stability of parameters*.

5.4.5 Stability of parameters

In some environments, it is possible for the content of a parameter to change while a function is executing. It might also be possible for the content of an output parameter to be read before the function terminates. This can happen if the application is multithreaded. In some implementations, memory can be shared between security contexts, for example, between tasks in a multitasking operating system, between a user land task and the kernel, or between the Non-secure world and the Secure world of a trusted execution environment.

This section describes the assumptions that an implementation can make about function parameters, and the guarantees that the implementation must provide about how it accesses parameters.

Parameters that are not buffers are assumed to be under the caller's full control. In a shared memory environment, this means that the parameter must be in memory that is exclusively accessible by the application. In a multithreaded environment, this means that the parameter must not be modified during the execution, and the value of an output parameter is undetermined until the function returns. The implementation can read an input parameter that is not a buffer multiple times and expect to read the same data. The implementation can write to an output parameter that is not a buffer and expect to read back the value that it last wrote. The implementation has the same permissions on buffers that overlap with a buffer in the opposite direction.

In an environment with multiple threads or with shared memory, the implementation carefully accesses non-overlapping buffer parameters in order to prevent any security risk resulting from the content of the buffer being modified or observed during the execution of the function. In an input buffer that does not overlap with an output buffer, the implementation reads each byte of the input once, at most. The implementation does not read from an output buffer that does not overlap with an input buffer.

Additionally, the implementation does not write data to a non-overlapping output buffer if this data is potentially confidential and the implementation has not yet verified that outputting this data is authorized.

Unless otherwise specified, the implementation must not keep a reference to any parameter once a function call has returned.

5.5 Key types and algorithms

Types of cryptographic keys and cryptographic algorithms are encoded separately. Each is encoded by using an integral type: psa_key_type_t and psa_algorithm_t, respectively.

There is some overlap in the information conveyed by key types and algorithms. Both types contain enough information, so that the meaning of an algorithm type value does not depend on what type of key it is used with, and vice versa. However, the particular instance of an algorithm might depend on the key type. For example, the algorithm PSA_ALG_GCM can be instantiated as any AEAD algorithm using the GCM mode over a block cipher. The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

Key types do not encode the key size. For example, AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 share a key type PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES.

5.5.1 Structure of key types and algorithms

Both types use a partial bitmask structure, which allows the analysis and building of values from parts. However, the interface defines constants, so that applications do not need to depend on the encoding, and an implementation might only care about the encoding for code size optimization.

The encodings follows a few conventions:

- The highest bit is a vendor flag. Current and future versions of this specification will only define values where this bit is clear. Implementations that wish to define additional implementation-specific values must use values where this bit is set, to avoid conflicts with future versions of this specification.
- The next few highest bits indicate the algorithm or key category: hash, MAC, symmetric cipher, asymmetric encryption, and so on.
- The following bits identify a family of algorithms or keys in a category-dependent manner.
- In some categories and algorithm families, the lowest-order bits indicate a variant in a systematic way. For example, algorithm families that are parametrized around a hash function encode the hash in the 8 lowest bits.

The Algorithm and key type encoding on page 356 appendix provides a full definition of the encoding of key types and algorithm identifiers.

5.6 Concurrent calls

In some environments, an application can make calls to the Crypto API in separate threads. In such an environment, *concurrent calls* are two or more calls to the API whose execution can overlap in time.

Sequential consistency

The result of two or more concurrent calls must be consistent with the same set of calls being executed sequentially in some order, provided that the calls obey the following constraints:

- There is no overlap between an output parameter of one call and an input or output parameter of another call. Overlap between input parameters is permitted.
- A call to psa_destroy_key() must not overlap with a concurrent call to any of the following functions:
 - Any call where the same key identifier is a parameter to the call.
 - Any call in a multi-part operation, where the same key identifier was used as a parameter to a previous step in the multi-part operation.
- Concurrent calls must not use the same operation object.

If any of these constraints are violated, the behavior is undefined.

The consistency requirement does not apply to errors that arise from resource failures or limitations. For example, errors resulting from resource exhaustion can arise in concurrent execution that do not arise in sequential execution.

As an example of this rule: suppose two calls are executed concurrently which both attempt to create a new key with the same key identifier that is not already in the key store. Then:

- If one call returns PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS, then the other call must succeed.
- If one of the calls succeeds, then the other must fail: either with PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or some other error status.
- Both calls can fail with error codes that are not PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS.

Parameter stability

If the application concurrently modifies an input parameter while a function call is in progress, the behavior is undefined.

Individual implementations can provide additional guarantees.

6 Implementation considerations

6.1 Implementation-specific aspects of the interface

6.1.1 Implementation profile

Implementations can implement a subset of the API and a subset of the available algorithms. The implemented subset is known as the implementation's profile. The documentation for each implementation must describe the profile that it implements. This specification's companion documents also define a number of standard profiles.

6.1.2 Implementation-specific types

This specification defines a number of implementation-specific types, which represent objects whose content depends on the implementation. These are defined as C typedef types in this specification, with a comment /* implementation-defined type */ in place of the underlying type definition. For some types the specification constrains the type, for example, by requiring that the type is a struct, or that it is convertible to and from an unsigned integer. In the implementation's version of psa/crypto.h, these types need to be defined as complete C types so that objects of these types can be instantiated by application code.

Applications that rely on the implementation specific definition of any of these types might not be portable to other implementations of this specification.

6.1.3 Implementation-specific macros

Some macro constants and function-like macros are precisely defined by this specification. The use of an exact definition is essential if the definition can appear in more than one header file within a compilation.

Other macros that are defined by this specification have a macro body that is implementation-specific. The description of an implementation-specific macro can optionally specify each of the following requirements:

- Input domains: the macro must be valid for arguments within the input domain.
- A return type: the macro result must be compatible with this type.
- Output range: the macro result must lie in the output range.
- Computed value: A precise mapping of valid input to output values.

Each implementation-specific macro is in one of following categories:

Specification-defined value

The result type and computed value of the macro expression is defined by this specification, but the definition of the macro body is provided by the implementation.

These macros are indicated in this specification using the comment:

```
/* specification-defined value */
```

For function-like macros with specification-defined values:

- Example implementations are provided in an appendix to this specification. See *Example macro implementations* on page 369.
- The expected computation for valid and supported input arguments will be defined as pseudo-code in a future version of this specification.

Implementation-defined value

The value of the macro expression is implementation-defined.

For some macros, the computed value is derived from the specification of one or more cryptographic algorithms. In these cases, the result must exactly match the value in those external specifications.

These macros are indicated in this specification using the comment:

```
/* implementation-defined value */
```

Some of these macros compute a result based on an algorithm or key type. If an implementation defines vendor-specific algorithms or key types, then it must provide an implementation for such macros that takes all relevant algorithms and types into account. Conversely, an implementation that does not support a certain algorithm or key type can define such macros in a simpler way that does not take unsupported argument values into account.

Some macros define the minimum sufficient output buffer size for certain functions. In some cases, an implementation is permitted to require a buffer size that is larger than the theoretical minimum. An implementation must define minimum-size macros in such a way that it guarantees that the buffer of the resulting size is sufficient for the output of the corresponding function. Refer to each macro's documentation for the applicable requirements.

6.2 Porting to a platform

6.2.1 Platform assumptions

This specification is designed for a C99 platform. The interface is defined in terms of C macros, functions and objects.

The specification assumes 8-bit bytes, and "byte" and "octet" are used synonymously.

6.2.2 Platform-specific types

The specification makes use of some types defined in C99. These types must be defined in the implementation version of psa/crypto.h or by a header included in this file. The following C99 types are used:

uint8_t, uint16_t, uint32_t

Unsigned integer types with 8, 16 and 32 value bits respectively. These types are defined by the C99 header stdint.h.

6.2.3 Cryptographic hardware support

Implementations are encouraged to make use of hardware accelerators where available. A future version of this specification will define a function interface that calls drivers for hardware accelerators and external cryptographic hardware.

6.3 Security requirements and recommendations

6.3.1 Error detection

Implementations that provide *isolation* between the caller and the cryptography processing environment must validate parameters to ensure that the cryptography processing environment is protected from attacks caused by passing invalid parameters.

Even implementations that do not provide isolation are recommended to detect bad parameters and fail-safe where possible.

6.3.2 Indirect object references

Implementations can use different strategies for allocating key identifiers, and other types of indirect object reference.

Implementations that provide isolation between the caller and the cryptography processing environment must consider the threats relating to abuse and misuse of key identifiers and other indirect resource references. For example, multi-part operations can be implemented as backend state to which the client only maintains an indirect reference in the application's multi-part operation object.

An implementation that supports multiple callers must implement strict isolation of API resources between different callers. For example, a client must not be able to obtain a reference to another client's key by guessing the key identifier value. Isolation of key identifiers can be achieved in several ways. For example:

• There is a single identifier namespace for all clients, and the implementation verifies that the client is the owner of the identifier when looking up the key.

• Each client has an independent identifier namespace, and the implementation uses a client specific identifier-to-key mapping when looking up the key.

After a volatile key identifier is destroyed, it is recommended that the implementation does not immediately reuse the same identifier value for a different key. This reduces the risk of an attack that is able to exploit a key identifier reuse vulnerability within an application.

6.3.3 Memory cleanup

Implementations must wipe all sensitive data from memory when it is no longer used. It is recommended that they wipe this sensitive data as soon as possible. All temporary data used during the execution of a function, such as stack buffers, must be wiped before the function returns. All data associated with an object, such as a multi-part operation, must be wiped, at the latest, when the object becomes inactive, for example, when a multi-part operation is aborted.

The rationale for this non-functional requirement is to minimize impact if the system is compromised. If sensitive data is wiped immediately after use, only data that is currently in use can be leaked. It does not compromise past data.

6.3.4 Managing key material

In implementations that have limited volatile memory for keys, the implementation is permitted to store a *volatile key* to a temporary location in non-volatile memory. The implementation must delete any non-volatile copies when the key is destroyed, and it is recommended that these copies are deleted as soon as the key is reloaded into volatile memory. An implementation that uses this method must clear any stored volatile key material on startup.

Implementing the memory cleanup rule (see *Memory cleanup*) for a *persistent key* can result in inefficiencies when the same persistent key is used sequentially in multiple cryptographic operations. The inefficiency stems from loading the key from non-volatile storage on each use of the key. The PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE usage flag in a key policy allows an application to request that the implementation does not cleanup non-essential copies of persistent key material, effectively suspending the cleanup rules for that key. The effects of this policy depend on the implementation and the key, for example:

- For volatile keys or keys in a secure element with no open/close mechanism, this is likely to have no effect.
- For persistent keys that are not in a secure element, this allows the implementation to keep the key in a memory cache outside of the memory used by ongoing operations.
- For keys in a secure element with an open/close mechanism, this is a hint to keep the key open in the secure element.

The application can indicate when it has finished using the key by calling <code>psa_purge_key()</code>, to request that the key material is cleaned from memory.

6.3.5 Safe outputs on error

Implementations must ensure that confidential data is not written to output parameters before validating that the disclosure of this confidential data is authorized. This requirement is particularly important for implementations where the caller can share memory with another security context, as described in *Stability of parameters* on page 35.

In most cases, the specification does not define the content of output parameters when an error occurs. It is recommended that implementations try to ensure that the content of output parameters is as safe as possible, in case an application flaw or a data leak causes it to be used. In particular, Arm recommends that implementations avoid placing partial output in output buffers when an action is interrupted. The meaning of "safe as possible" depends on the implementation, as different environments require different compromises between implementation complexity, overall robustness and performance. Some common strategies are to leave output parameters unchanged, in case of errors, or zeroing them out.

6.3.6 Attack resistance

Cryptographic code tends to manipulate high-value secrets, from which other secrets can be unlocked. As such, it is a high-value target for attacks. There is a vast body of literature on attack types, such as side channel attacks and glitch attacks. Typical side channels include timing, cache access patterns, branch-prediction access patterns, power consumption, radio emissions and more.

This specification does not specify particular requirements for attack resistance. Implementers are encouraged to consider the attack resistance desired in each use case and design their implementation accordingly. Security standards for attack resistance for particular targets might be applicable in certain use cases.

6.4 Other implementation considerations

6.4.1 Philosophy of resource management

The specification allows most functions to return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY. This gives implementations the freedom to manage memory as they please.

Alternatively, the interface is also designed for conservative strategies of memory management. An implementation can avoid dynamic memory allocation altogether by obeying certain restrictions:

- Pre-allocate memory for a predefined number of keys, each with sufficient memory for all key types that can be stored.
- For multi-part operations, in an implementation with *no isolation*, place all the data that needs to be carried over from one step to the next in the operation object. The application is then fully in control of how memory is allocated for the operation.
- In an implementation with *isolation*, pre-allocate memory for a predefined number of operations inside the cryptoprocessor.

7 Usage considerations

7.1 Security recommendations

7.1.1 Always check for errors

Most functions in the Crypto API can return errors. All functions that can fail have the return type psa_status_t. A few functions cannot fail, and thus, return void or some other type.

If an error occurs, unless otherwise specified, the content of the output parameters is undefined and must not be used.

Some common causes of errors include:

- In implementations where the keys are stored and processed in a separate environment from the application, all functions that need to access the cryptography processing environment might fail due to an error in the communication between the two environments.
- If an algorithm is implemented with a hardware accelerator, which is logically separate from the application processor, the accelerator might fail, even when the application processor keeps running normally.
- Most functions might fail due to a lack of resources. However, some implementations guarantee that certain functions always have sufficient memory.
- All functions that access persistent keys might fail due to a storage failure.
- All functions that require randomness might fail due to a lack of entropy. Implementations are encouraged to seed the random generator with sufficient entropy during the execution of psa_crypto_init(). However, some security standards require periodic reseeding from a hardware random generator, which can fail.

7.1.2 Shared memory and concurrency

Some environments allow applications to be multithreaded, while others do not. In some environments, applications can share memory with a different security context. In environments with multithreaded applications or shared memory, applications must be written carefully to avoid data corruption or leakage. This specification requires the application to obey certain constraints.

In general, the Crypto API allows either one writer or any number of simultaneous readers, on any given object. In other words, if two or more calls access the same object concurrently, then the behavior is only well-defined if all the calls are only reading from the object and do not modify it. Read accesses include reading memory by input parameters and reading keystore content by using a key. For more details, refer to *Concurrent calls* on page 36.

If an application shares memory with another security context, it can pass shared memory blocks as input buffers or output buffers, but not as non-buffer parameters. For more details, refer to *Stability of parameters* on page 35.

7.1.3 Cleaning up after use

To minimize impact if the system is compromised, it is recommended that applications wipe all sensitive data from memory when it is no longer used. That way, only data that is currently in use can be leaked, and past data is not compromised.

Wiping sensitive data includes:

- Clearing temporary buffers in the stack or on the heap.
- Aborting operations if they will not be finished.
- Destroying keys that are no longer used.

8 Library management reference

8.1 Status codes

The Crypto API uses the status code definitions that are shared with the other PSA Certified APIs. The Crypto API also provides some Crypto API-specific status codes, see *Error codes specific to the Crypto API* on page 45.

The following elements are defined in psa/error.h from PSA Certified Status code API [PSA-STAT] (previously defined in [PSA-FFM]):

```
typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
                                         ((psa_status_t)-132)
#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
                                         ((psa_status_t)-133)
#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
                                         ((psa_status_t)-134)
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
                                         ((psa_status_t)-135)
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-136)
#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-137)
#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
                                         ((psa_status_t)-138)
#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
                                         ((psa_status_t)-139)
#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
                                         ((psa_status_t)-140)
#define PSA ERROR INSUFFICIENT MEMORY
                                         ((psa_status_t)-141)
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-142)
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
                                         ((psa_status_t)-143)
#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-146)
#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-147)
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
                                         ((psa_status_t)-149)
#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
                                         ((psa_status_t)-151)
#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
                                         ((psa_status_t)-152)
#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
                                         ((psa_status_t)-153)
```

These definitions must be available to an application that includes the psa/crypto.h header file.

Implementation note

An implementation is permitted to define the status code interface elements within the psa/crypto.h header file, or to define them via inclusion of a psa/error.h header file that is shared with the implementation of other PSA Certified APIs.

8.1.1 Common error codes

Some of the common status codes have a more precise meaning when returned by a function in the Crypto API, compared to the definitions in [PSA-STAT]. See also *Error handling* on page 32.

| Error code | Meaning in the Crypto API |
|-------------------------------|---|
| PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED | [PSA-STAT] recommends the use of PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT for invalid parameter values. |
| | In the Crypto API, this is relaxed for algorithm identifier and key type parameters. It is recommended to return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT for invalid values, but PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED is also allowed, to permit implementations to avoid having to recognize all the cryptographic mechanisms that are defined in the PSA specification but not provided by that particular implementation. |
| PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT | [PSA-STAT] recommends the use of PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED for unsupported parameter values. |
| | In the Crypto API, either PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED can be returned when unsupported algorithm identifier or key type parameters are used. This allows implementations to avoid having to recognize all the cryptographic mechanisms that are defined in the PSA specification but not provided by that particular implementation. |
| PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE | A key identifier does not refer to an existing key. See also <i>Key identifiers</i> on page 23. |
| PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE | Multi-part operations return this error when one of the functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions. |
| | Implementations can return this error if the caller has not initialized the library by a call to psa_crypto_init(). |
| PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL | Applications can call the PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function description to determine a sufficient buffer size. |
| PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE | When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other data might fail even if the data is still readable but its integrity cannot be guaranteed. |
| PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED | This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still protected. Implementations must only return this error code to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed, or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now considered compromised. |
| PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT | When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other data might fail even if the data is still readable but its integrity cannot be guaranteed. |

8.1.2 Error codes specific to the Crypto API

The following elements are defined in the psa/crypto.h header file.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY (macro)

A status code that indicates that there is not enough entropy to generate random data needed for the requested action.

#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148)

This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator. Application writers must note that this error can be returned not only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure to certain attacks.

It is recommended that implementations do not return this error after psa_crypto_init() has succeeded. This can be achieved if the implementation generates sufficient entropy during initialization and subsequently a cryptographically secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG) is used. However, implementations might return this error at any time, for example, if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded during normal operation.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING (macro)

A status code that indicates that the decrypted padding is incorrect.

#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150)

Warning

In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding is correct, down to precise timing. Protocols that use authenticated encryption are recommended for use by applications, rather than plain encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of unauthenticated data, the application writer must take care not to reveal whether the padding is invalid.

Implementations must handle padding carefully, aiming to make it impossible for an external observer to distinguish between valid and invalid padding. In particular, it is recommended that the timing of a decryption operation does not depend on the validity of the padding.

8.2 Crypto API library

8.2.1 API version

PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR (macro)

The major version of this implementation of the Crypto API.

#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1

PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR (macro)

The minor version of this implementation of the Crypto API.

#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 3

8.2.2 Library initialization

psa_crypto_init (function)

Library initialization.

psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

It is recommended that applications call this function before calling any other function in this module.

Applications are permitted to call this function more than once. Once a call succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed.

If the application calls any function that returns a psa_status_t result code before calling psa_crypto_init(), the following will occur:

- If initialization of the library is essential for secure operation of the function, the implementation must return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or other appropriate error.
- If failure to initialize the library does not compromise the security of the function, the implementation must either provide the expected result for the function, or return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or other appropriate error.

Note:

The following scenarios are examples where an implementation can require that the library has been initialized by calling psa_crypto_init():

- A client-server implementation, in which psa_crypto_init() establishes the communication with the server. No key management or cryptographic operation can be performed until this is done.
- An implementation in which psa_crypto_init() initializes the random bit generator, and no operations that require the RNG can be performed until this is done. For example, random data, key, IV, or nonce generation; randomized signature or encryption; and algorithms that are implemented with blinding.

Warning

The set of functions that depend on successful initialization of the library is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. Applications that rely on calling functions before initializing the library might not be portable to other implementations.

9 Key management reference

9.1 Key attributes

Key attributes are managed in a psa_key_attributes_t object. These are used when a key is created, after which the key attributes are fixed. Attributes of an existing key can be queried using psa_get_key_attributes().

Description of the individual attributes is found in the following sections:

- Key types on page 51
- Key identifiers on page 91
- Key lifetimes on page 83
- Key policies on page 93

9.1.1 Managing key attributes

psa_key_attributes_t (typedef)

The type of an object containing key attributes.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_key_attributes_t;
```

This is the object that represents the metadata of a key object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes:

- The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier and its lifetime.
- The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of the permitted algorithm(s).
- Information about the key itself: the key type and its size.
- Implementations can define additional attributes.

The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key. Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered highly confidential.

Note:

Implementations are recommended to define the attribute object as a simple data structure, with fields corresponding to the individual key attributes. In such an implementation, each function psa_set_key_xxx() sets a field and the corresponding function psa_get_key_xxx() retrieves the value of the field.

An implementations can report attribute values that are equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. For example, an implementation can use a more compact representation for types where many bit-patterns are invalid or not supported, and store all values that it does not support as a special marker value. In such an implementation, after setting an invalid value, the corresponding get function returns an invalid value which might not be the one that was originally stored.

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

An attribute object can contain references to auxiliary resources, for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute object is optional if the object has only been modified by the following functions since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes():

```
• psa_set_key_id()
```

- psa_set_key_lifetime()
- psa_set_key_type()
- psa_set_key_bits()
- psa_set_key_usage_flags()
- psa_set_key_algorithm()

Before calling any function on a key attribute object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, for example:

```
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
```

A freshly initialized attribute object contains the following values:

| Attribute | Value |
|----------------|--|
| lifetime | PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. |
| key identifier | PSA_KEY_ID_NULL — which is not a valid key identifier. |
| type | PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE — meaning that the type is unspecified. |
| key size | ${ m 0-meaning}$ that the size is unspecified. |
| usage flags | ø — which permits no usage except exporting a public key. |
| algorithm | PSA_ALG_NONE — which does not permit cryptographic usage, but permits exporting. |

Usage

A typical sequence to create a key is as follows:

- 1. Create and initialize an attribute object.
- 2. If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id(). Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default location.
- 3. Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and psa_set_key_algorithm().
- 4. Set the key type with psa_set_key_type(). Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key().
- 5. When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or psa_generate_key_custom(), or deriving a key with psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), set the desired key size with psa_set_key_bits().
- 6. Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_custom(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), psa_key_agreement(), psa_encapsulate(), psa_decapsulate(), psa_pake_get_shared_key(), Or psa_copy_key(). This function reads the attribute object, creates a key with these attributes, and outputs an identifier for the newly created key.
- 7. Optionally call psa_reset_key_attributes(), now that the attribute object is no longer needed. Currently this call is not required as the attributes defined in this specification do not require additional resources beyond the object itself.

A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows:

- Call psa_get_key_attributes().
- 2. Call psa_get_key_xxx() functions to retrieve the required attribute(s).
- 3. Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that can be used by the attribute object.

Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes.

PSA KEY ATTRIBUTES INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute object of type psa_key_attributes_t.

#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT /* implementation-defined value */

psa_key_attributes_init (function)

Return an initial value for a key attribute object.

```
psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_key_attributes_t

psa_get_key_attributes (function)

Retrieve the attributes of a key.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to query.

attributes On entry, *attributes must be in a valid state. On successful return, it

contains the attributes of the key. On failure, it is equivalent to a

freshly-initialized attribute object.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. attributes contains the attributes of the key.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function first resets the attribute object as with psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of the given key into the given attribute object.

Note:

This function clears any previous content from the attribute object and therefore expects it to be in a valid state. In particular, if this function is called on a newly allocated attribute object, the attribute object must be initialized before calling this function.

Note:

This function might allocate memory or other resources. Once this function has been called on an

psa_reset_key_attributes (function)

Reset a key attribute object to a freshly initialized state.

```
void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes

The attribute object to reset.

Returns: void Description

The attribute object must be initialized as described in the documentation of the type psa_key_attributes_t before calling this function. Once the object has been initialized, this function can be called at any time.

This function frees any auxiliary resources that the object might contain.

9.2 Key types

9.2.1 Key type encoding

psa_key_type_t (typedef)

Encoding of a key type.

```
typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t;
```

This is a structured bitfield that identifies the category and type of key. The range of key type values is divided as follows:

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE == 0
```

Reserved as an invalid key type.

```
0x0001 - 0x7fff
```

Specification-defined key types. Key types defined by this standard always have bit 15 clear. Unallocated key type values in this range are reserved for future use.

```
0x8000 - 0xffff
```

Implementation-defined key types. Implementations that define additional key types must use an encoding with bit 15 set. The related support macros will be easier to write if these key encodings also respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings.

The Algorithm and key type encoding on page 356 appendix provides a full definition of the key type encoding.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE (macro)

An invalid key type value.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000)

Zero is not the encoding of any key type.

9.2.2 Key categories

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED (macro)

Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

Description

This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.

See Symmetric keys on page 53 for a list of symmetric key types.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC (macro)

Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

Description

See Asymmetric keys on page 62 for a list of asymmetric key types.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public part.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

9.2.3 Symmetric keys

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (macro)

Raw data.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001)
```

A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation. Applications can use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore.

The bit size of a raw key must be a non-zero multiple of 8. The maximum size of a raw key is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

Compatible algorithms

A key of this type can also be used as a non-secret input to the following key-derivation algorithms:

- PSA_ALG_HKDF
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC (macro)

HMAC kev.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100)
```

HMAC keys can be used in HMAC, or HMAC-based, algorithms. Although HMAC is parameterized by a specific hash algorithm, for example SHA-256, the hash algorithm is not specified in the key type. The permitted-algorithm policy for the key must specify a particular hash algorithm.

The bit size of an HMAC key must be a non-zero multiple of 8. An HMAC key is typically the same size as the output of the underlying hash algorithm. An HMAC key that is longer than the block size of the underlying hash algorithm will be hashed before use, see HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication [RFC2104] §2.

It is recommended that an application does not construct HMAC keys that are longer than the block size of the hash algorithm that will be used. It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether an HMAC key that is longer than the hash block size is supported.

If the application does not control the length of the data used to construct the HMAC key, it is recommended that the application hashes the key data, when it exceeds the hash block length, before constructing the HMAC key.

Note:

PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) provides the output size of hash algorithm alg, in bytes.

PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) provides the block size of hash algorithm alg, in bytes.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_HMAC
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC (secret input)

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (macro)

A secret for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200)
```

This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.

These keys can be used in the PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step of key-derivation algorithms.

The key policy determines which key-derivation algorithm the key can be used for.

The bit size of a secret for key derivation must be a non-zero multiple of 8. The maximum size of a secret for key derivation is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

Compatible algorithms

A key of this type can be used as the secret input to the following key-derivation algorithms:

- PSA_ALG_HKDF
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (macro)

A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t)0x1203)
```

This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with maximum or near-maximum entropy, but PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy, such as numerical PINs.

These keys can be used in the PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step of key-derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or key stretching algorithms.

These keys cannot be used in the PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input step of key-derivation algorithms, as the algorithms expect such an input to have high entropy.

The key policy determines which key-derivation algorithm the key can be used for, among the permissible subset defined above.

Compatible algorithms

A key of this type can be used as the password input to the following key-stretching algorithms:

- PSA ALG PBKDF2 HMAC
- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH (macro)

A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t)0x1205)
```

The key policy determines which key-derivation algorithm the key can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.

Compatible algorithms

A key of this type can be used to output or verify the result of the following key-stretching algorithms:

- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC
- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER (macro)

A secret value that can be used when computing a password hash.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t)0x1206)
```

The key policy determines which key-derivation algorithm the key can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.

Compatible algorithms

A key of this type can be used as the salt input to the following key-stretching algorithms:

- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC
- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES (macro)

Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400)
```

The size of the key is related to the AES algorithm variant. For algorithms except the XTS block cipher mode, the following key sizes are used:

- AES-128 uses a 16-byte key: key_bits = 128
- AES-192 uses a 24-byte key: key_bits = 192
- AES-256 uses a 32-byte key : key_bits = 256

For the XTS block cipher mode (PSA_ALG_XTS), the following key sizes are used:

- AES-128-XTS uses two 16-byte keys: key_bits = 256
- AES-192-XTS uses two 24-byte keys: key_bits = 384
- AES-256-XTS uses two 32-byte keys: key_bits = 512

The AES block cipher is defined in FIPS Publication 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [FIPS197].

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
- PSA_ALG_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_CTR
- PSA_ALG_CFB
- PSA_ALG_OFB
- PSA_ALG_XTS
- PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
- PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CCM
- PSA_ALG_GCM
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC (secret input)

Kev format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA (macro)

Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the ARIA block cipher.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2406)
```

The size of the key is related to the ARIA algorithm variant. For algorithms except the XTS block cipher mode, the following key sizes are used:

- ARIA-128 uses a 16-byte key: key_bits = 128
- ARIA-192 uses a 24-byte key: key_bits = 192
- ARIA-256 uses a 32-byte key: key_bits = 256

For the XTS block cipher mode (PSA_ALG_XTS), the following key sizes are used:

- ARIA-128-XTS uses two 16-byte keys: key_bits = 256
- ARIA-192-XTS uses two 24-byte keys: key_bits = 384
- ARIA-256-XTS uses two 32-byte keys: key_bits = 512

The ARIA block cipher is defined in A Description of the ARIA Encryption Algorithm [RFC5794].

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
- PSA_ALG_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_CTR
- PSA_ALG_CFB
- PSA_ALG_OFB
- PSA_ALG_XTS
- PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
- PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CCM
- PSA_ALG_GCM
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC (secret input)

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Kev derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES (macro)

Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301)
```

The size of the key determines which DES algorithm is used:

- Single DES uses an 8-byte key: key_bits = 64
- 2-key 3DES uses a 16-byte key: key_bits = 128
- 3-key 3DES uses a 24-byte key: key_bits = 192

Warning

Single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly deprecated and are only recommended for decrypting legacy data.

3-key 3DES is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

The DES and 3DES block ciphers are defined in NIST Special Publication 800-67: Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher [SP800-67].

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
- PSA_ALG_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_CTR
- PSA_ALG_CFB
- PSA_ALG_OFB

- PSA_ALG_XTS
- PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
- PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key. The parity bits in each 64-bit DES key element must be correct.

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will construct a single 64-bit DES key using the following process:

- 1. Draw an 8-byte string.
- 2. Set/clear the parity bits in each byte.
- 3. If the result is a forbidden weak key, discard the result and return to step 1.
- 4. Output the string.

For 2-key 3DES and 3-key 3DES, this process is repeated to derive the 2nd and 3rd keys, as required.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA (macro)

Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the Camellia block cipher.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403)
```

The size of the key is related to the Camellia algorithm variant. For algorithms except the XTS block cipher mode, the following key sizes are used:

- Camellia-128 uses a 16-byte key: key_bits = 128
- Camellia-192 uses a 24-byte key: key_bits = 192
- Camellia-256 uses a 32-byte key: key_bits = 256

For the XTS block cipher mode (PSA_ALG_XTS), the following key sizes are used:

- Camellia-128-XTS uses two 16-byte keys: key_bits = 256
- Camellia-192-XTS uses two 24-byte keys: key_bits = 384
- Camellia-256-XTS uses two 32-byte keys: key_bits = 512

The Camellia block cipher is defined in Specification of Camellia — a 128-bit Block Cipher [NTT-CAM] and also described in A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm [RFC3713].

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
- PSA_ALG_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_CTR
- PSA_ALG_CFB
- PSA_ALG_OFB
- PSA_ALG_XTS
- PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING

- PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
- PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CCM
- PSA_ALG_GCM
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC (secret input)

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4 (macro)

Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the SM4 block cipher.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2405)
```

For algorithms except the XTS block cipher mode, the SM4 key size is 128 bits (16 bytes).

For the XTS block cipher mode (PSA_ALG_XTS), the SM4 key size is 256 bits (two 16-byte keys).

The SM4 block cipher is defined in GM/T 0002-2012: SM4 block cipher algorithm [CSTC0002].

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
- PSA_ALG_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_CTR
- PSA_ALG_CFB
- PSA_ALG_OFB
- PSA_ALG_XTS
- PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
- PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING
- PSA_ALG_CCM
- PSA_ALG_GCM
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC (secret input)

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to $psa_{key_derivation_output_key()}$ will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 (macro)

Key for the ARC4 stream cipher.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2002)



Warning

The ARC4 cipher is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

The ARC4 cipher supports key sizes between 40 and 2048 bits, that are multiples of 8. (5 to 256 bytes) Use algorithm PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER to use this key with the ARC4 cipher.

Compatible algorithms

• PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER

Kev format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will draw m/8 bytes of output and use these as the key data, where m is the bit-size of the key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 (macro)

Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004)

The ChaCha20 key size is 256 bits (32 bytes).

- Use algorithm PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER to use this key with the ChaCha20 cipher for unauthenticated encryption. See PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER for details of this algorithm.
- Use algorithm PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 to use this key with the ChaCha20 cipher and Poly1305 authenticator for AEAD. See PSA ALG CHACHA20 POLY1305 for details of this algorithm.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER
- PSA ALG CHACHA20 POLY1305

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will draw 32 bytes of output and use these as the key data.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 (macro)

Key for the XChaCha20 stream cipher or the XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2007)

The XChaCha20 key size is 256 bits (32 bytes).

- Use algorithm PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER to use this key with the XChaCha20 cipher for unauthenticated encryption. See PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER for details of this algorithm.
- Use algorithm PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 to use this key with the XChaCha20 cipher and Poly1305 authenticator for AEAD. See PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 for details of this algorithm.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER
- PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key is the raw bytes of the key.

Kev derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will draw 32 bytes of output and use these as the key data.

9.2.4 Asymmetric keys

The Crypto API defines the following types of asymmetric key:

- RSA keys
- Elliptic Curve keys on page 64
- Diffie Hellman keys on page 74
- SPAKE2+ keys on page 78

9.2.5 RSA keys

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR (macro)

RSA key pair: both the private and public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001)
```

The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT

Key format

The data format for import and export of a key-pair is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by in *PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2* [RFC8017] as RSAPrivateKey, Version 0.

```
RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
   version
                       INTEGER, -- must be 0
   modulus
                       INTEGER, -- n
   publicExponent
                       INTEGER, -- e
   privateExponent
                       INTEGER, -- d
   prime1
                       INTEGER, -- p
   prime2
                       INTEGER, -- q
   exponent1
                       INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1)
   exponent2
                       INTEGER, -- d \mod (q-1)
   coefficient
                       INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p
```

Note:

Although it is possible to define an RSA key pair or private key using a subset of these elements, the output from psa_export_key() for an RSA key pair must include all of these elements.

See PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY for the data format used when exporting the public key with psa_export_public_key().

Key generation

A call to psa_generate_key() will generate an RSA key-pair with the default public exponent of 65537. The modulus n=pq is a product of two probabilistic primes p and q, where $2^{r-1} \le n < 2^r$ and r is the bit size specified in the attributes.

The exponent can be explicitly specified in non-default production parameters in a call to psa_generate_key_custom(). Use the following custom production parameters:

- The production parameters structure, custom, must have flags set to zero.
- If custom_data_length == 0, the default exponent value 65537 is used.
- The additional production parameter buffer custom_data is the public exponent, in little-endian byte order.

The exponent must be an odd integer greater than 1. An implementation must support an exponent of 65537, and is recommended to support an exponent of 3, and can support other values.

The maximum supported exponent value is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

Key derivation

The method used by psa_key_derivation_output_key() to derive an RSA key-pair is implementation defined.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

RSA public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001)
```

The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP (encryption only)
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT (encryption only)
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN (signature verification only)
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (signature verification only)
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS (signature verification only)
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT (signature verification only)

Key format

The data format for import and export of a public key is the DER encoding of the representation defined by Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile [RFC3279] §2.3.1 as RSAPublicKey.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA (macro)

Whether a key type is an RSA key. This includes both key pairs and public keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

9.2.6 Elliptic Curve keys

Elliptic curve keys are grouped into families of related curves. A keys for a specific curve is specified by a combination of the elliptic curve family and the bit-size of the key.

There are three categories of elliptic curve key, shown in Table 6 on page 65. The curve type affects the key format, the key-derivation procedure, and the algorithms which the key can be used with.

Table 6 Types of elliptic curve key

| Curve type | Curve families |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Weierstrass | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 |
| | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP |
| Montgomery | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY |
| Twisted Edwards | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS |

psa_ecc_family_t (typedef)

The type of identifiers of an elliptic curve family.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t;
```

The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY() macros.

The specific ECC curve within a family is identified by the key_bits attribute of the key.

The range of elliptic curve family identifier values is divided as follows:

Invalid. Values in this range must not be used.

```
0×00
              Reserved. Not allocated to an ECC family.
0 \times 01 - 0 \times 7f
              ECC family identifiers defined by this standard. Unallocated values in this range are reserved
              for future use.
0x80 - 0xff
```

The least significant bit of a elliptic curve family identifier is a parity bit for the whole key type. See Asymmetric key encoding on page 367 for details of the encoding of asymmetric key types.

Implementation note

To provide other elliptic curve families, it is recommended that an implementation defines a key type with bit 15 set, which indicates an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED key type.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Elliptic curve key pair: both the private and public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

curve A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the ECC curve family

to be used.

Description

The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve, that is, the bit size of q' for a curve over a field \mathbb{F}_q . See the documentation of each elliptic curve family for details.

Compatible algorithms

Table 7 shows the compatible algorithms for each type of elliptic curve key-pair.

Table 7 Compatible algorithms for elliptic curve key-pairs

| Curve type | Compatible algorithms |
|-----------------|---|
| Weierstrass | Weierstrass curve key-pairs can be used in asymmetric signature, key-agreement, and key-encapsulation algorithms. |
| | PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDH |
| | PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 |
| Montgomery | Montgomery curve key-pairs can be used in key-agreement and key-encapsulation algorithms. |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDH |
| | PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 |
| Twisted Edwards | Twisted Edwards curve key-pairs can only be used in asymmetric signature algorithms. |
| | PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ED25519PH (Edwards25519 only) |
| | PSA_ALG_ED448PH (Edwards448 only) |

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key-pair depends on the type of elliptic curve. Table 8 on page 67 shows the format for each type of elliptic curve key-pair.

See PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY for the data format used when exporting the public key with psa_export_public_key().

| Curve type | Key-pair format |
|-----------------|--|
| Weierstrass | The key data is the content of the privateKey field of the ECPrivateKey format defined by Elliptic Curve Private Key Structure [RFC5915]. |
| | This is a $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ -byte string in big-endian order, where m is the key size in bits. |
| Montgomery | The key data is the scalar value of the 'private key' in little-endian order as defined by <i>Elliptic Curves for Security</i> [RFC7748] §6. The value must have the forced bits set to zero or one as specified by decodeScalar25519() and decodeScalar448() in [RFC7748] §5. |
| | This is a $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ -byte string where m is the key size in bits. This is 32 bytes for Curve25519, and 56 bytes for Curve448. |
| Twisted Edwards | The key data is the private key, as defined by Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032]. |
| | This is a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, and a 57-byte string for Edwards448. |

Key derivation

The key-derivation method used when calling psa_key_derivation_output_key() depends on the type of elliptic curve. Table 9 shows the derivation method for each type of elliptic curve key.

Table 9 Key derivation for elliptic curve keys

| Curve type | Key derivation |
|-------------|--|
| Weierstrass | A Weierstrass elliptic curve private key is $d \in [1, N-1]$, where N is the order of the curve's base point for ECC. |
| | Let m be the bit size of N , such that $2^{m-1} \le N < 2^m$. This function generates the private key using the following process: |
| | 1. Draw a byte string of length $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ bytes. |
| | 2. If m is not a multiple of 8, set the most significant $8 * \lceil m/8 \rceil - m'$ bits of the first byte in the string to zero. |
| | 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a big-endian byte-string. |
| | 4. If $k > N-2$, discard the result and return to step 1. |
| | 5. Output $d = k + 1$ as the private key. |
| | This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically the methods titled Key-Pair Generation by Testing Candidates in [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.2.2 or FIPS Publication 186-4: Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [FIPS186-4] §B.4.2. |

continues on next page

Table 9 - continued from previous page

| Curve type | Key derivation |
|-----------------|--|
| Montgomery | Draw a byte string whose length is determined by the curve, and set the mandatory bits accordingly. That is: |
| | Curve25519 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte string and process it as specified in <i>Elliptic Curves for Security</i> [RFC7748] §5. |
| | Curve448 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte string and process it as specified in [RFC7748] §5. |
| Twisted Edwards | Draw a byte string whose length is determined by the curve, and use this as the private key. That is: |
| | Ed25519 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte string. Ed448 (PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 57-byte string. |

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Elliptic curve public key.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

curve

A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the ECC curve family to be used.

Description

The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding private key. See PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each elliptic curve family for details.

Compatible algorithms

Table 10 on page 69 shows the compatible algorithms for each type of elliptic curve public key.

Note:

For key agreement, the public key of the peer is provided to the Crypto API as a buffer. This avoids the need to import the public-key data that is received from the peer, just to carry out the key-agreement algorithm.

Table 10 Compatible algorithms for elliptic curve public keys

| Curve type | Compatible algorithms |
|-----------------|--|
| Weierstrass | Weierstrass curve public keys can be used in asymmetric signature and key-encapsulation algorithms. |
| | PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY |
| | PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 |
| Montgomery | Montgomery curve public keys can only be used in key-encapsulation algorithms. PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 |
| Twisted Edwards | Twisted Edwards curve public keys can only be used in asymmetric signature algorithms. |
| | PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA |
| | PSA_ALG_ED25519PH (Edwards25519 only) |
| | PSA_ALG_ED448PH (Edwards448 only) |

Key format

The data format for import and export of the public key depends on the type of elliptic curve. Table 11 shows the format for each type of elliptic curve public key.

 Table 11 Public-key formats for elliptic curve keys

| Curve type | Public-key format |
|-------------|---|
| Weierstrass | The key data is the uncompressed representation of an elliptic curve point as an octet string defined in SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1] §2.3.3. If m is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of q for a curve over \mathbb{F}_q , then the representation of point P consists of: |
| | • The byte 0x04; |
| | • x_P as a $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ -byte string, big-endian; |
| | • y_P as a $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ -byte string, big-endian. |
| Montgomery | The key data is the scalar value of the 'public key' in little-endian order as defined by <i>Elliptic Curves for Security</i> [RFC7748] §6. This is a $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ -byte string where m is the key size in bits. |
| | • This is 32 bytes for Curve25519, computed as X25519(private_key, 9). |
| | This is 56 bytes for Curve448, computed as X448(private_key, 5). |

continues on next page

Table 11 - continued from previous page

| Curve type | Public-key format |
|-----------------|--|
| Twisted Edwards | The key data is the public key, as defined by <i>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</i> [RFC8032]. This is a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, and a 57-byte string for Edwards448. |

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 (macro)

SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

- secp192k1: key_bits = 192
- secp224k1: key_bits = 225
- secp256k1: key_bits = 256

They are defined in SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters [SEC2].

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 (macro)

SEC random curves over prime fields.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

- secp192r1: key_bits = 192
- secp224r1: key_bits = 224
- secp256r1: key_bits = 256
- secp384r1: key_bits = 384
- secp521r1: key_bits = 521

They are defined in [SEC2].

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 (macro)



Warning

This family of curves is weak and deprecated.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

• secp160r2 : key_bits = 160 (Deprecated)

It is defined in the superseded SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters, Version 1.0 [SEC2v1].

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 (macro)

SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

- sect163k1 : key_bits = 163 (Deprecated)
- sect233k1: key_bits = 233
- sect239k1: key_bits = 239
- sect283k1 : key_bits = 283
- sect409k1: key_bits = 409
- sect571k1: key_bits = 571

They are defined in [SEC2].

Warning

The 163-bit curve sect163k1 is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 (macro)

SEC random curves over binary fields.

```
\label{eq:condition} \mbox{\tt \#define PSA\_ECC\_FAMILY\_SECT\_R1 ((psa\_ecc\_family\_t) 0x22)}
```

This family comprises the following curves:

- sect163r1 : key_bits = 163 (Deprecated)
- sect233r1: key_bits = 233
- sect283r1: key_bits = 283
- sect409r1: key_bits = 409
- sect571r1: key_bits = 571

They are defined in [SEC2].

Warning

The 163-bit curve sect163r1 is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 (macro)

SEC additional random curves over binary fields.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

• sect163r2: key_bits = 163 (Deprecated)

It is defined in [SEC2].

Warning

The 163-bit curve sect163r2 is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 (macro)

Brainpool P random curves.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
```

This family comprises the following curves:

- brainpoolP160r1: key_bits = 160 (Deprecated)
- brainpoolP192r1 : key_bits = 192
- brainpoolP224r1 : key_bits = 224
- brainpoolP256r1 : key_bits = 256
- brainpoolP320r1: key_bits = 320
- brainpoolP384r1 : key_bits = 384
- brainpoolP512r1 : key_bits = 512

They are defined in *Elliptic Curve Cryptography* (ECC) *Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation* [RFC5639].

Warning

The 160-bit curve brainpoolP160r1 is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP (macro)

Curve used primarily in France and elsewhere in Europe.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x33)
```

This family comprises one 256-bit curve:

• FRP256v1: key_bits = 256

This is defined by Publication d'un paramétrage de courbe elliptique visant des applications de passeport électronique et de l'administration électronique française [FRP].

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY (macro)

Montgomery curves.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
```

This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:

• Curve25519: key_bits = 255 • Curve448: key_bits = 448

Curve25519 is defined in Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records [Curve25519]. Curve448 is defined in Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve [Curve448].

PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS (macro)

Twisted Edwards curves.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
```

This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves:

- Edwards25519: key_bits = 255. This curve is birationally equivalent to Curve25519.
- Edwards448: key_bits = 448. This curve is birationally equivalent to Curve448.

Edwards 25519 is defined in Twisted Edwards curves [Ed25519]. Edwards448 is defined in Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve [Curve448].

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC (macro)

Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key, either a key pair or a public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY (macro)

Extract the curve family from an elliptic curve key type.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

An elliptic curve key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t such that PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) is true.

Returns: psa_ecc_family_t

The elliptic curve family id, if type is a supported elliptic curve key. Unspecified if type is not a supported elliptic curve key.

9.2.7 Diffie Hellman keys

psa_dh_family_t (typedef)

The type of identifiers of a finite-field Diffie-Hellman group family.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t;
```

The group family identifier is required to create a finite-field Diffie-Hellman key using the PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY() macros.

The specific Diffie-Hellman group within a family is identified by the key_bits attribute of the key.

The range of Diffie-Hellman group family identifier values is divided as follows:

```
0x00 Reserved. Not allocated to a DH group family.
```

0x01 - 0x7f

DH group family identifiers defined by this standard. Unallocated values in this range are reserved for future use.

```
0x80 - 0xff
```

Invalid. Values in this range must not be used.

The least significant bit of a Diffie-Hellman group family identifier is a parity bit for the whole key type. See *Asymmetric key encoding* on page 367 for details of the encoding of asymmetric key types.

Implementation note

To provide other Diffie-Hellman group families, it is recommended that an implementation defines a key type with bit 15 set, which indicates an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED key type.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Finite-field Diffie-Hellman key pair: both the private key and public key.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

group

A value of type psa_dh_family_t that identifies the Diffie-Hellman group family to be used.

Compatible algorithms

• PSA_ALG_FFDH

Key format

The data format for import and export of the key pair is the representation of the private key x as a big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the private key's size in bytes, and leading zeroes are not stripped.

See PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY for the data format used when exporting the public key with psa_export_public_key().

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will use the following process, defined in Key-Pair Generation by Testing Candidates in NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.6.1.1.4.

A Diffie-Hellman private key is $x \in [1, p-1]$, where p is the group's prime modulus. Let m be the bit size of p, such that $2^{m-1} \le p < 2^m$.

This function generates the private key using the following process:

- 1. Draw a byte string of length $\lceil m/8 \rceil$ bytes.
- 2. If m is not a multiple of 8, set the most significant $8 * \lceil m/8 \rceil m$ bits of the first byte in the string to zero.
- 3. Convert the string to integer k by decoding it as a big-endian byte-string.
- 4. If k > p 2, discard the result and return to step 1.
- 5. Output x = k + 1 as the private key.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Finite-field Diffie-Hellman public key.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

group

A value of type psa_dh_family_t that identifies the Diffie-Hellman group family to be used.

Compatible algorithms

None: Finite-field Diffie-Hellman public keys are exported to use in a key-agreement algorithm, and the peer key is provided to the PSA_ALG_FFDH key-agreement algorithm as a buffer of key data.

Key format

The data format for export of the public key is the representation of the public key $y = g^x \mod p$ as a big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime p in bytes.

PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 (macro)

Finite-field Diffie-Hellman groups defined for TLS in RFC 7919.

```
#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
```

This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits): 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. An implementation can support all of these sizes or only a subset.

Keys is this group can only be used with the PSA_ALG_FFDH key-agreement algorithm.

These groups are defined by Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC7919] Appendix A.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

The key-pair type corresponding to a public-key type.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A public-key type or key-pair type.

Returns

The corresponding key-pair type. If type is not a public key or a key pair, the return value is undefined.

Description

If type is a key-pair type, it will be left unchanged.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR (macro)

The public-key type corresponding to a key-pair type.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A public-key type or key-pair type.

Returns

The corresponding public-key type. If type is not a public key or a key pair, the return value is undefined.

Description

If type is a public-key type, it will be left unchanged.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH (macro)

Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key, either a key pair or a public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY (macro)

Extract the group family from a Diffie-Hellman key type.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A Diffie-Hellman key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t such that PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) is true.

Returns: psa_dh_family_t

The Diffie-Hellman group family id, if type is a supported Diffie-Hellman key. Unspecified if type is not a supported Diffie-Hellman key.

9.2.8 SPAKE2+ keys

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR (macro)

SPAKE2+ key pair: both the prover and verifier key.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(curve) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

curve

A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic curve family to be used.

Description

The bit-size of a SPAKE2+ key is the size associated with the elliptic curve group, that is, $\lceil log_2(q) \rceil$ for a curve over a field \mathbb{F}_q . See *Elliptic Curve keys* on page 64 for details of each elliptic curve family.

To create a new SPAKE2+ key pair, use psa_key_derivation_output_key() as described in SPAKE2+ registration on page 329. The SPAKE2+ protocol recommends that a key-stretching key-derivation function, such as PBKDF2, is used to hash the SPAKE2+ password. This follows the recommended process described in [RFC9383].

A SPAKE2+ key pair can also be imported from a previously exported SPAKE2+ key pair.

The corresponding public key can be exported using psa_export_public_key(). See also PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY().

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER

Key format

A SPAKE2+ key pair consists of the two values w0 and w1, which result from the SPAKE2+ registration phase, see SPAKE2+ registration on page 329. w0 and w1 are scalars in the same range as an elliptic curve private key from the group used as the SPAKE2+ primitive group.

The data format for import and export of the key pair is the concatenation of the formatted values for w0 and w1, using the standard formats for elliptic curve keys used by the Crypto API. For example, for SPAKE2+ over P-256 (secp256r1), the output from psa_export_key() would be the concatenation of:

- The P-256 private key w0. This is a 32-byte big-endian encoding of the integer w0.
- The P-256 private key w1. This is a 32-byte big-endian encoding of the integer w1.

See PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY for the data format used when exporting the public key with psa_export_public_key().

Key derivation

A call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() will use the following process, which follows the recommendations for the registration process in SPAKE2+, an Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) Protocol [RFC9383], and matches the specification of this process in Matter Specification, Version 1.2 [MATTER].

The derivation of SPAKE2+ keys extracts $\lceil log_2(p)/8 \rceil + 8$ bytes from the PBKDF for each of w0s and w1s, where p is the prime factor of the order of the elliptic curve group. The following sizes are used for extracting w0s and w1s, depending on the elliptic curve:

• P-256: 40 bytes

• P-384: 56 bytes

• P-521: 74 bytes

• edwards25519: 40 bytes

• edwards448: 64 bytes

The calculation of w0, w1, and L then proceeds as described in [RFC9383].

Implementation note

The values of w0 and w1 are required as part of the SPAKE2+ key pair.

It is implementation defined whether L is computed during key derivation, and stored as part of the key pair; or only computed when required from the key pair.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

SPAKE2+ public key: the verifier key.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

curve

A value of type psa_ecc_family_t that identifies the elliptic curve family to be used.

Description

The bit-size of an SPAKE2+ public key is the same as the corresponding private key. See PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR() and the documentation of each elliptic curve family for details.

To construct a SPAKE2+ public key, it must be imported.

Compatible algorithms

- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC (verification only)
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC (verification only)
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER (verification only)

Kev format

A SPAKE2+ public key consists of the two values w0 and L, which result from the SPAKE2+ registration phase, see SPAKE2+ registration on page 329. w0 is a scalar in the same range as a elliptic curve private key from the group used as the SPAKE2+ primitive group. L is a point on the curve, similar to a public key from the same group, corresponding to the w1 value in the key pair.

The data format for import and export of the public key is the concatenation of the formatted values for w0and L, using the standard formats for elliptic curve keys used by the Crypto API. For example, for SPAKE2+ over P-256 (secp256r1), the output from psa_export_public_key() would be the concatenation of:

- The P-256 private key w0. This is a 32-byte big-endian encoding of the integer w0.
- The P-256 public key L. This is a 65-byte concatenation of:
 - The byte 0x04.
 - The 32-byte big-endian encoding of the x-coordinate of L.
 - The 32-byte big-endian encoding of the y-coordinate of L.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P (macro)

Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key, either a key pair or a public key.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR (macro)

Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ key pair.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY (macro)

Whether a key type is a SPAKE2+ public key.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY (macro)

Extract the curve family from a SPAKE2+ key type.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A SPAKE2+ key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t such that PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) is true.

Returns: psa_ecc_family_t

The elliptic curve family id, if type is a supported SPAKE2+ key. Unspecified if type is not a supported SPAKE2+ key.

9.2.9 Attribute accessors

psa_set_key_type (function)

Declare the type of a key.

Parameters

attributes

The attribute object to write to.

type

The key type to write. If this is PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, the key type in

attributes becomes unspecified.

Returns: void Description

This function overwrites any key type previously set in attributes.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_type (function)

Retrieve the key type from key attributes.

```
psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes

The key attribute object to query.

Returns: psa_key_type_t

The key type stored in the attribute object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_bits (function)

Retrieve the key size from key attributes.

```
size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes

The key attribute object to query.

Returns: size_t

The key size stored in the attribute object, in bits.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_set_key_bits (function)

Declare the size of a key.

```
void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                      size_t bits);
```

Parameters

attributes

The attribute object to write to.

bits

The key size in bits. If this is 0, the key size in attributes becomes

unspecified. Keys of size o are not supported.

Returns: void Description

This function overwrites any key size previously set in attributes.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

9.3 Key lifetimes

The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and which application and system actions will create and destroy it.

Lifetime values are composed from:

- A persistence level, which indicates what device management actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates whether the key is volatile or persistent. See psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
- A location indicator, which indicates where the key is stored and where operations on the key are performed. See psa_key_location_t for more information.

There are two main types of lifetime, indicated by the persistence level: volatile and persistent.

9.3.1 Volatile keys

Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance terminates or on a power reset of the device. Volatile keys can be explicitly destroyed by the application.

Volatile keys have the persistence level PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE in the key lifetime value, see *Key lifetime encoding* on page 84. Unless the key lifetime is explicitly set in the key attributes before creating a key, a volatile key will be created with the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime value.

To create a volatile key:

- 1. Populate a psa_key_attributes_t object with the required type, size, policy and other key attributes.
- 2. If a non-default storage location is being used, set the key lifetime in the attributes object.
- 3. Create the key with one of the key creation functions. If successful, these functions output a transient key identifier.

To destroy a volatile key: call psa_destroy_key() with the key identifier. There must be a matching call to psa_destroy_key() for each successful call to a create a volatile key.

9.3.2 Persistent keys

Persistent keys are preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an implementation-specific device management event occurs, for example, a factory reset.

Each persistent key has a permanent key identifier, which acts as a name for the key. Within an application, the key identifier corresponds to a single key. The application specifies the key identifier when the key is created and when using the key.

The lifetime attribute of a persistent key indicates how and where it is stored. The default lifetime value for a persistent key is PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, which corresponds to a default storage area. This specification defines how implementations can provide other lifetime values corresponding to different storage areas with different retention policies, or to secure elements with different security characteristics.

To create a persistent key:

- 1. Populate a psa_key_attributes_t object with the key's type, size, policy and other attributes.
- 2. In the attributes object, set the desired lifetime and persistent identifier for the key.
- 3. Create the key with one of the key creation functions. If successful, these functions output the key identifier that was specified by the application in step 2.

To access an existing persistent key: use the key identifier in any API that requires a key.

To destroy a persistent key: call psa_destroy_key() with the key identifier. Destroying a persistent key permanently removes it from memory and storage.

By default, persistent key material is removed from volatile memory when not in use. Frequently used persistent keys can benefit from caching, depending on the implementation and the application. Caching can be enabled by creating the key with the PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE policy. Cached keys can be removed from volatile memory by calling psa_purge_key(). See also Memory cleanup on page 40 and Managing key material on page 40.

9.3.3 Key lifetime encoding

psa_key_lifetime_t (typedef)

Encoding of key lifetimes.

typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;

The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and which application and system actions will create and destroy it.

Lifetime values have the following structure:

Bits[7:0]: Persistence level

This value indicates what device management actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates whether the key is *volatile* or *persistent*. See psa_key_persistence_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) returns the persistence level for a key lifetime value.

Bits[31:8]: Location indicator

This value indicates where the key material is stored (or at least where it is accessible in cleartext) and where operations on the key are performed. See psa_key_location_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) returns the location indicator for a key lifetime value.

Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an implementation-specific device management event occurs, for example, a factory reset.

Persistent keys have a key identifier of type psa_key_id_t. This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key, even if the application instance that created the key terminates.

This specification defines two basic lifetime values:

- Keys with the lifetime PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE are volatile. All implementations should support this lifetime.
- Keys with the lifetime PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT are persistent. All implementations that have access to persistent storage with appropriate security guarantees should support this lifetime.

psa_key_persistence_t (typedef)

Encoding of key persistence levels.

typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t;

What distinguishes different persistence levels is which device management events can cause keys to be destroyed. For example, power reset, transfer of device ownership, or a factory reset are device management events that can affect keys at different persistence levels. The specific management events which affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the scope of the Crypto API.

Values for persistence levels defined by Crypto API are shown in Table 12.

Table 12 Key persistence level values

| Persistence level | Definition |
|---|--|
| <pre>0 = PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE</pre> | Volatile key. |
| | A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device. |
| 1 = PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT | Persistent key with a default lifetime. |
| | Implementations should support this value if they support persistent keys at all. Applications should use this value if they have no specific needs that are only met by implementation-specific features. |
| 2 - 127 | Persistent key with a PSA Certified API-specified lifetime. |
| | The Crypto API does not define the meaning of these values, but another PSA Certified API may do so. |

continues on next page

Table 12 - continued from previous page

| Persistence level | Definition |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 128 - 254 | Persistent key with a vendor-specified lifetime. |
| | No PSA Certified API will define the meaning of these values so implementations may choose the meaning freely. As a guideline, higher persistence levels should cause a key to survive more management events than lower levels. |
| 255 = PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY | Read-only or write-once key. |
| | A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed. Implementations that support such keys may either allow their creation through the Crypto API, preferably only to applications with the appropriate privilege, or only expose keys created through implementation-specific means such as a factory ROM engraving process. |
| | Note that keys that are read-only due to policy restrictions rather than due to physical limitations should not have this persistence level. |

Note:

Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management interfaces operate on lifetimes (type psa_key_lifetime_t), and encode the persistence value as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value.

psa_key_location_t (typedef)

Encoding of key location indicators.

typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t;

If an implementation of the Crypto API can make calls to external cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key. If the key material is not stored persistently inside the secure element, it must be stored in a wrapped form such that only the secure element can access the key material in cleartext.

Values for location indicators defined by this specification are shown in Table 13.

Table 13 Key location indicator values

| Location indicator | Definition |
|--------------------|---|
| 0 | Primary local storage. |
| | All implementations should support this value. The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that contains the key metadata. |

continues on next page

Table 13 - continued from previous page

| Location indicator | Definition |
|---------------------|---|
| 1 | Primary secure element. |
| | Implementations should support this value if there is a secure element attached to the operating environment. As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may have restrictions on supported key types, sizes policies and operations and may have different performance characteristics. |
| 2 - 0x7fffff | Other locations defined by a PSA specification. |
| | The Crypto API does not currently assign any meaning to these locations, but future versions of this specification or other PSA Certified APIs may do so. |
| 0x800000 - 0xffffff | Vendor-defined locations. |
| | No PSA Certified API will assign a meaning to locations in this range. |

Note:

Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management interfaces operate on lifetimes (type psa_key_lifetime_t), and encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value.

9.3.4 Lifetime values

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE (macro)

The default lifetime for volatile keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
```

A volatile key only exists as long as its identifier is not destroyed. The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.

A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the Crypto API implementation. However this is an implementation choice. If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory, it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the key material if the calling application terminates.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT (macro)

The default lifetime for persistent keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
```

A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area. Implementations are permitted to provide their own mechanism, for example, to perform a factory reset, to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application.

This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling application. Implementations can offer other storage areas designated by other lifetime values as implementation-specific extensions.

PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE (macro)

The persistence level of volatile keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
```

See psa_key_persistence_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT (macro)

The default persistence level for persistent keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
```

See psa_key_persistence_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY (macro)

A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.

```
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
```

See psa_key_persistence_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE (macro)

The local storage area for persistent keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
```

This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.

See psa_key_location_t for more information.

PSA_KEY_LOCATION_PRIMARY_SECURE_ELEMENT (macro)

The default secure element storage area for persistent keys.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_PRIMARY_SECURE_ELEMENT ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000001)
```

This storage location is available on systems that have one or more secure elements that are able to store keys.

Vendor-defined locations must be provided by the system for storing keys in additional secure elements.

See psa_key_location_t for more information.

9.3.5 Attribute accessors

psa_set_key_lifetime (function)

Set the lifetime of a key, for a persistent key or a non-default location.

Parameters

attributes The attribute object to write to.

lifetime The lifetime for the key.

If this is a volatile lifetime (such that

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) is true), the key identifier

attribute is reset to PSA_KEY_ID_NULL.

Returns: void Description

To make a key persistent, give it a persistent key identifier by using psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier is stored in the default storage area identifier by PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a specific storage area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile.

This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given value in the attribute object. The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute object is passed to a key creation function such as psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_custom(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), psa_key_agreement(), psa_encapsulate(), psa_decapsulate(), psa_pake_get_shared_key(), Or psa_copy_key().

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_lifetime (function)

Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes.

```
psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes The key attribute object to query.

$Returns: \verb|psa_key_lifetime_t| \\$

The lifetime value stored in the attribute object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

9.3.6 Support macros

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE (macro)

Extract the persistence level from a key lifetime.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \
     ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
```

Parameters

lifetime

The lifetime value to query: a value of type psa_key_lifetime_t.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION (macro)

Extract the location indicator from a key lifetime.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \
   ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
```

Parameters

lifetime

The lifetime value to query: a value of type psa_key_lifetime_t.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE (macro)

Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \
    (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
```

Parameters

lifetime

The lifetime value to query: a value of type psa_key_lifetime_t.

Returns

1 if the key is volatile, otherwise 0.

Description

A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.

A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an implementation-specific device management event occurs, for example, a factory reset.

PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION (macro)

Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.

```
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
   ((location) << 8 | (persistence))</pre>
```

Parameters

persistence The persistence level: a value of type psa_key_persistence_t.

10cation The location indicator: a value of type psa_key_location_t.

Returns

The constructed lifetime value.

9.4 Key identifiers

Key identifiers are integral values that act as permanent names for persistent keys, or as transient references to volatile keys. Key identifiers use the psa_key_id_t type, and the range of identifier values is divided as follows:

```
PSA_KEY_ID_NULL = 0
```

Reserved as an invalid key identifier.

```
PSA KEY ID USER MIN - PSA KEY ID USER MAX
```

Applications can freely choose persistent key identifiers in this range.

```
PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN - PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX
```

Implementations can define additional persistent key identifiers in this range, and must allocate any volatile key identifiers from this range.

Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use.

Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key creation functions. For persistent keys, this is the same identifier as the one specified in the key attributes used to create the key. The key identifier remains valid until it is invalidated by passing it to psa_destroy_key(). A volatile key identifier must not be used after it has been invalidated.

If an invalid key identifier is provided as a parameter in any function, the function will return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; except for the special case of calling psa_destroy_key(PSA_KEY_ID_NULL), which has no effect and always returns PSA_SUCCESS.

Valid key identifiers must have distinct values within the same application. If the implementation provides *caller isolation*, then key identifiers are local to each application. That is, the same key identifier in two applications corresponds to two different keys.

9.4.1 Key identifier type

psa_key_id_t (typedef)

Key identifier.

```
typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
```

A key identifier can be a permanent name for a persistent key, or a transient reference to volatile key. See *Key identifiers*.

PSA_KEY_ID_NULL (macro)

The null key identifier.

```
#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0)
```

The null key identifier is always invalid, except when used without in a call to psa_destroy_key() which will return PSA_SUCCESS.

PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN (macro)

The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.

```
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001)
```

PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX (macro)

The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.

```
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff)
```

PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN (macro)

The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000)
```

PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX (macro)

The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff)
```

9.4.2 Attribute accessors

psa_set_key_id (function)

Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier.

Parameters

attributes The attribute object to write to.

id The persistent identifier for the key.

Returns: void

Description

The application must choose a value for id between PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN and PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX.

If the attribute object currently declares the key as volatile, this function sets the persistence level in the lifetime attribute to PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT without changing the key location. See *Key lifetimes* on page 83.

This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given value in the attribute object. The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute object is passed to a key creation function such as psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_custom(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), psa_key_agreement(), psa_encapsulate(), psa_decapsulate(), psa_pake_get_shared_key(), Or psa_copy_key().

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_id (function)

Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes.

```
psa_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes

The key attribute object to guery.

Returns: psa_key_id_t

The persistent identifier stored in the attribute object. This value is unspecified if the attribute object declares the key as volatile.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

9.5 Key policies

All keys have an associated policy that regulates which operations are permitted on the key. A key policy is composed of two elements:

- A set of usage flags. See Key usage flags on page 95.
- A specific algorithm that is permitted with the key. See Permitted algorithms on page 94.

The policy is part of the key attributes that are managed by a psa_key_attributes_t object.

A highly constrained implementation might not be able to support all the policies that can be expressed through this interface. If an implementation cannot create a key with the required policy, it must return an appropriate error code when the key is created.

9.5.1 Permitted algorithms

The permitted algorithm is encoded using a algorithm identifier, as described in Algorithms on page 117.

This specification only defines policies that restrict keys to a single algorithm, which is consistent with both common practice and security good practice.

The following algorithm policies are supported:

- PSA_ALG_NONE does not permit any cryptographic operation with the key. The key can still be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting, if permitted by the usage flags.
- A specific algorithm value permits exactly that particular algorithm.
- A signature algorithm constructed with PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH permits the specified signature scheme with any hash algorithm. In addition, PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) also permits the PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW signature algorithm.
- A standalone key-agreement algorithm also permits the specified key-agreement scheme to be combined with any key-derivation algorithm.
- An algorithm built from PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC() permits any MAC algorithm from the same base class (for example, CMAC) which computes or verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
- An algorithm built from PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG() permits any AEAD algorithm
 from the same base class (for example, CCM) which computes or verifies a tag length greater than or
 equal to the length encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
- The PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG wildcard algorithm permits the PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG cipher algorithm, the PSA_ALG_CCM AEAD algorithm, and the PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, tag_length) truncated-tag AEAD algorithm for tag_length equal to 4, 8 or 16.

When a key is used in a cryptographic operation, the application must supply the algorithm to use for the operation. This algorithm is checked against the key's permitted-algorithm policy.

psa_set_key_algorithm (function)

Declare the permitted-algorithm policy for a key.

Parameters

attributes The attribute object to write to.
alg The permitted algorithm to write.

Returns: void

Description

The permitted-algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or algorithms are permitted to be used with this key.

This function overwrites any permitted-algorithm policy previously set in attributes.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_algorithm (function)

Retrieve the permitted-algorithm policy from key attributes.

psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);

Parameters

attributes

The key attribute object to query.

Returns: psa_algorithm_t

The algorithm stored in the attribute object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

9.5.2 Key usage flags

The usage flags are encoded in a bitmask, which has the type psa_key_usage_t. Four kinds of usage flag can be specified:

- The extractable flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT determines whether the key material can be extracted from the cryptoprocessor, or copied outside of its current security boundary.
- The copyable flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY determines whether the key material can be copied into a new key, which can have a different lifetime or a more restrictive policy.
- The cacheable flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE determines whether the implementation is permitted to retain non-essential copies of the key material in RAM. This policy only applies to persistent keys. See also *Managing key material* on page 40.
- The following usage flags determine whether the corresponding operations are permitted with the key:
 - PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT

- PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE
- PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION

psa_key_usage_t (typedef)

Encoding of permitted usage on a key.

```
typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
```

PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT (macro)

Permission to export the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001)
```

This flag permits a key to be moved outside of the security boundary of its current storage location. In particular:

- This flag is required to export a key from the cryptoprocessor using psa_export_key(). A public key or the public part of a key pair can always be exported regardless of the value of this permission flag.
- This flag can also be required to make a copy of a key outside of a secure element using psa_copy_key(). See also PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY.

If a key does not have export permission, implementations must not permit the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor, whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface. The key might still be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form where it is encrypted by another key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY (macro)

Permission to copy the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002)
```

This flag is required to make a copy of a key using psa_copy_key().

For a key lifetime that corresponds to a secure element location that enforces the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure element also requires the usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. Copying the key within the secure element is permitted with just PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY, if the secure element supports it. For keys with the lifetime PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY is sufficient to permit the copy.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE (macro)

Permission for the implementation to cache the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000004)
```

This flag permits the implementation to make additional copies of the key material that are not in storage and not for the purpose of an ongoing operation. Applications can use it as a hint for the cryptoprocessor, to keep a copy of the key around for repeated access.

An application can request that cached key material is removed from memory by calling psa_purge_key().

The presence of this usage flag when creating a key is a hint:

- An implementation is not required to cache keys that have this usage flag.
- An implementation must not report an error if it does not cache keys.

If this usage flag is not present, the implementation must ensure key material is removed from memory as soon as it is not required for an operation, or for maintenance of a volatile key.

This flag must be preserved when reading back the attributes for all keys, regardless of key type or implementation behavior.

See also Managing key material on page 40.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT (macro)

Permission to encrypt a message, or perform key encapsulation, with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100)
```

This flag is required to use the key in a symmetric encryption operation, in an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation, in an asymmetric encryption operation, or in a key-encapsulation operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

- psa_cipher_encrypt()
- psa_cipher_encrypt_setup()
- psa_aead_encrypt()
- psa_aead_encrypt_setup()
- psa_asymmetric_encrypt()
- psa_encapsulate()

For a key pair, this concerns the public key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT (macro)

Permission to decrypt a message, or perform key decapsulation, with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200)
```

This flag is required to use the key in a symmetric decryption operation, in an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation, in an asymmetric decryption operation, or in a key-decapsulation operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

- psa_cipher_decrypt()
- psa_cipher_decrypt_setup()
- psa_aead_decrypt()
- psa_aead_decrypt_setup()
- psa_asymmetric_decrypt()
- psa_decapsulate()

For a key pair, this concerns the private key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE (macro)

Permission to sign a message with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
```

This flag is required to use the key in a MAC calculation operation, or in an asymmetric message signature operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

- psa_mac_compute()
- psa_mac_sign_setup()
- psa_sign_message()

For a key pair, this concerns the private key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE (macro)

Permission to verify a message signature with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
```

This flag is required to use the key in a MAC verification operation, or in an asymmetric message signature verification operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

- psa_mac_verify()
- psa_mac_verify_setup()
- psa_verify_message()

For a key pair, this concerns the public key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH (macro)

Permission to sign a message hash with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000)
```

This flag is required to use the key to sign a pre-computed message hash in an asymmetric signature operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

• psa_sign_hash()

This flag automatically sets PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: if an application sets the flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH when creating a key, then the key always has the permissions conveyed by PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE, and the flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE will also be present when the application queries the usage flags of the key.

For a key pair, this concerns the private key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH (macro)

Permission to verify a message hash with the key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000)
```

This flag is required to use the key to verify a pre-computed message hash in an asymmetric signature verification operation. The flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

• psa_verify_hash()

This flag automatically sets PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: if an application sets the flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH when creating a key, then the key always has the permissions conveyed by PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, and the flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE will also be present when the application queries the usage flags of the key.

For a key pair, this concerns the public key.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE (macro)

Permission to derive other keys or produce a password hash from this key.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000)
```

This flag is required to use the key for derivation in a key-derivation operation, or in a key-agreement operation.

This flag must be present on keys used with the following APIs:

- psa_key_agreement()
- psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()
- psa_raw_key_agreement()

If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key-derivation operation, then it permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), Or psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (macro)

Permission to verify the result of a key derivation, including password hashing.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00008000)
```

This flag is required to use the key for verification in a key-derivation operation.

This flag must be present on keys used with psa_key_derivation_verify_key().

If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key-derivation operation, then it permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.

psa_set_key_usage_flags (function)

Declare usage flags for a key.

Parameters

attributes The attribute object to write to.

usage_flags The usage flags to write.

Returns: void Description

Usage flags are part of a key's policy. They encode what kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details, see *Key policies* on page 93.

This function overwrites any usage flags previously set in attributes.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

psa_get_key_usage_flags (function)

Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes.

```
psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
```

Parameters

attributes The key attribute object to query.

Returns: psa_key_usage_t

The usage flags stored in the attribute object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like-macro.

9.6 Key management functions

9.6.1 Key creation

New keys can be created in the following ways:

- psa_import_key() creates a key from a data buffer provided by the application.
- psa_generate_key() and psa_generate_key_custom() create a key from randomly generated data.
- psa_key_derivation_output_key() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() create a key from data generated by a pseudorandom derivation process. See *Key derivation* on page 214.
- psa_key_agreement() creates a key from the shared secret result of a key-agreement process. See *Key agreement* on page 275.
- psa_encapsulate() and psa_decapsulate() create a shared secret key using a key-encapsulation mechanism.
- psa_pake_get_shared_key() creates a key from the shared secret result of a password-authenticated key exchange. See *Password-authenticated key exchange* (PAKE) on page 296.
- psa_copy_key() duplicates an existing key with a different lifetime or with a more restrictive usage policy.

When creating a key, the attributes for the new key are specified in a psa_key_attributes_t object. Each key creation function defines how it uses the attributes.

Note:

The attributes for a key are immutable after the key has been created.

The application must set the key algorithm policy and the appropriate key usage flags in the attributes in order for the key to be used in any cryptographic operations.

psa_import_key (function)

Import a key in binary format.

Parameters

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

• The key type determines how the data buffer is interpreted.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

• The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.

• The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA KEY LIFETIME VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see Key identifiers on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

• If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the key size determined from data.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be gueried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

data

Buffer containing the key data. The content of this buffer is interpreted according to the type declared in attributes.

All implementations must support at least the format described in the Key format section of the chosen key type. Implementations can support other formats, but be conservative in interpreting the key data: it is recommended that implementations reject content if it might be erroneous, for example, if it is the wrong type or is truncated.

data_length

Size of the data buffer in bytes.

key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key type is invalid.
- The key size is nonzero, and is incompatible with the key data in data.
- The key lifetime is invalid.
- The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
- The key usage flags include invalid values.
- The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

• The key data is not correctly formatted for the key type.

The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
```

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The key is extracted from the provided data buffer. Its location, policy, and type are taken from attributes.

The provided key data determines the key size. The attributes can optionally specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined from the key data. A key size of 0 in attributes — the default value indicates that the key size is solely determined by the key data.

Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0.

This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Each key type in Key types on page 51 describes the expected format of keys.

This specification defines a single format for each key type. Implementations can optionally support other formats in addition to the standard format. It is recommended that implementations that support other formats ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous, to minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted according to a different format.

Note:

The Crypto API does not support asymmetric private-key objects outside of a key pair. To import a private key, the attributes must specify the corresponding key-pair type. Depending on the key type, either the import format contains the public-key data or the implementation will reconstruct the public key from the private key as needed.

psa_custom_key_parameters_t (struct)

Custom production parameters for key generation or key derivation.

Added in version 1.3.

```
typedef struct psa_custom_key_parameters_t {
   uint32_t flags;
} psa_custom_key_parameters_t;
```

Fields

flags

Flags to control the key production process. 0 for the default production parameters.

Description

Note:

Future versions of the specification, and implementations, may add other fields in this structure.

The interpretation of this structure depends on the type of the key. Table 14 shows the custom production parameters for each type of key. See the key type definitions for details of the valid parameter values.

Table 14 Custom key parameters

| Key type | Custom key parameters |
|-----------------|--|
| RSA | Use the production parameters to select an exponent value that is different from the default value of 65537. |
| | See psa_key_type_rsa_key_pair. |
| Other key types | Reserved for future use. flags must be 0. |

PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT (macro)

The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation.

Added in version 1.3.

```
#define PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 }
```

Calling psa_generate_key_custom() Or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() With custom == PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT and custom_data_length == 0 is equivalent to calling psa_generate_key() Or psa_key_derivation_output_key() respectively.

psa_generate_key (function)

Generate a key or key pair.

Parameters

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

- The key type. It must not be an asymmetric public key.
- The key size. It must be a valid size for the key type.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see Permitted algorithms on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see Key identifiers on page 91.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be gueried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. For persistent keys, this is the key identifier defined in attributes. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key type is invalid, or is an asymmetric public-key type.
- The key size is not valid for the key type.
- The key lifetime is invalid.
- The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
- The key usage flags include invalid values.
- The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE

PSA ERROR COMMUNICATION FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

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```
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

The key is generated randomly. Its location, policy, type and size are taken from attributes.

Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0.

The key type definitions in *Key types* on page 51 provide specific details relating to generation of the key.

Note:

This function is equivalent to calling psa_generate_key_custom() with the production parameters PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT and custom_data_length == 0 (custom_data is ignored).

psa_generate_key_custom (function)

Generate a key or key pair using custom production parameters.

Added in version 1.3.

Parameters

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

- The key type. It must not be an asymmetric public key.
- The key size. It must be a valid size for the key type.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

Customized production parameters for the key generation. custom

When this is PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT with custom_data_length

== 0, this function is equivalent to psa_generate_key().

A buffer containing additional variable-sized production parameters. custom_data

Length of custom_data in bytes.

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. For persistent key

keys, this is the key identifier defined in attributes. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL

on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

custom_data_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's

metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

persistent key with the given identifier.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA ERROR INVALID ARGUMENT

• The key type is invalid, or is an asymmetric public-key type.

• The key size is not valid for the key type.

• The key lifetime is invalid.

• The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.

• The key usage flags include invalid values.

• The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.

• The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

• The production parameters are invalid.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

> • The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

• The production parameters are not supported by the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Use this function to provide explicit production parameters when generating a key. See the description of psa_generate_key() for the operation of this function with the default production parameters.

The key is generated randomly. Its location, policy, type and size are taken from attributes.

Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0.

See the documentation of psa_custom_key_parameters_t for a list of non-default production parameters. See the key type definitions in *Key types* on page 51 for details of the custom production parameters used for key generation.

psa_copy_key (function)

Make a copy of a key.

Parameters

source kev

attributes

The key to copy. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is being copied outside of a secure element it must also permit PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

These flags are combined with the source key policy so that both sets of restrictions apply, as described in the documentation of this function.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA KEY LIFETIME VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

- If the key type has a non-default value, it must be equal to the source key type.
- If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the source key size.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

target_key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

Success. If the new key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

source_key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- source_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag.
- source_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT usage flag, and the location of target_key is outside the security boundary of the source_key storage location.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- attributes specifies a key type or key size which does not match the attributes of source key.
- The lifetime or identifier in attributes are invalid.
- The key policies from source_key and those specified in attributes are incompatible.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The source key storage location does not support copying to the target key's storage location.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported in the target key's storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Copy key material from one location to another. Its location is taken from attributes, its policy is the intersection of the policy in attributes and the source key policy, and its type and size are taken from the source key.

This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location to another, as it populates a key using the material from another key which can have a different lifetime.

This function can be used to share a key with a different party, subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing.

The policy on the source key must have the usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set. This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE OR PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make a copy of the key outside the secure element.

The resulting key can only be used in a way that conforms to both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in the attributes parameter:

- The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in attributes.
- If both permit the same algorithm or wildcard-based algorithm, the resulting key has the same permitted algorithm.
- If either of the policies permits an algorithm and the other policy permits a wildcard-based permitted algorithm that includes this algorithm, the resulting key uses this permitted algorithm.
- If the policies do not permit any algorithm in common, this function fails with the status PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT.

As a result, the new key cannot be used for operations that were not permitted on the source key.

The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is implementation-defined.

9.6.2 Key destruction

psa_destroy_key (function)

Destroy a key.

psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(psa_key_id_t key);

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is PSA_KEY_ID_NULL, do nothing and

return PSA_SUCCESS.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. If key was a valid key identifier, then the key material that it

referred to has been erased. Alternatively, key was PSA_KEY_ID_NULL.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is neither a valid key identifier, nor PSA_KEY_ID_NULL.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key cannot be erased because it is read-only, either due to a

policy or due to physical restrictions.

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

There was an failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor. The

key material might still be present in the cryptoprocessor.

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or a

communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor might have been

compromised.

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE The storage operation failed. Implementations must make a best effort

to erase key material even in this situation, however, it might be impossible to guarantee that the key material is not recoverable in

such cases.

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT The storage is corrupted. Implementations must make a best effort to

erase key material even in this situation, however, it might be impossible to guarantee that the key material is not recoverable in

such cases.

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function destroys a key from both volatile memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations must make a best effort to ensure that that the key material cannot be recovered.

This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees resources associated with the key.

Destroying the key makes the key identifier invalid, and the key identifier must not be used again by the application.

If a key is currently in use in a multi-part operation, then destroying the key will cause the multi-part operation to fail.

psa_purge_key (function)

Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory.

psa_status_t psa_purge_key(psa_key_id_t key);

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to purge.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The key material has been removed from memory, if the key

material is not currently required.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

```
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

For keys that have been created with the PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE usage flag, an implementation is permitted to make additional copies of the key material that are not in storage and not for the purpose of ongoing operations.

This function will remove these extra copies of the key material from memory.

This function is not required to remove key material from memory in any of the following situations:

- The key is currently in use in a cryptographic operation.
- The key is volatile.

See also Managing key material on page 40.

9.6.3 Key export

psa_export_key (function)

Export a key in binary format.

Parameters

key

data

data_size

Identifier of the key to export. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public key.

Buffer where the key data is to be written.

Size of the data buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the key:

- The required output size is PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(type, bits) where type is the key type and bits is the key size in bits.
- PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported public key or key pair.
- PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported key pair.
- PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported public key.
- This API defines no maximum size for symmetric keys. Arbitrarily large data items can be stored in the key store, for example certificates that correspond to a stored private key or input material for key derivation.

data_length On suc

On success, the number of bytes that make up the key data.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*data_length) bytes of data contain the exported

key.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the data buffer is too small. PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(),

PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE, PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE, or PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• The key's storage location does not support export of the key.

• The implementation does not support export of keys with this key type.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to create an equivalent object.

If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key() must use the representation specified in *Key types* on page 51, not the originally imported representation.

For standard key types, the output format is defined in the relevant *Key format* section in *Key types* on page 51. The policy on the key must have the usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set.

psa_export_public_key (function)

Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to export.

data Buffer where the key data is to be written.

data_size Size of the data buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the key:

- The required output size is PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(type, bits) where type is the key type and bits is the key size in bits.
- PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported public key or public part of a key pair.
- PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported public key or key pair.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the key data.

Returns: psa_status_t

data_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*data_length) bytes of data contain the exported

public key.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the data buffer is too small.

PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(), PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE, or

PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The key is neither a public key nor a key pair.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• The key's storage location does not support export of the key.

• The implementation does not support export of keys with this key type.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to create an object that is equivalent to the public key.

If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_public_key() must use the representation specified in *Key types* on page 51, not the originally imported representation.

For standard key types, the output format is defined in the relevant *Key format* section in *Key types* on page 51.

Exporting a public-key object or the public part of a key pair is always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags.

PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key().

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A supported key type.

key_bits The size of the key in bits.

Returns

If the parameters are valid and supported, return a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported by the implementation, this macro must return either a sensible size or 0. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export a key by querying the key type and size at runtime.

```
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS)
   handle_error(...);
psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
if (buffer == NULL)
   handle_error(...);
size_t buffer_length;
status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS)
   handle_error(...);
```

See also PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE, PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE, and PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key().

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

| key_type | A public-key or key-pair key type. |
|----------|------------------------------------|
| key_bits | The size of the key in bits. |

Returns

If the parameters are valid and supported, return a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that psa_export_public_key() will not fail with PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL. If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported by the implementation, this macro must return either a sensible size or 0. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

If the parameters are valid and supported, it is recommended that this macro returns the same result as PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type), key_bits).

Description

The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime.

```
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS)
   handle_error(...);
psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
if (buffer == NULL)
   handle_error(...);
size t buffer length;
status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS)
   handle_error(...);
```

See also PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE and PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair.

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

This value must be a sufficient buffer size when calling <code>psa_export_key()</code> to export any asymmetric key pair that is supported by the implementation, regardless of the exact key type and key size.

```
See also PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(), PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE, and PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE.
```

PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key.

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

This value must be a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key that is supported by the implementation, regardless of the exact key type and key size.

See also PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(), PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(), PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE, and PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair or public key.

Added in version 1.3.

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

This value must be a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric key pair or public key that is supported by the implementation, regardless of the exact key type and key size.

See also PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE, PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE, and PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE().

10 Cryptographic operation reference

10.1 Algorithms

This specification encodes algorithms into a structured 32-bit integer value.

Algorithm identifiers are used for two purposes in the Crypto API:

- 1. To specify a specific algorithm to use in a cryptographic operation. These are all defined in *Cryptographic operation reference*.
- 2. To specify the policy for a key, identifying the permitted algorithm for use with the key. This use is described in *Key policies* on page 93.

The specific algorithm identifiers are described alongside the cryptographic operation functions to which they apply:

- Hash algorithms on page 124
- MAC algorithms on page 143
- Cipher algorithms on page 160
- AEAD algorithms on page 186
- Key-derivation algorithms on page 216
- Asymmetric signature on page 247

- Asymmetric encryption algorithms on page 269
- Key-agreement algorithms on page 275
- Key encapsulation on page 287
- Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) on page 296

10.1.1 Algorithm encoding

psa_algorithm_t (typedef)

Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.

```
typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
```

This is a structured bitfield that identifies the category and type of algorithm. The range of algorithm identifier values is divided as follows:

0x00000000 Reserved as an invalid algorithm identifier.

0x00000001 - 0x7fffffff

Specification-defined algorithm identifiers. Algorithm identifiers defined by this standard always have bit 31 clear. Unallocated algorithm identifier values in this range are reserved for future use.

0x80000000 - 0xfffffff

Implementation-defined algorithm identifiers. Implementations that define additional algorithms must use an encoding with bit 31 set. The related support macros will be easier to write if these algorithm identifier encodings also respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings.

For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this identifier does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers based on a block cipher, psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded via psa_key_type_t.

The Algorithm and key type encoding on page 356 appendix provides a full definition of the algorithm identifier encoding.

PSA_ALG_NONE (macro)

An invalid algorithm identifier value.

```
#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
```

Zero is not the encoding of any algorithm.

10.1.2 Algorithm categories

PSA ALG IS HASH (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Hash algorithms on page 124 for a list of defined hash algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_MAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See MAC algorithms on page 143 for a list of defined MAC algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Cipher algorithms on page 160 for a list of defined cipher algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See AEAD algorithms on page 186 for a list of defined AEAD algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a key-derivation algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a key-derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Key-derivation algorithms on page 216 for a list of defined key-derivation algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm, also known as public-key signature algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Asymmetric signature on page 247 for a list of defined signature algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, also known as public-key encryption algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Asymmetric encryption algorithms on page 269 for a list of defined asymmetric encryption algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a key-agreement algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a key-agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Key-agreement algorithms on page 275 for a list of defined key-agreement algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) algorithm, ø otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a key-encapsulation algorithm.

Added in version 1.3.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a key-encapsulation algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See Key encapsulation on page 287 for a list of defined key-encapsulation algorithms.

10.1.3 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.

o if alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding that is suitable for an operation.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

Wildcard algorithm values can only be used to set the permitted-algorithm field in a key policy, wildcard values cannot be used to perform an operation.

See PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH for example of how a wildcard algorithm can be used in a key policy.

PSA_ALG_GET_HASH (macro)

Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that uses a hash algorithm.

PSA_ALG_NONE if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.

Description

The following composite algorithms require a hash algorithm:

- PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA()
- PSA_ALG_ECDSA()
- PSA_ALG_HKDF()
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND()
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT()
- PSA_ALG_HMAC()
- PSA_ALG_JPAKE()
- PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC()
- PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP()
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN()
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS()
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT()
- PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC()
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC()
- PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC()
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF()
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS()

10.2 Message digests (Hashes)

The single-part hash functions are:

- psa_hash_compute() to calculate the hash of a message.
- psa_hash_compare() to compare the hash of a message with a reference value.

The psa_hash_operation_t multi-part operation allows messages to be processed in fragments. A multi-part hash operation is used as follows:

- 1. Initialize the psa_hash_operation_t object to zero, or by assigning the value of the associated macro PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT.
- 2. Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the required hash algorithm, call psa_hash_clone() to duplicate the state of *active* psa_hash_operation_t object, or call psa_hash_resume() to restart a hash operation with the output from a previously suspended hash operation.
- 3. Call the psa_hash_update() function on successive chunks of the message.
- 4. At the end of the message, call the required finishing function:
 - To suspend the hash operation and extract a hash suspend state, call psa_hash_suspend(). The output state can subsequently be used to resume the hash operation.

- To calculate the digest of a message, call psa_hash_finish().
- To verify the digest of a message against a reference value, call psa_hash_verify().

To abort the operation or recover from an error, call psa_hash_abort().

10.2.1 Hash algorithms

PSA_ALG_MD2 (macro)

The MD2 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001)



Warning

The MD2 hash is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

MD2 is defined in The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1319].

PSA_ALG_MD4 (macro)

The MD4 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000002)



Warning

The MD4 hash is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

MD4 is defined in The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1320].

PSA_ALG_MD5 (macro)

The MD5 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003)



Warning

The MD5 hash is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

MD5 is defined in The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm [RFC1321].

PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 (macro)

The RIPEMD-160 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004)

RIPEMD-160 is defined in RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD [RIPEMD], and also in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 IT Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions [ISO10118].

PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE (macro)

The Zigbee 1.0 hash function based on a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) construction using AES-128. Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000007)

This is the cryptographic hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård construction over a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas one-way compression function and the AES-128 block cipher, with the parametrization defined in zigbee Specification [ZIGBEE] §B.6.

This hash function can operate on input strings of up to $2^{32} - 1$ bits.

Note:

The Zigbee keyed hash function from [ZIGBEE] §B.1.4 is PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE).

PSA_ALG_SHA_1 (macro)

The SHA-1 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005)



Warning

The SHA-1 hash is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

SHA-1 is defined in FIPS Publication 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_224 (macro)

The SHA-224 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008)

SHA-224 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_256 (macro)

The SHA-256 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009)

SHA-256 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_384 (macro)

The SHA-384 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a)

SHA-384 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_512 (macro)

The SHA-512 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b)

SHA-512 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 (macro)

The SHA-512/224 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c)

SHA-512/224 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 (macro)

The SHA-512/256 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d)

SHA-512/256 is defined in [FIPS180-4].

PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 (macro)

The SHA3-224 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010)

SHA3-224 is defined in FIPS Publication 202: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions [FIPS202].

PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 (macro)

The SHA3-256 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011)

SHA3-256 is defined in [FIPS202].

PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 (macro)

The SHA3-384 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012)

SHA3-384 is defined in [FIPS202].

PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 (macro)

The SHA3-512 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013)

SHA3-512 is defined in [FIPS202].

PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 (macro)

The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000015)

This is the pre-hashing for Ed448ph (see PSA_ALG_ED448PH).

SHAKE256 is defined in [FIPS202].

Note:

For other scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3 or SHAKE is required, SHA3-512 is recommended. SHA3-512 has the same output size, and a theoretically higher security strength.

PSA_ALG_SM3 (macro)

The SM3 message-digest algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_SM3 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000014)

SM3 is defined in ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 IT Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions [ISO10118], and also in GM/T 0004-2012: SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm [CSTC0004].

10.2.2 Single-part hashing functions

psa_hash_compute (function)

Calculate the hash (digest) of a message.

Parameters

alg The hash algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

input Buffer containing the message to hash.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

hash Buffer where the hash is to be written.

hash_size Size of the hash buffer in bytes. This must be at least

PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg).

hash_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the hash value. This is

always PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg).

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*hash_length) bytes of hash contain the hash value.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the hash buffer is too small. PSA_HASH_LENGTH() can be used

to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a hash algorithm.

• input_length is too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Note:

To verify the hash of a message against an expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead.

psa_hash_compare (function)

Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a reference value.

Parameters

alg The hash algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

input Buffer containing the message to hash.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.

hash_length Size of the hash buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE The calculated hash of the message does not match the value in hash.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a hash algorithm.

• input_length is too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

10.2.3 Multi-part hashing operations

psa_hash_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for multi-part hash operations.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_hash_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_hash_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_hash_operation_t operation;
operation = psa_hash_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object of type psa_hash_operation_t.

```
#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_hash_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for a hash operation object.

```
psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_setup (function)

Set up a multi-part hash operation.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use.

alg The hash algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT alg is not a hash algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest) is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a hash operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
- 4. Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- 5. To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify(). To suspend the hash operation and extract the current state, call psa_hash_suspend().

After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify() or psa_hash_suspend().
- A call to psa_hash_abort().

If psa_hash_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_hash_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_hash_update (function)

Add a message fragment to a multi-part hash operation.

Parameters

operation Active hash operation.

input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The total input for the operation is too large for the hash algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The total input for the operation is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The application must call psa_hash_setup() or psa_hash_resume() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().

psa_hash_finish (function)

Finish the calculation of the hash of a message.

Parameters

operation Active hash operation.

hash Buffer where the hash is to be written.

hash_size Size of the hash buffer in bytes. This must be at least

PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) where alg is the algorithm that the operation

performs.

hash_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the hash value. This is

always PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) where alg is the hash algorithm that the

operation performs.

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. The first (*hash_length) bytes of hash contain the hash value. PSA SUCCESS

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

The size of the hash buffer is too small. PSA_HASH_LENGTH() can be used PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA ERROR COMMUNICATION FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The application must call psa_hash_setup() or psa_hash_resume() before calling this function. This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa hash update().

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().

Warning

It is not recommended to use this function when a specific value is expected for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead with the expected hash value.

Comparing integrity or authenticity data such as hash values with a function such as memcmp() is risky because the time taken by the comparison might leak information about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls.

psa_hash_verify (function)

Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with an expected value.

```
psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * hash,
                             size_t hash_length);
```

Parameters

Active hash operation. operation

Buffer containing the expected hash value. hash

hash_length Size of the hash buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the

message.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

The calculated hash of the message does not match the value in hash.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function. This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a parameter to this function.

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().

Note:

Implementations must make the best effort to ensure that the comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed in constant time.

psa_hash_abort (function)

Abort a hash operation.

psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t * operation);

Parameters

operation Initialized hash operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_hash_setup() again.

This function can be called any time after the operation object has been initialized by one of the methods described in psa_hash_operation_t.

In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect.

psa_hash_suspend (function)

Halt the hash operation and extract the intermediate state of the hash computation.

Parameters

| operation | Active hash operation. |
|-----------------|--|
| hash_state | Buffer where the hash suspend state is to be written. |
| hash_state_size | Size of the hash_state buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm: |
| | A (6 : 1 1 1 : : : |

• A sufficient output size is PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) where alg is the algorithm that was used to set up the operation.

• PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported hash algorithm.

hash_state_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the hash suspend state.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*hash_state_length) bytes of hash_state contain the intermediate hash state.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the hash_state buffer is too small.

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE() Or PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE

can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The hash algorithm being computed does not support suspend and

resume.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The application must call psa_hash_setup() or psa_hash_resume() before calling this function. This function extracts an intermediate state of the hash computation of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().

This function can be used to halt a hash operation, and then resume the hash operation at a later time, or in another application, by transferring the extracted hash suspend state to a call to psa_hash_resume().

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().

Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SHA3 family of hash algorithms. Hash suspend state on page 141 defines the format of the output from psa_hash_suspend().



Warning

Applications must not use any of the hash suspend state as if it was a hash output. Instead, the suspend state must only be used to resume a hash operation, and psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify() can then calculate or verify the final hash value.

Usage

The sequence of operations to suspend and resume a hash operation is as follows:

- 1. Compute the first part of the hash.
 - a. Allocate an operation object and initialize it as described in the documentation for psa_hash_operation_t.
 - b. Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
 - c. Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time.
 - d. Call psa_hash_suspend() to extract the hash suspend state into a buffer.
- 2. Pass the hash state buffer to the application which will resume the operation.
- 3. Compute the rest of the hash.
 - a. Allocate an operation object and initialize it as described in the documentation for psa_hash_operation_t.
 - b. Call psa_hash_resume() with the extracted hash state.
 - c. Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time.
 - d. To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish(). To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify().

If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup() or psa_hash_resume(), the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The application can call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation has been initialized.

psa_hash_resume (function)

Set up a multi-part hash operation using the hash suspend state from a previously suspended hash operation.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use.

hash_state A buffer containing the suspended hash state which is to be resumed.

This must be in the format output by psa_hash_suspend(), which is

described in Hash suspend state format on page 141.

hash_state_length Length of hash_state in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT hash_state does not correspond to a valid hash suspend state. See

Hash suspend state format on page 141 for the definition.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The provided hash suspend state is for an algorithm that is not

supported.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

See psa_hash_suspend() for an example of how to use this function to suspend and resume a hash operation.

After a successful call to psa_hash_resume(), the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_hash_finish(), psa_hash_verify() Or psa_hash_suspend().
- A call to psa_hash_abort().

psa_hash_clone (function)

Clone a hash operation.

Parameters

source_operation The active hash operation to clone.

target_operation The operation object to set up. It must be initialized but not active.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. target_operation is ready to continue the same hash

operation as source_operation.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The source_operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The target_operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent to calling psa_hash_setup() on target_operation with the same algorithm that source_operation was set up for, then psa_hash_update() on target_operation with the same input that that was passed to source_operation. After this function returns, the two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of the objects do not affect the other object.

10.2.4 Support macros

PSA_HASH_LENGTH (macro)

The size of the output of psa_hash_compute() and psa_hash_finish(), in bytes.

#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) /* implementation-defined value */

Parameters

alg A hash algorithm or an HMAC algorithm: a value of type

psa_algorithm_t such that (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) ||

PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg)) is true.

Returns

The hash length for the specified hash algorithm. If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

This is also the hash length that psa_hash_compare() and psa_hash_verify() expect.

See also PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Maximum size of a hash.

```
#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

It is recommended that this value is the maximum size of a hash supported by the implementation, in bytes. The value must not be smaller than this maximum.

See also PSA_HASH_LENGTH().

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient hash suspend state buffer size for psa_hash_suspend(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient output size for the algorithm. If the hash algorithm is not recognized, or is not supported by psa_hash_suspend(), return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

For a supported hash algorithm alg, the following expression is true:

```
PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) == PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH +
PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) +
PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) +
PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) - 1
```

Description

If the size of the hash state buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_hash_suspend() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient hash suspend state buffer size for psa_hash_suspend(), for any supported hash algorithms.

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the hash state buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_hash_suspend() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH (macro)

The size of the algorithm field that is part of the output of psa_hash_suspend(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH ((size_t)4)
```

Applications can use this value to unpack the hash suspend state that is output by psa_hash_suspend().

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH (macro)

The size of the input-length field that is part of the output of psa_hash_suspend(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

Returns

The size, in bytes, of the *input-length* field of the hash suspend state for the specified hash algorithm. If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

The algorithm-specific values are defined in *Hash suspend state field sizes* on page 142.

Description

Applications can use this value to unpack the hash suspend state that is output by psa_hash_suspend().

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH (macro)

The size of the hash-state field that is part of the output of psa_hash_suspend(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

Returns

The size, in bytes, of the *hash-state* field of the hash suspend state for the specified hash algorithm. If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

The algorithm-specific values are defined in Hash suspend state field sizes on page 142.

Description

Applications can use this value to unpack the hash suspend state that is output by psa_hash_suspend().

PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH (macro)

The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes.

#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) /* implementation-defined value */

Parameters

alq

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) is true.

Returns

The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm. If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or until the operation is finished.

This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend().

10.2.5 Hash suspend state

The hash suspend state is output by psa_hash_suspend() and input to psa_hash_resume().

Note:

Hash suspend and resume is not defined for the SM3 algorithm and the SHA3 family of hash algorithms.

Hash suspend state format

The hash suspend state has the following format:

 $hash_suspend_state = algorithm \mid \mid input_length \mid \mid hash_state \mid \mid unprocessed_input$

The fields in the hash suspend state are defined as follows:

algorithm A big-endian 32-bit unsigned integer.

The Crypto API algorithm identifier value.

The byte length of the algorithm field can be evaluated using

PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH.

input length

A big-endian unsigned integer

The content of this field is algorithm-specific:

- For MD2, this is the number of bytes in *unprocessed_input*.
- For all other hash algorithms, this is the total number of bytes of input to the hash computation. This includes the *unprocessed input* bytes.

The size of this field is algorithm-specific:

- For MD2: *input_length* is an 8-bit unsigned integer.
- For MD4, MD5, RIPEMD-160, SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256: *input_length* is a 64-bit unsigned integer.
- For SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: *input_length* is a 128-bit unsigned integer.

The length, in bytes, of the *input_length* field can be calculated using PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) where alg is a hash algorithm. See *Hash suspend state field sizes*.

hash_state An array of bytes

Algorithm-specific intermediate hash state:

- For MD2: 16 bytes of internal checksum, then 48 bytes of intermediate digest.
- For MD4 and MD5: 4x 32-bit integers, in little-endian encoding.
- For RIPEMD-160: 5x 32-bit integers, in little-endian encoding.
- For SHA-1: 5x 32-bit integers, in big-endian encoding.
- For SHA-224 and SHA-256: 8x 32-bit integers, in big-endian encoding.
- For SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: 8x 64-bit integers, in big-endian encoding.

The length of this field is specific to the algorithm. The length, in bytes, of the *hash_state* field can be calculated using PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) where alg is a hash algorithm. See *Hash suspend state field sizes*.

unprocessed input

0 to $(hash_block_size - 1)$ bytes

A partial block of unprocessed input data. This is between zero and $hash_block_size-1$ bytes of data, the length can be calculated by:

 $length(unprocessed\ input) = input\ length\ mod\ hash\ block\ size.$

The value of $hash_block_size$ is specific to the hash algorithm. The size of a hash block can be calculated using PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) where alg is a hash algorithm. See Hash suspend state field sizes.

Hash suspend state field sizes

The following table defines the algorithm-specific field lengths for the hash suspend state returned by psa_hash_suspend(). All of the field lengths are in bytes. To compute the field lengths for algorithm alg, use the following expressions:

- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH returns the length of the algorithm field.
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) returns the length of the *input_length* field.
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) returns the length of the hash_state field.
- PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) 1 is the maximum length of the unprocessed_bytes field.

• PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) returns the maximum size of the hash suspend state.

| Hash algorithm | <pre>input_length size (bytes)</pre> | hash_state length (bytes) | unprocessed_bytes length (bytes) |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| PSA_ALG_MD2 | 1 | 64 | 0 - 15 |
| PSA_ALG_MD4 | 8 | 16 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_MD5 | 8 | 16 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 | 8 | 20 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_1 | 8 | 20 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_224 | 8 | 32 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_256 | 8 | 32 | 0 - 63 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 | 16 | 64 | 0 - 127 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 | 16 | 64 | 0 - 127 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_384 | 16 | 64 | 0 - 127 |
| PSA_ALG_SHA_512 | 16 | 64 | 0 - 127 |

10.3 Message authentication codes (MAC)

The single-part MAC functions are:

- psa_mac_compute() to calculate the MAC of a message.
- psa_mac_verify() to compare the MAC of a message with a reference value.

The psa_mac_operation_t multi-part operation allows messages to be processed in fragments. A multi-part MAC operation is used as follows:

- 1. Initialize the psa_mac_operation_t object to zero, or by assigning the value of the associated macro PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
- 2. Call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 3. Call the psa_mac_update() function on successive chunks of the message.
- 4. At the end of the message, call the required finishing function:
 - To calculate the MAC of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish().
 - To verify the MAC of the message against a reference value, call psa_mac_verify_finish().

To abort the operation or recover from an error, call psa_mac_abort().

10.3.1 MAC algorithms

PSA_ALG_HMAC (macro)

Macro to build an HMAC message-authentication-code algorithm from an underlying hash algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding HMAC algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

For example, PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.

The HMAC construction is defined in HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication [RFC2104].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC

PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC (macro)

The CBC-MAC message-authentication-code algorithm, constructed over a block cipher.

#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100)



Warning

CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases. A more secure mode, such as PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.

The CBC-MAC algorithm must be used with a key for a block cipher. For example, one of PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES.

CBC-MAC is defined as MAC Algorithm 1 in ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher [ISO9797].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CMAC (macro)

The CMAC message-authentication-code algorithm, constructed over a block cipher.

#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200)

The CMAC algorithm must be used with a key for a block cipher. For example, when used with a key with type PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, the resulting operation is AES-CMAC.

CMAC is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38B: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CMAC Mode for Authentication [SP800-38B].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA ALG TRUNCATED MAC (macro)

Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

A MAC algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that mac_alg

PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(mac_alg) is true. This can be a truncated or

untruncated MAC algorithm.

Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes. This must be at most mac_length

> the untruncated length of the MAC and must be at least an implementation-specified minimum. The implementation-specified

minimum must not be zero.

Returns

The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified length.

Unspecified if mac_alg is not a supported MAC algorithm or if mac_length is too small or too large for the specified MAC algorithm.

Description

A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm consists of only the first mac_length bytes of the MAC value for the untruncated algorithm.

Note:

This macro might allow constructing algorithm identifiers that are not valid, either because the specified length is larger than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is smaller than permitted by the implementation.

Note:

It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm for policy comparison purposes.

The untruncated MAC algorithm can be recovered using PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC().

Compatible key types

The resulting truncated MAC algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the MAC algorithm used to construct it.

PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC (macro)

Macro to construct the MAC algorithm with an untruncated MAC, from a truncated MAC algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

mac_alg

A MAC algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(mac_alg) is true. This can be a truncated or untruncated MAC algorithm.

Returns

The corresponding MAC algorithm with an untruncated MAC.

Unspecified if mac_alg is not a supported MAC algorithm.

Compatible key types

The resulting untruncated MAC algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the MAC algorithm used to construct it.

PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC (macro)

Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

mac_alg A MAC algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true. This can be a truncated or untruncated

MAC algorithm.

min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication code in bytes.

This must be at most the untruncated length of the MAC and must be

at least 1.

Returns

The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the specified minimum MAC length.

Unspecified if mac_alg is not a supported MAC algorithm or if min_mac_length is less than 1 or too large for the specified MAC algorithm.

Description

A key with a minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm as permitted-algorithm policy can be used with all MAC algorithms sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard algorithm's minimum MAC length.

Note:

When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the smallest MAC length permitted by the base algorithm, this effectively becomes an 'any-MAC-length-permitted' policy for that base algorithm.

The untruncated MAC algorithm can be recovered using PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC().

Compatible key types

The resulting wildcard MAC algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the MAC algorithm used to construct it.

10.3.2 Single-part MAC functions

psa_mac_compute (function)

Calculate the message authentication code (MAC) of a message.

Parameters

| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. |
|--------------|--|
| alg | The MAC algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true. |
| input | Buffer containing the input message. |
| input_length | Size of the input buffer in bytes. |
| mac | Buffer where the MAC value is to be written. |
| mac_size | Size of the mac buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: |

- The exact MAC size is PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are attributes of the key used to compute the MAC.
- PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum MAC size of any supported MAC algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the MAC value.

Returns: psa_status_t

mac_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*mac_length) bytes of mac contain the MAC value.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, or it does

not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the mac buffer is too small. PSA_MAC_LENGTH() or

PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a MAC algorithm.

key is not compatible with alg.

• input_length is too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Note:

To verify the MAC of a message against an expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead. Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as MAC values with a function such as memcmp() is risky because the time taken by the comparison might leak information about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.

psa_mac_verify (function)

Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.

alg The MAC algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true.

input Buffer containing the input message.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

Buffer containing the expected MAC value.

mac_length Size of the mac buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the

input.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE flag, or it

does not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE The calculated MAC of the message does not match the value in mac.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

• input_length is too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

10.3.3 Multi-part MAC operations

psa_mac_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for multi-part MAC operations.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_mac_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_mac_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_mac_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_mac_operation_t operation;
operation = psa_mac_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type psa_mac_operation_t.

```
#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_mac_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for a MAC operation object.

```
psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_mac_operation_t

psa_mac_sign_setup (function)

Set up a multi-part MAC calculation operation.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until

the operation terminates. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.

alg The MAC algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, or it does

not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA ERROR COMMUNICATION FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function sets up the calculation of the message authentication code (MAC) of a byte string. To verify the MAC of a message against an expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.

The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a MAC operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- 5. At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.

After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish().
- A call to psa_mac_abort().

If psa_mac_sign_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_mac_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_mac_verify_setup (function)

Set up a multi-part MAC verification operation.

Parameters

| operation | The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the documentation for psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use. |
|-----------|---|
| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until the operation terminates. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE. |
| alg | The MAC algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true. |

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE flag, or it

does not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function sets up the verification of the message authentication code (MAC) of a byte string against an expected value.

The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a MAC operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC of the concatenation of these messages in order.
- 5. At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against the expected value.

After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish().
- A call to psa_mac_abort().

If psa_mac_verify_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_mac_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_mac_update (function)

Add a message fragment to a multi-part MAC operation.

Parameters

operation Active MAC operation.

input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to the MAC

calculation.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The total input for the operation is too large for the MAC algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The total input for the operation is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().

psa_mac_sign_finish (function)

Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message.

Parameters

operation Active MAC operation.

mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.

mac_size Size of the mac buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:

• The exact MAC size is PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are attributes of the key, and alg is the algorithm used to compute the MAC.

• PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum MAC size of any supported MAC algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the MAC value. This is always PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are attributes of the key, and alg is the algorithm used to compute the MAC.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

mac_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*mac_length) bytes of mac contain the MAC value.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be an active mac sign operation.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the mac buffer is too small. PSA_MAC_LENGTH() or

PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().

Warning

It is not recommended to use this function when a specific value is expected for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead with the expected MAC value.

Comparing integrity or authenticity data such as MAC values with a function such as memcmp() is risky because the time taken by the comparison might leak information about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.

psa_mac_verify_finish (function)

Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with an expected value.

```
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                                   const uint8_t * mac,
                                   size_t mac_length);
```

Parameters

Active MAC operation. operation

Buffer containing the expected MAC value. mac

Size of the mac buffer in bytes. mac_length

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the PSA_SUCCESS

message.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

> • The operation state is not valid: it must be an active mac verify operation.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). The calculated MAC of the message does not match the value in mac.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function. This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a parameter to this function.

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().

Note:

Implementations must make the best effort to ensure that the comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed in constant time.

psa_mac_abort (function)

Abort a MAC operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t * operation);
```

Parameters

operation Initialized MAC operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA ERROR CORRUPTION DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again.

This function can be called any time after the operation object has been initialized by one of the methods described in psa_mac_operation_t.

In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect.

10.3.4 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.

PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_MAC_LENGTH (macro)

The size of the output of psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type The type of the MAC key.

key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits.

alg A MAC algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) is true.

Returns

The MAC length for the specified algorithm with the specified key parameters.

ø if the MAC algorithm is not recognized.

Either 0 or the correct length for a MAC algorithm that the implementation recognizes, but does not support.

Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent with the algorithm.

Description

If the size of the MAC buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_mac_compute() and psa_mac_sign_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

This is also the MAC length that psa_mac_verify() and psa_mac_verify_finish() expect.

See also PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient buffer size for storing the MAC output by psa_mac_verify() and psa_mac_verify_finish(), for any of the supported key types and MAC algorithms.

#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */

If the size of the MAC buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_mac_verify() and psa_mac_verify_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_MAC_LENGTH().

10.4 Unauthenticated ciphers

Warning

The unauthenticated cipher API is provided to implement legacy protocols and for use cases where the data integrity and authenticity is guaranteed by non-cryptographic means.

It is recommended that newer protocols use Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) on page 185.

The single-part functions for encrypting or decrypting a message using an unauthenticated symmetric cipher are:

- psa_cipher_encrypt() to encrypt a message using an unauthenticated symmetric cipher. The encryption function generates a random initialization vector (IV). Use the multi-part API to provide a deterministic IV: this is not secure in general, but can be secure in some conditions that depend on the algorithm.
- psa_cipher_decrypt() to decrypt a message using an unauthenticated symmetric cipher.

The psa_cipher_operation_t multi-part operation permits alternative initialization parameters and allows messages to be processed in fragments. A multi-part cipher operation is used as follows:

- 1. Initialize the psa_cipher_operation_t object to zero, or by assigning the value of the associated macro PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
- 2. Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 3. Provide additional parameters:
 - When encrypting data, generate or set an IV, nonce, or similar initial value such as an initial counter value. To generate a random IV, which is recommended in most protocols, call psa_cipher_generate_iv(). To set the IV, call psa_cipher_set_iv().

- When decrypting, set the IV or nonce. To set the IV, call psa_cipher_set_iv().
- 4. Call the psa_cipher_update() function on successive chunks of the message.
- 5. Call psa_cipher_finish() to complete the operation and return any final output.

To abort the operation or recover from an error, call psa_cipher_abort().

10.4.1 Cipher algorithms

PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER (macro)

The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100)

The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type. The ARC4, ChaCha20, and XChaCha20 ciphers use this algorithm identifier.

ARC4

To use ARC4, use a key type of PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 and algorithm id PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER.



The ARC4 cipher is weak and deprecated and is only recommended for use in legacy applications.

The ARC4 cipher does not use an initialization vector (IV). When using a multi-part cipher operation with the PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER algorithm and an ARC4 key, psa_cipher_generate_iv() and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.

ChaCha20

To use ChaCha20, use a key type of PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 and algorithm id PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER.

Implementations must support the variant that is defined in *ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols* [RFC8439] §2.4, which has a 96-bit nonce and a 32-bit counter. Implementations can optionally also support the original variant, as defined in *ChaCha*, a variant of Salsa20 [CHACHA20], which has a 64-bit nonce and a 64-bit counter. Except where noted, the [RFC8439] variant must be used.

ChaCha20 defines a nonce and an initial counter to be provided to the encryption and decryption operations. When using a ChaCha20 key with the PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER algorithm, these values are provided using the initialization vector (IV) functions in the following ways:

- A call to psa_cipher_encrypt() will generate a random 12-byte nonce, and set the counter value to zero. The random nonce is output as a 12-byte IV value in the output.
- A call to psa_cipher_decrypt() will use first 12 bytes of the input buffer as the nonce and set the counter value to zero.
- A call to psa_cipher_generate_iv() on a multi-part cipher operation will generate and return a random 12-byte nonce and set the counter value to zero.
- A call to psa_cipher_set_iv() on a multi-part cipher operation can support the following IV sizes:
 - 12 bytes: the provided IV is used as the nonce, and the counter value is set to zero.

- 16 bytes: the first four bytes of the IV are used as the counter value (encoded as little-endian),
 and the remaining 12 bytes are used as the nonce.
- 8 bytes: the cipher operation uses the original [CHACHA20] definition of ChaCha20: the provided IV is used as the 64-bit nonce, and the 64-bit counter value is set to zero.
- It is recommended that implementations do not support other sizes of IV.

XChaCha20

To use XChaCha20, use a key type of PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 and algorithm id PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER.

XChaCha20 is a variation of ChaCha20 that uses a 192-bit nonce and a 64-bit counter. The larger nonce provides much lower probability of nonce misuse.

When using an XChaCha20 key with the PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER algorithm, the nonce and an initial counter values are provided using the initialization vector (IV) functions in the following ways:

- A call to psa_cipher_encrypt() will generate a random 24-byte nonce, and set the counter value to zero. The random nonce is output as a 24-byte IV value in the output.
- A call to psa_cipher_decrypt() will use first 24 bytes of the input buffer as the nonce and set the counter value to zero.
- A call to psa_cipher_generate_iv() on a multi-part cipher operation will generate and return a random 24-byte nonce and set the counter value to zero.
- A call to psa_cipher_set_iv() on a multi-part cipher operation can support the following IV sizes:
 - 24 bytes: the provided IV is used as the nonce, and the counter value is set to zero.
 - 32 bytes: the first 8 bytes of the IV are used as the counter value (encoded as little-endian), and the remaining 24 bytes are used as the nonce.

Other sizes of IV are invalid.

XChaCha20 is defined in XChaCha: eXtended-nonce ChaCha and AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305 [XCHACHA].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20

PSA_ALG_CTR (macro)

A stream cipher built using the Counter (CTR) mode of a block cipher.

#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000)

CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher. The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a size of 128 bits (16 bytes).

The CTR block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A].

CTR mode operates using a *counter block* which is the same size as the cipher block length. The counter block is updated for each block, or a partial final block, that is encrypted or decrypted.

For the PSA_ALG_CTR algorithm, the counter block is initialized from the IV. The counter block is then treated as a single, big-endian encoded integer, and the counter block is updated by incrementing this integer by 1.

The security of CTR mode depends on using counter block values that are unique across all messages encrypted using the same key value. This is achieved by using suitable initial counter block values, the appropriate way to do this depends on the application use case:

• If the application is using CTR mode to implement a protocol that specifies the construction of the IV, then the application must use a multi-part cipher operation, and call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the appropriate IV for encryption and decryption operations.

Note:

The protocol must use the same counter block update strategy as the one specified here.

- If the application is able to construct a unique *nonce* value for each time the same key is used to encrypt data, then it is recommended that the application uses a multi-part cipher operation, and call psa_cipher_set_iv() using the nonce as the IV for encryption and decryption operations.
 - The nonce length, n bytes, must satisfy $1 \le n \le b$, where b is the cipher block size in bytes. To avoid a counter-block collision with other nonce values, the application must ensure that at most $2^{8(b-n)}$ blocks of data are encrypted in any single operation.
 - For example, when using CTR encryption with an AES key, the cipher block size is 16 bytes. The application can provide a 12-byte nonce when setting the IV. This leaves 4 bytes for the counter, allowing up to 2^{32} blocks (64GB) of message data to be encrypted in each message.
- Otherwise, it is recommended that the application uses a random IV value when encrypting data, and transmits the IV along with the ciphertext for use when decrypting the data. This can be achieved with either the single-part cipher functions or the multi-part cipher operation:
 - In a multi-part cipher encryption operation, call psa_cipher_generate_iv(), which returns the IV value. To use the same IV in a multi-part cipher decryption operation, call psa_cipher_set_iv().
 - A call to psa_cipher_encrypt() will generate a random counter block value. This is the first block
 of output. A call to psa_cipher_decrypt() will use first block of the input buffer as the initial
 counter block value.

When using PSA_ALG_CTR, if the IV passed to psa_cipher_set_iv() is shorter than a cipher block, the initial counter block is formed by padding the end of the IV with zero bytes up to the block length.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG (macro)

The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01300)

This is CCM* as specified in *IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks* [IEEE-CCM] §7, with a tag length of 0. For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm PSA_ALG_CCM.

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

The IV generated or set in the cipher API is used as the nonce in the CCM* operation. An implementation must support the default IV length of 13. Support for setting a shorter IV is optional.

The maximum message length that can be encrypted is dependent on the length of the IV. See PSA_ALG_CCM for details of this relationship.

Usage in Zigbee

The Zigbee message encryption algorithm is based on CCM*. This is detailed in zigbee Specification [ZIGBEE] §B.1.1 and §A.

• For unauthenticated messages — when tag length M=0 — the PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG algorithm is used with an AES-128 key in a multi-part cipher operation. The 13-byte IV must be constructed as specified in [ZIGBEE], and provided to the operation using psa_cipher_set_iv().

Note:

An implementation of Zigbee cannot use the single-part psa_cipher_encrypt() function, as this generates a random IV, which is not valid for the Zigbee protocol.

• For authenticated messages — when tag length $M \in \{4,8,16\}$ — the PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, tag_length) algorithm is used with an AES-128 key, where tag_length is the required value of M. The 13-byte nonce must be constructed as specified in [ZIGBEE].

As the default tag length for CCM is 16, then PSA_ALG_CCM algorithm can be used when M=16.

• To enable a single AES-128 key to be used for both the PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG cipher and PSA_ALG_CCM AEAD algorithm, the key can be defined with the wildcard PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG permitted algorithm.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CFB (macro)

A stream cipher built using the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode of a block cipher.

```
#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100)
```

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type. This is the variant of CFB where each iteration encrypts or decrypts a segment of the input that is the same length as the cipher block size. For example, using PSA_ALG_CFB with a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES will result in the AES-CFB-128 cipher.

CFB mode requires an initialization vector (IV) that is the same size as the cipher block length.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

The CFB block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A], using a segment size s equal to the block size s. The definition in [SP800-38A] is extended to allow an incomplete final block of input, in which case the algorithm discards the final bytes of the key stream when encrypting or decrypting the final partial block.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_OFB (macro)

A stream cipher built using the Output Feedback (OFB) mode of a block cipher.

```
#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200)
```

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

OFB mode requires an initialization vector (IV) that is the same size as the cipher block length. OFB mode requires that the IV is a nonce, and must be unique for each use of the mode with the same key.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

The OFB block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES

PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_XTS (macro)

The XEX with Ciphertext Stealing (XTS) cipher mode of a block cipher.

#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00)

XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher, designed for use in disk encryption. It requires at least one full cipher block length of input, but beyond this minimum the input does not need to be a whole number of blocks.

XTS mode uses two keys for the underlying block cipher. These are provided by using a key that is twice the normal key size for the cipher. For example, to use AES-256-XTS the application must create a key with type PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and bit size 512.

XTS mode requires an initialization vector (IV) that is the same size as the cipher block length. The IV for XTS is typically defined to be the sector number of the disk block being encrypted or decrypted.

The XTS block cipher mode is defined in 1619-2018 --- IEEE Standard for Cryptographic Protection of Data on Block-Oriented Storage Devices [IEEE-XTS].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA KEY TYPE SM4

PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING (macro)

The Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.

#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400)

Warning

ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access to ECB.

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.

ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv() and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

The ECB block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING (macro)

The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.

```
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000)
```

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.

CBC mode requires an initialization vector (IV) that is the same size as the cipher block length.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

The CBC block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 (macro)

The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of a block cipher, with PKCS#7 padding.

#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100)

The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

CBC mode requires an initialization vector (IV) that is the same size as the cipher block length.

Note:

The cipher block length can be determined using PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

The CBC block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38A: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques [SP800-38A]. The padding operation is defined by PKCS #7: Cryptographic Message Syntax Version 1.5 [RFC2315] §10.3.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

10.4.2 Single-part cipher functions

psa_cipher_encrypt (function)

Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.

Parameters

| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. |
|--------------|---|
| alg | The cipher algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true. |
| input | Buffer containing the message to encrypt. |
| input_length | Size of the input buffer in bytes. |
| output | Buffer where the output is to be written. The output contains the IV followed by the ciphertext proper. |
| output_size | Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key: |
| | A sufficient output size is PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) |

where key_type is the type of key.

• PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported cipher encryption.

output_length

On success, the number of bytes that make up the output.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the

encrypted output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a cipher algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

 The input_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type. For example, the algorithm is a based on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the total input size is not a multiple

of the block size.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.

key is not supported for use with alg.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function encrypts a message with a random initialization vector (IV). The length of the IV is PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of key. The output of psa_cipher_encrypt() is the IV followed by the ciphertext.

Use the multi-part operation interface with a psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV or to manage the IV and ciphertext independently.

psa_cipher_decrypt (function)

Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until

the operation terminates. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.

alq The cipher algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

input Buffer containing the message to decrypt. This consists of the IV

followed by the ciphertext proper.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

A sufficient output size is

PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)

where key_type is the type of key.

• PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) evaluates to

the maximum output size of any supported cipher decryption.

output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the output.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the

plaintext.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING The algorithm uses padding, and the input does not contain valid

padding.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not a cipher algorithm.
- key is not compatible with alg.
- The input_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type. For example, the algorithm is a based on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the total input size is not a multiple of the block size.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- input_length is too large for the implementation.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher.

The input to this function must contain the IV followed by the ciphertext, as output by psa_cipher_encrypt(). The IV must be PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) bytes in length, where key_type is the type of key.

Use the multi-part operation interface with a psa_cipher_operation_t object to decrypt data which is not in the expected input format.

10.4.3 Multi-part cipher operations

psa_cipher_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for multi-part cipher operations.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_cipher_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of type psa_cipher_operation_t.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_cipher_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for a cipher operation object.

```
psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_cipher_operation_t

psa_cipher_encrypt_setup (function)

Set the key for a multi-part symmetric encryption operation.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until

the operation terminates. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.

alg The cipher algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a cipher algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a cipher operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to generate or set the initialization vector (IV), if the algorithm requires one. It is recommended to use psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol being implemented requires a specific IV value.
- 5. Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time.
- 6. Call psa_cipher_finish().

After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
- A call to psa_cipher_abort().

If psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_cipher_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_cipher_decrypt_setup (function)

Set the key for a multi-part symmetric decryption operation.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until

the operation terminates. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.

alg The cipher algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not a cipher algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a cipher operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g. PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the initialization vector (IV) for the decryption, if the algorithm requires one. This must match the IV used for the encryption.
- 5. Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message each time.
- Call psa_cipher_finish().

After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
- A call to psa_cipher_abort().

If psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_cipher_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_cipher_generate_iv (function)

Generate an initialization vector (IV) for a symmetric encryption operation.

Parameters

operation Active cipher operation.

iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written.

iv_size Size of the iv buffer in bytes. This must be at least

PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type and alg are type of key and the algorithm respectively that were used to set up the

cipher operation.

iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the generated IV.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*iv_length) bytes of iv contain the generated IV.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The cipher algorithm does not use an IV.

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with no IV set.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

The size of the iv buffer is too small. PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH() or PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

This function generates a random IV, nonce or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size.

The generated IV is always the default length for the key and algorithm: PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg), where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm that were used to set up the operation. To generate different lengths of IV, use psa_generate_random() and psa_cipher_set_iv().

If the cipher algorithm does not use an IV, calling this function returns a PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE error. For these algorithms, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) will be zero.

The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().

psa_cipher_set_iv (function)

Set the initialization vector (IV) for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.

Parameters

operation Active cipher operation.

iv Buffer containing the IV to use.

iv_length Size of the IV in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The cipher algorithm does not use an IV.

- The operation state is not valid: it must be an active cipher encrypt operation, with no IV set.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
- iv_length is not valid for the chosen algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

iv_length is not supported for use with the operation's algorithm and key.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

This function sets the IV, nonce or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation.

If the cipher algorithm does not use an IV, calling this function returns a PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE error. For these algorithms, PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) will be zero.

The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().

Note:

When encrypting, psa_cipher_generate_iv() is recommended instead of using this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires a non-random IV.

psa_cipher_update (function)

Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation.

Parameters

operation Active cipher operation.

input Buffer containing the message fragment to encrypt or decrypt.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

output Buffer where the output is to be written.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

A sufficient output size is
 PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length)
 where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm that

were used to set up the operation.

PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) evaluates to

the maximum output size of any supported cipher algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output.

Returns: psa status t

output_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the output

data.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with an IV set if

required for the algorithm.

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the output buffer is too small.

 ${\sf PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE()} \ or \\$

PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The total input size passed to this operation is too large for this

particular algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The total input size passed to this operation is too large for the

implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The following must occur before calling this function:

- 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input.
- 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv(). psa_cipher_generate_iv() is recommended when encrypting.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().

Note:

This function does not require the input to be aligned to any particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but it might delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent call to psa_cipher_update() provides sufficient input, or a subsequent call to psa_cipher_finish() indicates the end of the input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is bounded by the associated output size macro: PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE().

psa_cipher_finish (function)

Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation.

Parameters

operation Active cipher operation.

output

Buffer where the last part of the output is to be written.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:

• A sufficient output size is PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm that were used to set up the operation.

• PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported cipher algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output.

Returns: psa_status_t

output_length

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the final

output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with an IV set if required for the algorithm.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The

The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING

This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes padding,

and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the total input size

is not a multiple of the block size.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA ERROR STORAGE FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input.

This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_cipher_update().

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().

psa_cipher_abort (function)

Abort a cipher operation.

psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation);

Parameters

operation Initialized cipher operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again.

This function can be called any time after the operation object has been initialized as described in psa_cipher_operation_t.

In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish() is safe and has no effect.

10.4.4 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.

Description

A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated from a key.

PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG (macro)

A wildcard algorithm that permits the use of the key with CCM* as both an AEAD and an unauthenticated cipher algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c09300)
```

If a block-cipher key specifies PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG as its permitted algorithm, then the key can be used with the PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG unauthenticated cipher, the PSA_ALG_CCM AEAD algorithm, and truncated PSA_ALG_CCM AEAD algorithms.

PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alq, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg. key_type A cipher algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that alg

PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

Size of the input in bytes. input_length

Returns

A sufficient output size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.

See also PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the supported key types and cipher algorithms.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

Size of the input in bytes. input_length

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg. key_type alg A cipher algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

Size of the input in bytes. input_length

Returns

A sufficient output size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.

See also PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the supported key types and cipher algorithms.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

input length

Size of the input in bytes.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH (macro)

The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

A cipher algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA ALG IS CIPHER(alg) is true.

Returns

The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

The IV that is generated as part of a call to psa_cipher_encrypt() is always the default IV length for the algorithm.

This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the IV output from psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using a multi-part cipher operation.

See also PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient buffer size for storing the IV generated by psa_cipher_generate_iv(), for any of the supported key types and cipher algorithms.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the IV buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_generate_iv() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH().

PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

A cipher algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

input_length Size of the input in bytes.

Returns

A sufficient output size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return Ø. An implementation can return either Ø or a correct size for a key type and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the supported key types and cipher algorithms.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

input_length Size of the input in bytes.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_finish().

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

A cipher algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient output size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and cipher algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the supported key types and cipher algorithms.

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH (macro)

The block size of a block cipher.

```
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

type

A cipher key type: a value of type psa_key_type_t.

Returns

The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher. The return value is undefined if type is not a supported cipher key type.

Description

Note:

It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block cipher, for example CTR mode (PSA_ALG_CTR). This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be used to determine the size of the data that psa_cipher_update() might buffer for future processing in general.

See also PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE (macro)

The maximum block size of a block cipher supported by the implementation.

#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */

See also PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH().

10.5 Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)

The single-part AEAD functions are:

- psa_aead_encrypt() to encrypt a message using an authenticated symmetric cipher.
- psa_aead_decrypt() to decrypt a message using an authenticated symmetric cipher.

These functions follow the interface recommended by An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption [RFC5116].

The encryption function requires a nonce to be provided. To generate a random nonce, either call psa_generate_random() or use the AEAD multi-part API.

The psa_aead_operation_t multi-part operation permits alternative initialization parameters and allows messages to be processed in fragments. A multi-part AEAD operation is used as follows:

- 1. Initialize the psa_aead_operation_t object to zero, or by assigning the value of the associated macro PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
- 2. Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 3. Provide additional parameters:
 - If the algorithm requires it, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the non-encrypted and encrypted inputs to the operation.
 - When encrypting, call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to generate or set the nonce.

- When decrypting, call psa_aead_set_nonce() to set the nonce.
- 4. Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero or more times with fragments of the non-encrypted additional data.
- 5. Call psa_aead_update() zero or more times with fragments of the plaintext or ciphertext to encrypt or decrypt.
- 6. At the end of the message, call the required finishing function:
 - To complete an encryption operation, call psa_aead_finish() to compute and return authentication tag.
 - To complete a decryption operation, call psa_aead_verify() to compute the authentication tag and verify it against a reference value.

To abort the operation or recover from an error, call psa_aead_abort().

Note:

Using a multi-part interface to authenticated encryption raises specific issues.

- Multi-part authenticated decryption produces intermediate results that are not authenticated.
 Revealing unauthenticated results, either directly or indirectly through the application's behavior, can compromise the confidentiality of all inputs that are encrypted with the same key. See the detailed warning.
- For encryption, some common algorithms cannot be processed in a streaming fashion. For SIV mode, the whole plaintext must be known before the encryption can start; the multi-part AEAD API is not meant to be usable with SIV mode. For CCM mode, the length of the plaintext must be known before the encryption can start; the application can call the function psa_aead_set_lengths() to provide these lengths before providing input.

10.5.1 AEAD algorithms

PSA_ALG_CCM (macro)

The Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) authenticated encryption algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100)
```

CCM is defined for block ciphers that have a 128-bit block size. The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

To use PSA_ALG_CCM with a multi-part AEAD operation, the application must call psa_aead_set_lengths() before providing the nonce, the additional data and plaintext to the operation.

CCM requires a nonce of between 7 and 13 bytes in length. The length of the nonce affects the maximum length of the plaintext than can be encrypted or decrypted. If the nonce has length N, then the plaintext length pLen is encoded in L=15-N octets, this requires that $pLen < 2^{8L}$.

The value for L that is used with PSA_ALG_CCM depends on the function used to provide the nonce:

• A call to psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt(), or psa_aead_set_nonce() will set $L=15-{\tt nonce_length}$. If the plaintext length cannot be encoded in L octets, then a PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT error is returned.

• A call to psa_aead_generate_nonce() on a multi-part cipher operation will select the smallest integer $L \geq 2$, where $pLen < 2^{8L}$, with pLen being the plaintext_length provided to psa_aead_set_lengths(). The call to psa_aead_generate_nonce() will generate and return a random nonce of length 15-L bytes.

CCM supports authentication tag sizes of 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 bytes. The default tag length is 16. Shortened tag lengths can be requested using PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, tag_length), where tag_length is a valid CCM tag length.

The CCM block cipher mode is defined in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) [RFC3610].

Usage in Zigbee

The CCM* algorithm is required by zigbee Specification [ZIGBEE].

- PSA_ALG_CCM, and its truncated variants, can be used to implement CCM* for non-zero tag lengths.
- For unauthenticated CCM*, with a zero-length tag, use the PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG cipher algorithm.

See also Usage in Zigbee under PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_GCM (macro)

The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) authenticated encryption algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200)
```

GCM is defined for block ciphers that have a 128-bit block size. The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.

GCM requires a nonce of at least 1 byte in length. The maximum supported nonce size is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. Calling psa_aead_generate_nonce() will generate a random 12-byte nonce.

GCM supports authentication tag sizes of 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 bytes. The default tag length is 16. Shortened tag lengths can be requested using PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, tag_length), where tag_length is a valid GCM tag length.

The GCM block cipher mode is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC [SP800-38D].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4

PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 (macro)

The ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500)

There are two defined variants of ChaCha20-Poly1305:

- An implementation that supports ChaCha20-Poly1305 must support the variant defined by ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols [RFC8439], which has a 96-bit nonce and 32-bit counter.
- An implementation can optionally also support the original variant defined by *ChaCha*, a variant of *Salsa20* [CHACHA20], which has a 64-bit nonce and 64-bit counter.

The variant used for the AEAD encryption or decryption operation, depends on the nonce provided for an AEAD operation using PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305:

- A nonce provided in a call to psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() or psa_aead_set_nonce() must be 8 or 12 bytes. The size of nonce will select the appropriate variant of the algorithm.
- A nonce generated by a call to psa_aead_generate_nonce() will be 12 bytes, and will use the [RFC8439] variant.

Implementations must support 16-byte tags. It is recommended that truncated tag sizes are rejected.

Compatible key types

PSA KEY TYPE CHACHA20

PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 (macro)

The XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100600)

XChaCha20-Poly1305 is a variation of the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm, but uses a 192-bit nonce. The larger nonce provides much lower probability of nonce misuse.

XChaCha20-Poly1305 requires a 24-byte nonce.

Implementations must support 16-byte tags. It is recommended that truncated tag sizes are rejected.

XChaCha20-Poly1305 is defined in XChaCha: eXtended-nonce ChaCha and AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305 [XCHACHA].

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20

PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG (macro)

Macro to build a AEAD algorithm with a shortened tag.

```
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

aead_alg An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(aead_alg) is true.

tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.

Returns

The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified tag length.

Unspecified if aead_alg is not a supported AEAD algorithm or if tag_length is not valid for the specified AEAD algorithm.

Description

An AEAD algorithm with a shortened tag is similar to the corresponding AEAD algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes. Depending on the algorithm, the tag length might affect the calculation of the ciphertext.

The AEAD algorithm with a default length tag can be recovered using PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG().

Compatible key types

The resulting AEAD algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the AEAD algorithm used to construct it.

PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG (macro)

An AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.

```
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

aead_alg An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(aead_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length for that algorithm.

Description

This macro can be used to construct the AEAD algorithm with default tag length from an AEAD algorithm with a shortened tag. See also PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG().

Compatible key types

The resulting AEAD algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the AEAD algorithm used to construct it.

PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG (macro)

Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that aead alg

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(aead_alg) is true.

Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in bytes. This must min_tag_length

be at least 1 and at most the largest permitted tag length of the

algorithm.

Returns

The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the specified minimum tag length.

Unspecified if aead_alg is not a supported AEAD algorithm or if min_tag_length is less than 1 or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm.

Description

A key with a minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm as permitted-algorithm policy can be used with all AEAD algorithms sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the wildcard algorithm.

Note:

When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the smallest tag length permitted by the base algorithm, this effectively becomes an 'any-tag-length-permitted' policy for that base algorithm.

The AEAD algorithm with a default length tag can be recovered using PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG().

Compatible key types

The resulting wildcard AEAD algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the AEAD algorithm used to construct it.

10.5.2 Single-part AEAD functions

psa_aead_encrypt (function)

Process an authenticated encryption operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * nonce,
                              size_t nonce_length,
                              const uint8_t * additional_data,
```

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(continued from previous page)

size_t additional_data_length, const uint8_t * plaintext, size_t plaintext_length, uint8_t * ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_size, size_t * ciphertext_length);

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.

alg The AEAD algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Nonce or IV to use. nonce

Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the nonce_length

selected algorithm. The default nonce size is

PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of

Additional data that will be authenticated but not encrypted. additional_data

Size of additional_data in bytes. additional_data_length

Data that will be authenticated and encrypted. plaintext

plaintext_length Size of plaintext in bytes.

ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and encrypted data. The

> additional data is not part of this output. For algorithms where the encrypted data and the authentication tag are defined as separate outputs, the authentication tag is appended to the encrypted data.

Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the ciphertext_size

selected algorithm and key:

A sufficient output size is

PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length)

where key_type is the type of key.

 PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum ciphertext size of any supported AEAD

encryption.

On success, the size of the output in the ciphertext buffer. ciphertext_length

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. The first (*ciphertext_length) bytes of ciphertext contain PSA_SUCCESS

the output.

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

key is not a valid key identifier. PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

The size of the ciphertext buffer is too small.

PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() Or

PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not an AEAD algorithm.
- key is not compatible with alg.
- nonce_length is not valid for use with alg and key.
- additional_data_length or plaintext_length are too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- nonce_length is not supported for use with alg and key.
- additional_data_length or plaintext_length are too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

psa_aead_decrypt (function)

Process an authenticated decryption operation.

Parameters

key

Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.

alg

The AEAD algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

nonce Nonce or IV to use.

nonce_length Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm. The default nonce size is

PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of

key.

additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated but not encrypted.

additional_data_length Size of additional_data in bytes.

ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and encrypted. For algorithms

where the encrypted data and the authentication tag are defined as separate inputs, the buffer must contain the encrypted data followed

by the authentication tag.

ciphertext_length Size of ciphertext in bytes.

plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data.

plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

 A sufficient output size is PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg,

• PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) evaluates

to the maximum plaintext size of any supported AEAD

ciphertext_length) where key_type is the type of key.

decryption.

plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in the plaintext buffer.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*plaintext_length) bytes of plaintext contain the

output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE The ciphertext is not authentic.

PSA ERROR BUFFER TOO SMALL The size of the plaintext buffer is too small.

PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not an AEAD algorithm.
- key is not compatible with alg.
- nonce_length is not valid for use with alg and key.
- additional_data_length Or ciphertext_length are too large for alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.

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- key is not supported for use with alg.
- nonce_length is not supported for use with alg and key.
- additional_data_length or plaintext_length are too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

10.5.3 Multi-part AEAD operations

Warning

When decrypting using a multi-part AEAD operation, there is no guarantee that the input or output is valid until psa_aead_verify() has returned PSA_SUCCESS.

A call to psa_aead_update() or psa_aead_update_ad() returning PSA_SUCCESS **does not** indicate that the input and output is valid.

Until an application calls psa_aead_verify() and it has returned PSA_SUCCESS, the following rules apply to input and output data from a multi-part AEAD operation:

- Do not trust the input. If the application takes any action that depends on the input data, this action will need to be undone if the input turns out to be invalid.
- Store the output in a confidential location. In particular, the application must not copy the output to a memory or storage space which is shared.
- Do not trust the output. If the application takes any action that depends on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be undone if the input turns out to be invalid. Furthermore, if an adversary can observe that this action took place, for example, through timing, they might be able to use this fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the same key.

An application that does not follow these rules might be vulnerable to maliciously constructed AEAD input data.

psa_aead_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for multi-part AEAD operations.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_aead_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_aead_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_aead_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_aead_operation_t operation;
operation = psa_aead_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of type psa_aead_operation_t.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_aead_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object.

```
psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_aead_operation_t

psa_aead_encrypt_setup (function)

Set the key for a multi-part authenticated encryption operation.

Parameters

| operation | The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the documentation for psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. |
|-----------|---|
| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until the operation terminates. It must permit the usage |
| | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT. |
| alg | The AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true. |

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not an AEAD algorithm.

• key is not compatible with alg.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication is as follows:

- 1. Allocate an AEAD operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() for details.
- 5. Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to generate or set the nonce. It is recommended to use psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol being implemented requires a specific nonce value.
- 6. Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
- 7. Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the message to encrypt each time.
- 8. Call psa_aead_finish().

After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_aead_finish().
- A call to psa_aead_abort().

If psa_aead_encrypt_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_aead_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_aead_decrypt_setup (function)

Set the key for a multi-part authenticated decryption operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                    psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
```

Parameters

| operation | The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the documentation for psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use. |
|-----------|--|
| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must remain valid until the operation terminates. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. |
| alg | The AEAD algorithm to compute: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true. |

Re

| | that PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true. |
|----------------------------|--|
| eturns: psa_status_t | |
| PSA_SUCCESS | Success. The operation is now active. |
| PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE | The following conditions can result in this error: |
| | The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). |
| PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE | key is not a valid key identifier. |
| PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED | The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm. |
| PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT | The following conditions can result in this error: |
| | alg is not an AEAD algorithm.key is not compatible with alg. |
| PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED | The following conditions can result in this error: |

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

• alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

```
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication is as follows:

- 1. Allocate an AEAD operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_aead_operation_t, e.g. PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
- 4. If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths() for details.
- 5. Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption.
- 6. Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
- 7. Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment of the ciphertext to decrypt each time.
- 8. Call psa_aead_verify().

After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_aead_verify().
- A call to psa_aead_abort().

If psa_aead_decrypt_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_aead_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_aead_set_lengths (function)

Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.

Parameters

operation Active AEAD operation.

ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data in bytes.

plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, and psa_aead_set_nonce() and psa_aead_generate_nonce() must not have been called yet.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ad_length or plaintext_length are too large for the chosen algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ad_length or plaintext_length are too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA ERROR CORRUPTION DETECTED

Description

The application must call this function before calling psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce(), if the algorithm for the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it, calling this function is optional, but if this function is called then the implementation must enforce the lengths.

- For PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
- For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling this function is not required.
- For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

psa_aead_generate_nonce (function)

Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation.

Parameters

operation Active AEAD operation.

nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be written.

nonce_size Size of the nonce buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

- A sufficient output size is PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm that were used to set up the operation.
- PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to a sufficient output size for any supported AEAD algorithm.

nonce_length

On success, the number of bytes of the generated nonce.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

Success. The first (*nonce_length) bytes of nonce contain the generated nonce.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be an active AEAD encryption operation, with no nonce set.
- The operation state is not valid: this is an algorithm which requires psa_aead_set_lengths() to be called before setting the nonce.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA ERROR BUFFER TOO SMALL

The size of the nonce buffer is too small. PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() or PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA ERROR COMMUNICATION FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size.

Most algorithms generate a default-length nonce, as returned by PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(). Some algorithms can return a shorter nonce from psa_aead_generate_nonce(), see the individual algorithm descriptions for details.

The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before calling this function. If applicable for the algorithm, the application must call psa_aead_set_lengths() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

psa_aead_set_nonce (function)

Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation.

Parameters

operation Active AEAD operation.

nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use.

nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes. This must be a valid nonce size for the

chosen algorithm. The default nonce size is

PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) where key_type and alg are type of key and the algorithm respectively that were used to set up

the AEAD operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with no nonce set
- The operation state is not valid: this is an algorithm which requires psa_aead_set_lengths() to be called before setting the nonce
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

GUMENT nonce_length is not valid for the chosen algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

nonce_length is not supported for use with the operation's algorithm and key.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function sets the nonce for the authenticated encryption or decryption operation.

The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. If applicable for the algorithm, the application must call psa_aead_set_lengths() before calling this function.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

Note:

When encrypting, psa_aead_generate_nonce() is recommended instead of using this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires a non-random IV.

psa_aead_update_ad (function)

Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                const uint8_t * input,
                                size_t input_length);
```

Parameters

Active AEAD operation. operation

Buffer containing the fragment of additional data. input

Size of the input buffer in bytes. input_length

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. PSA_SUCCESS



When decrypting, do not trust the additional data until psa_aead_verify() succeeds.

See the detailed warning.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, have a nonce set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

Excess additional data: the total input length to psa_aead_update_ad() is greater than the additional data length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or is too large for the chosen AEAD algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The total additional data length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

```
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted.

This function can be called multiple times to pass successive fragments of the additional data. This function must not be called after passing data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update().

The following must occur before calling this function:

- 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
- 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

psa_aead_update (function)

Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * input,
                             size_t input_length,
                             uint8_t * output,
                             size_t output_size,
                             size_t * output_length);
```

Parameters

Active AEAD operation. operation

Buffer containing the message fragment to encrypt or decrypt. input

Size of the input buffer in bytes. input_length

output Buffer where the output is to be written.

Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the output_size selected algorithm and key:

- A sufficient output size is PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm that were used to set up the operation.
- PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported AEAD algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output.

output_length

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

Success. The first (*output_length) of output contains the output data.



Warning

When decrypting, do not use the output until psa_aead_verify() succeeds.

See the detailed warning.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, have a nonce set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE() can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- Incomplete additional data: the total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() is less than the additional data length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- Excess input data: the total length of input to psa_aead_update() is greater than the plaintext length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or is too large for the specific AEAD algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The following must occur before calling this function:

- 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup(). The choice of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or decrypts its input.
- 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
- 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

Note:

This function does not require the input to be aligned to any particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but it might delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent call to psa_aead_update() provides sufficient input, or a subsequent call to psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() indicates the end of the input. The amount of data that can be delayed in this way is bounded by the associated

The total input length is too large for the implementation.

psa_aead_finish (function)

Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation.

Active AEAD operation.

selected algorithm and key:

Parameters

operation

ciphertext

ciphertext_size

ciphertext_length

tag

tag_size

output size of any supported AEAD algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes of returned ciphertext.

Buffer where the authentication tag is to be written.

that were used to set up the operation.

Size of the tag buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:

Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext is to be written.

Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

• A sufficient output size is PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alq) where key_type is the type of key and alq is the algorithm

• PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum

- The exact tag size is PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are the type and bit-size of the key, and alg is the algorithm that were used in the call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
- PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum tag size of any supported AEAD algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned tag.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

tag_length

Success. The first (*tag_length) bytes of tag contain the authentication tag.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be an active encryption operation with a nonce set.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size

The size of the ciphertext or tag buffer is too small.

PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required ciphertext buffer size.

PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH() or PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the required tag buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- Incomplete additional data: the total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() is less than the additional data length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
- Incomplete plaintext: the total length of input to psa_aead_update() is less than the plaintext length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
```

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup().

This function finishes the authentication of the additional data formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().

This function has two output buffers:

- ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
- tag contains the authentication tag.

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

psa_aead_verify (function)

Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation.

Parameters

operation Active AEAD operation.

Buffer where the last part of the plaintext is to be written. This is the

remaining data from previous calls to psa_aead_update() that could not

be processed until the end of the input.

plaintext_size Size of the plaintext buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

• A sufficient output size is PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) where key_type is the type of key and alg is the algorithm

that were used to set up the operation.

• PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported AEAD algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes of returned plaintext.

Buffer containing the expected authentication tag.

Size of the tag buffer in bytes.

plaintext_length

tag

tag_length

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. For a decryption operation, it is now safe to use the

additional data and the plaintext output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be an active decryption

operation with a nonce set.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

The calculated authentication tag does not match the value in tag.

The size of the plaintext buffer is too small.

PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE

can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

• Incomplete additional data: the total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() is less than the additional data length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().

• Incomplete ciphertext: the total length of input to psa_aead_update() is less than the plaintext length that was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup().

This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message components:

- The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad().
- The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
- The tag passed to this function call.

If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct, this function returns PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.

When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().

Implementation note

Implementations must make the best effort to ensure that the comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed in constant time.

psa_aead_abort (function)

Abort an AEAD operation.

```
psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t * operation);
```

Parameters

operation Initialized AEAD operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again.

This function can be called any time after the operation object has been initialized as described in psa_aead_operation_t.

In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect.

10.5.4 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

alg An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.

Returns

The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the ciphertext might be smaller.

See also PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

Size of the plaintext in bytes. plaintext_length

Description

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA AEAD ENCRYPT OUTPUT SIZE().

PSA AEAD DECRYPT OUTPUT SIZE (macro)

A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg. key_type An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that alq

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Size of the ciphertext in bytes. ciphertext_length

Returns

The AEAD plaintext size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the plaintext might be smaller.

See also PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

Size of the ciphertext in bytes. ciphertext_length

Description

If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH (macro)

The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Returns

The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the nonce buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_generate_nonce() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

For most AEAD algorithms, PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH() evaluates to the exact size of the nonce generated by psa_aead_generate_nonce().

See also PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient buffer size for storing the nonce generated by psa_aead_generate_nonce(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the nonce buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_generate_nonce() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH().

PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update().

```
#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

alg An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

input_length Size of the input in bytes.

Returns

A sufficient output buffer size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

input_length

Size of the input in bytes.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish().

```
#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type

A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

alg

An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return Ø. An implementation can return either Ø or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

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PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient ciphertext buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH (macro)

The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type The type of the AEAD key.

key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits.

alq An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Returns

The tag length for the specified algorithm and key. If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified tag that can be distinguished from the rest of the ciphertext, return 0. If the AEAD algorithm is not recognized, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for an AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

This is the size of the tag output from psa_aead_finish().

If the size of the tag buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient tag buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient buffer size for storing the tag output by psa_aead_finish(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the tag buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH().

PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), in bytes.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

An AEAD algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the specified key type and algorithm. If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and AEAD algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.

Description

If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the supported key types and AEAD algorithms.

```
#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE().

10.6 Key derivation

A key derivation encodes a deterministic method to generate a finite stream of bytes. This data stream is computed by the cryptoprocessor and extracted in chunks. If two key-derivation operations are constructed with the same parameters, then they produce the same output.

A key derivation consists of two phases:

- 1. Input collection. This is sometimes known as *extraction*: the operation "extracts" information from the inputs to generate a pseudorandom intermediate secret value.
- 2. Output generation. This is sometimes known as *expansion*: the operation "expands" the intermediate secret value to the desired output length.

The specification defines a multi-part operation API for key derivation that allows:

• Multiple key and non-key outputs to be produced from a single derivation operation object.

- Key and non-key outputs can be extracted from the key-derivation object, or compared with existing key and non-key values.
- Algorithms that require high-entropy secret inputs. For example PSA_ALG_HKDF.
- Algorithms that work with low-entropy secret inputs, or passwords. For example PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC().

An implementation with isolation has the following properties:

- The intermediate state of the key derivation is not visible to the caller.
- If an output of the derivation is a non-exportable key, then this key cannot be recovered outside the isolation boundary.
- If an output of the derivation is compared using psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), then the output is not visible to the caller.

Applications use the psa_key_derivation_operation_t type to create key-derivation operations. The operation object is used as follows:

- 1. Initialize a psa_key_derivation_operation_t object to zero or to PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT.
- 2. Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select a key-derivation algorithm.
- 3. Call the functions psa_key_derivation_input_key() or psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() to provide the secret inputs, and psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_integer() to provide the non-secret inputs, to the key-derivation algorithm. Many key-derivation algorithms take multiple inputs; the step parameter to these functions indicates which input is being provided. The documentation for each key-derivation algorithm describes the expected inputs for that algorithm and in what order to pass them.
- 4. Optionally, call psa_key_derivation_set_capacity() to set a limit on the amount of data that can be output from the key-derivation operation.
- 5. Call an output or verification function:
 - psa_key_derivation_output_key() Or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() to create a derived key
 - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() to export the derived data.
 - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() to compare a derived key with an existing key value.
 - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() to compare derived data with a buffer.

These functions can be called multiple times to read successive output from the key derivation, until the stream is exhausted when its capacity has been reached.

6. Key derivation does not finish in the same way as other multi-part operations. Call psa_key_derivation_abort() to release the key-derivation operation memory when the object is no longer required.

To recover from an error, call psa_key_derivation_abort() to release the key-derivation operation memory.

A key-derivation operation cannot be rewound. Once a part of the stream has been output, it cannot be output again. This ensures that the same part of the output will not be used for different purposes.

10.6.1 Key-derivation algorithms

PSA_ALG_HKDF (macro)

Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding HKDF algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_HKDF (PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) specified by HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [RFC5869].

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step. It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key (input keying material) used in the "extract" step.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.

If PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is provided, it must be before PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET. PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO can be provided at any time after setup and before starting to generate output.

Warning

HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alq if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.

Each input may only be passed once.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the secret key) PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the other inputs)

PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT (macro)

Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is the Extract step of HKDF as specified by HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [RFC5869] §2.2.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the "extract" step.

The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. Each input may only be passed once.

Warning

HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.

Warning

HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the input keying material)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the salt)

PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND (macro)

Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is the Expand step of HKDF as specified by HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [RFC5869] §2.3.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.

The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above. Each input may only be passed once.

Warning

HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND is provided as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the pseudorandom key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the info string)

PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC (macro)

Macro to build a NIST SP 800-108 conformant, counter-mode KDF algorithm based on HMAC.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(hash_alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding key-derivation algorithm. For example, the counter-mode KDF using HMAC-SHA-256 is PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256).

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is an HMAC-based, counter mode key-derivation function, using the construction recommended by NIST Special Publication 800-108r1: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions [SP800-108], §4.1.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:

- ullet PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret input keying material, K_{IN} .
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the Label. It is optional; if omitted, Label is a zero-length string. If provided, it must not contain any null bytes.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT is the *Context*. It is optional; if omitted, *Context* is a zero-length string.

Each input can only be passed once. Inputs must be passed in the order above.

This algorithm uses the output length as part of the derivation process. In the derivation this value is L, the required output size in bits. After setup, the initial capacity of the key-derivation operation is $2^{29} - 1$ bytes (0x1fffffff). The capacity can be set to a lower value by calling psa_key_derivation_set_capacity().

When the first output is requested, the value of L is calculated as L=8*cap, where cap is the value of psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(). Subsequent calls to psa_key_derivation_set_capacity() are not permitted for this algorithm.

The derivation is constructed as described in [SP800-108] §4.1, with the iteration counter i and output length L encoded as big-endian, 32-bit values. The resulting output stream $K_1 \parallel K_2 \parallel K_3 \parallel ...$ is computed as:

$$K_i = \mathsf{HMAC}(K_{IN},[i]_4 \mid\mid Label\mid\mid \mathsf{0} \times \mathsf{00}\mid\mid Context\mid\mid [L]_4), \quad \text{for } i=1,2,3,\dots$$

Where $[x]_n$ is the big-endian, n-byte encoding of the integer x.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the other inputs)

PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC (macro)

Macro to build a NIST SP 800-108 conformant, counter-mode KDF algorithm based on CMAC.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000800)
```

This is a CMAC-based, counter mode key-derivation function, using the construction recommended by NIST Special Publication 800-108r1: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions [SP800-108], §4.1.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret input keying material, K_{IN} . This must be a block-cipher key that is compatible with the CMAC algorithm, and must be input using psa_key_derivation_input_key(). See also PSA_ALG_CMAC.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the Label. It is optional; if omitted, Label is a zero-length string. If provided, it must not contain any null bytes.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT is the *Context*. It is optional; if omitted, *Context* is a zero-length string.

Each input can only be passed once. Inputs must be passed in the order above.

This algorithm uses the output length as part of the derivation process. In the derivation this value is L, the required output size in bits. After setup, the initial capacity of the key-derivation operation is $2^{29} - 1$ bytes (0x1fffffff). The capacity can be set to a lower value by calling psa_key_derivation_set_capacity().

When the first output is requested, the value of L is calculated as L=8*cap, where cap is the value of psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(). Subsequent calls to psa_key_derivation_set_capacity() are not permitted for this algorithm.

The derivation is constructed as described in [SP800-108] §4.1, with the following details:

- The iteration counter i and output length L are encoded as big-endian, 32-bit values.
- The mitigation to make the CMAC-based construction robust is implemented.

The resulting output stream $K_1 \parallel K_2 \parallel K_3 \parallel \dots$ is computed as:

```
\begin{split} K_0 &= \mathsf{CMAC}(K_{IN}, Label \mid\mid \texttt{0x00} \mid\mid Context \mid\mid [L]_4 \;) \\ K_i &= \mathsf{CMAC}(K_{IN}, [i]_4 \mid\mid Label \mid\mid \texttt{0x00} \mid\mid Context \mid\mid [L]_4 \mid\mid K_0), \quad \text{for } i = 1, 2, 3, \dots \end{split}
```

Where $[x]_n$ is the big-endian, n-byte encoding of the integer x.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4 (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the other inputs)
```

PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF (macro)

Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) represents the TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule, specified in *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version* 1.2 [RFC5246] §5. It is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be passed in the order given here:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.

Each input may only be passed once.

For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion:

- The seed is the concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random.
- The label is "key expansion".

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the secret key)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the other inputs)

PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS (macro)

Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.

Changed in version 1.1: Added step to support cipher-suites that include a key-exchange.

#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_T0_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) represents the TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret (MS) is derived from the pre-shared key (PSK) through the application of padding (*Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)* [RFC4279] §2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (*The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2* [RFC5246] §5). The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be passed in the order given here:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional; if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length as the secret (PSK) input.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the PSK. The PSK must not be larger than PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.

Each input may only be passed once.

For the application to TLS-1.2:

- The seed, which is forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF, is the concatenation of the ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random.
- The other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
 - For a plain PSK cipher suite ([RFC4279] §2), omit PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET.
 - For a DHE-PSK ([RFC4279] §3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite (ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5489] §2), the other secret should be the output of the PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer. The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key-derivation algorithm constructed as PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_T0_MS(hash_alg)) and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively, this input may be an output of psa_key_agreement() passed with psa_key_derivation_input_key(), or an equivalent input passed with psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() Or psa_key_derivation_input_key().
 - For a RSA-PSK cipher suite ([RFC4279] §4), the other secret should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of [RFC5246] §7.4.7.1) concatenation of the TLS version and a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key-derivation operation with psa_key_derivation_input_bytes().
- The label is "master secret" or "extended master secret".

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for the PSK) PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for the other inputs)

PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS (macro)

The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS key-derivation algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000609)

This KDF is defined in Elliptic Curve J-PAKE Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [TLS-ECJPAKE] §8.7. This specifies the use of a KDF to derive the TLS 1.2 session secrets from the output of EC J-PAKE over the secp256r1 Elliptic curve (the 256-bit curve in PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1). EC J-PAKE operations can be performed using a PAKE operation, see Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) on page 296.

This KDF takes the shared secret K' (an uncompressed EC point in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.x).

This function takes a single input:

• PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE. For secp256r1, the input is exactly 65 bytes.

The shared secret can be obtained by calling psa_pake_get_shared_key() on a PAKE operation that is performing the EC J-PAKE algorithm. See Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) on page 296.

The 32-byte output has to be read in a single call to either psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), Or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(). The size of the output is defined as PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_OUTPUT_SIZE.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE — the secret key is extracted from a PAKE operation by calling psa_pake_get_shared_key().

PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC (macro)

Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password-hashing or key-stretching algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm. For example, PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is the algorithm identifier for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

PBKDF2 is specified by *PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1* [RFC8018] §5.2. This macro constructs a PBKDF2 algorithm that uses a pseudorandom function based on HMAC with the specified hash.

This key-derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be provided in the following order:

- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count. This input step must be used exactly once.
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt. This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
- PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed. This input step must be used exactly once.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for password input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (for password input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER (for salt input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for salt input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH (for key verification)

PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 (macro)

The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password-hashing or key-stretching algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800200)
```

PBKDF2 is specified by *PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification Version 2.1* [RFC8018] §5.2. This algorithm specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm using the AES-CMAC-PRF-128 pseudorandom function specified by [RFC4615]

This key-derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as $PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC()$ with the same constraints.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE (for password input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (for password input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER (for salt input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA (for salt input)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH (for key verification)

10.6.2 Input step types

psa_key_derivation_step_t (typedef)

Encoding of the step of a key derivation.

typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;

Implementation note

It is recommended that the value 0 is not allocated as a valid key-derivation step.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET (macro)

A high-entropy secret input for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key(), or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

For some algorithms, a specific type of key is required. For example, see PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC.

The secret can also be a direct input passed to psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(). In this case, the derivation operation cannot be used to derive keys: the operation will not permit a call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() Or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET (macro)

A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). It may alternatively be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key(), or a direct input passed to psa_key_derivation_input_bytes().

PSA KEY DERIVATION INPUT PASSWORD (macro)

A low-entropy secret input for password hashing or key stretching.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is usually a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key() or a direct input passed to psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() that is a password or passphrase. It can also be high-entropy secret, for example, a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.

If the secret is a direct input, the derivation operation cannot be used to derive keys: the operation will not permit a call to psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL (macro)

A label for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a direct input. It can also be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT (macro)

A context for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a direct input. It can also be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT (macro)

A salt for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a direct input. It can also be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO (macro)

An information string for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a direct input. It can also be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED (macro)

A seed for key derivation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED /* implementation-defined value */
```

This is typically a direct input. It can also be a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST (macro)

A cost parameter for password hashing or key stretching.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST /* implementation-defined value */
```

This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().

10.6.3 Key-derivation functions

psa_key_derivation_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for key-derivation operations.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_key_derivation_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on a key-derivation operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_key_derivation_operation;
operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key-derivation operation object of type psa_key_derivation_operation_t.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_key_derivation_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for a key-derivation operation object.

```
psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_setup (function)

Set up a key-derivation operation.

| <pre>psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,</pre> | |
|--|--|
| <pre>psa_algorithm_t alg);</pre> | |

Parameters

alq

operation The key-derivation operation object to set up. It must have been initialized but not set up yet.

The algorithm to compute. This must be one of the following:

• A key-derivation algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) is true.

• A key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is true and PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is false.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation is now active.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT alg is neither a key-derivation algorithm, nor a key-agreement and

key-derivation algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED alg is not supported or is not a key-derivation algorithm, or a

key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

A key-derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate a byte stream in a deterministic way. This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other cryptographic material.

A key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm uses a key-agreement protocol to provide a shared secret which is used for the key derivation. See psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

The sequence of operations to derive a key is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a key-derivation operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_key_derivation_operation_t, e.g. PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to specify the algorithm.
- 4. Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key() as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, whether keys are permitted, and what type of keys depends on the algorithm.
- 5. Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). This can be done before, in the middle of, or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory

because the output depends on the maximum capacity.

- 6. To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(). To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(). Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes calculated by the key-derivation algorithm.
- 7. Clean up the key-derivation operation object with psa_key_derivation_abort().

After a successful call to psa_key_derivation_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation with a call to psa_key_derivation_abort().

If psa_key_derivation_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_key_derivation_abort(). See *Multi-part operations* on page 25.

psa_key_derivation_get_capacity (function)

Retrieve the current capacity of a key-derivation operation.

Parameters

operation The operation to query.

capacity On success, the capacity of the operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The maximum number of bytes that this key derivation can

return is (*capacity).

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can return. Reading N bytes of output from a key-derivation operation reduces its capacity by at least N. The capacity can be reduced by more than N in the following situations:

- Calling psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() can reduce the capacity by more than the key size, depending on the type of key being generated. See psa_key_derivation_output_key() for details of the key-derivation process.
- When the psa_key_derivation_operation_t object is operating as a deterministic random bit generator (DBRG), which reduces capacity in whole blocks, even when less than a block is read.

psa_key_derivation_set_capacity (function)

Set the maximum capacity of a key-derivation operation.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to modify.

capacity The new capacity of the operation. It must be less or equal to the

operation's current capacity.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity. In this case,

the operation object remains valid and its capacity remains unchanged.

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

The capacity of a key-derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes that the key-derivation operation can return from this point onwards.

Note:

For some algorithms, the capacity value can affect the output of the key derivation. For example, see PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC.

psa_key_derivation_input_bytes (function)

Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to use. It must have been set up

with psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not have produced any

output yet.

step Which step the input data is for.

data Input data to use.

data_length Size of the data buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid for this input step. This can happen if the application provides a step out of order or repeats a step that may not be repeated.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.

• step does not permit direct inputs.

• data_length is too small or too large for step in this particular algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.

 data_length is is not supported for step in this particular algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. Refer to the documentation of each key-derivation or key-agreement algorithm for information.

This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which is normally in a key object, call <code>psa_key_derivation_input_key()</code> instead of this function. Refer to the documentation of individual step types (<code>PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx</code> values of type <code>psa_key_derivation_step_t</code>) for more information.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

psa_key_derivation_input_integer (function)

Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to use. It must have been set up

with psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not have produced any

output yet.

step Which step the input data is for.

value The value of the numeric input.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid for this input step. This can happen if the application provides a step out of order or repeats a step that may not be repeated.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

• step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.

• step does not permit numerical inputs.

• value is not valid for step in the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.

• value is not supported for step in the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA ERROR CORRUPTION DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters. Refer to the documentation of each key-derivation or key-agreement algorithm for information.

This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative integers.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

psa_key_derivation_input_key (function)

Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to use. It must have been set up

with psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not have produced any

output yet.

step Which step the input data is for.

key Identifier of the key. The key must have an appropriate type for step, it

must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note), and it must permit the

algorithm used by the operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid for this input step. This can happen if the application provides a step out of order or repeats a step that may not be repeated.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key has neither the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION usage flag.
- The key does not permit the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
- step does not permit key inputs of the given type, or does not permit key inputs at all.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
- Key inputs of the given type are not supported for step in the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

```
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm. Refer to the documentation of each key-derivation or key-agreement algorithm for information.

This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store, call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function. Refer to the documentation of individual step types (PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx values of type psa_key_derivation_step_t) for more information.

Note:

Once all inputs steps are completed, the following operations are permitted:

- psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input, or a key with usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() if the input for step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD was a key with usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, and every other input was either a direct input or a key with usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes()
- psa_key_derivation_verify_key()

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

psa_key_derivation_output_bytes (function)

Read some data from a key-derivation operation.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to read from.

output Buffer where the output will be written.

output_length Number of bytes to output.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first output_length bytes of output contain the derived

data.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with all required input steps complete.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

One of the inputs was a key whose policy did not permit PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

PSA ERROR INSUFFICIENT DATA

The operation's capacity was less than output_length bytes. In this case, the following occurs:

- No output is written to the output buffer.
- The operation's capacity is set to zero.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
```

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function calculates output bytes from a key-derivation algorithm and returns those bytes. If the key derivation's output is viewed as a stream of bytes, this function consumes the requested number of bytes from the stream and returns them to the caller. The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.

A request to extract more data than the remaining capacity — output_length > psa_key_derivation_get_capacity() — fails with PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, and sets the remaining capacity to zero.

If the operation's capacity is zero, and output_length is zero, then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this function returns PSA_SUCCESS or PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA.

If this function returns an error status other than PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

psa_key_derivation_output_key (function)

Derive a key from an ongoing key-derivation operation.

Parameters

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

- The key type. It must not be an asymmetric public key.
- The key size. It must be a valid size for the key type.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

• The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.

If the key type to be created is PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, then the permitted-algorithm policy must be either the same as the current operation's algorithm, or PSA_ALG_NONE.

• The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_qet_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

operation

key

The key-derivation operation object to read from.

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. For persistent keys, this is the key identifier defined in attributes. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with all required input steps complete.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- A PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
 PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step was neither
 provided through a key, nor the result of a key agreement.
- One of the inputs was a key whose policy did not permit PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA

There was not enough data to create the desired key. In this case, the following occurs:

- No key is generated.
- The operation's capacity is set to zero.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

• The key type is invalid, or is an asymmetric public-key type.

- The key type is PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, and the permitted-algorithm policy is not the same as the current operation's algorithm.
- The key size is not valid for the key type. Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0.
- The key lifetime is invalid.
- The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
- The key usage flags include invalid values.
- The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function calculates output bytes from a key-derivation algorithm and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. The key's location, policy, type and size are taken from attributes.

If the key derivation's output is viewed as a stream of bytes, this function consumes the required number of bytes from the stream. The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes used to derive the key.

A request that needs to extract more data than the remaining capacity fails with PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, and sets the remaining capacity to zero.

If this function returns an error status other than PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how the key is derived, depends on the key type. The key-derivation procedures for standard key-derivation algorithms are described in the *Key derivation* section of each key definition in *Key types* on page 51. Implementations can use other methods for implementation-specific algorithms.

For algorithms that take a PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step, the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key(). Future versions of this specification might include additional restrictions on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key.

Note:

This function is equivalent to calling psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom() with the production parameters PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT and custom_data_length == 0

psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom (function)

Derive a key from an ongoing key-derivation operation with custom production parameters. *Added in version 1.3.*

Parameters

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

- The key type. It must not be an asymmetric public key.
- The key size. It must be a valid size for the key type.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

• The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.

If the key type to be created is PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, then the permitted-algorithm policy must be either the same as the current operation's algorithm, or PSA_ALG_NONE.

• The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

operation custom

The key-derivation operation object to read from.

Customized production parameters for the key derivation.

When this is PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT with custom_data_length == 0, this function is equivalent to psa_key_derivation_output_key().

A buffer containing additional variable-sized production parameters.

custom_data

Length of custom_data in bytes.

custom_data_length

key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. For persistent keys, this is the key identifier defined in attributes. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

PSA ERROR BAD STATE

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with all required input steps complete.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA ERROR NOT PERMITTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- A PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step was neither provided through a key, nor the result of a key agreement.
- One of the inputs was a key whose policy did not permit PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA

There was not enough data to create the desired key. In this case, the following occurs:

- No key is generated.
- The operation's capacity is set to zero.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key type is invalid, or is an asymmetric public-key type.
- The key type is PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, and the permitted-algorithm policy is not the same as the current operation's algorithm.
- The key size is not valid for the key type. Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0.
- The key lifetime is invalid.
- The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
- The key usage flags include invalid values.
- The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.
- The production parameters are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.
- The production parameters are not supported by the implementation.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

This function calculates output bytes from a key-derivation algorithm and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically. The key's location, policy, type and size are taken from attributes.

This function operates in a similar way to psa_key_derivation_output_key(), but enables explicit production parameters to be provided when deriving a key. For example, the production parameters can be used to select an alternative key-derivation process, or configure additional key parameters. See psa_key_derivation_output_key() for the operation of this function with the default production parameters.

See psa_custom_key_parameters_t for a list of non-default production parameters. See the key type definitions in *Key types* on page 51 for details of the custom production parameters used for key derivation.

psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes (function)

Compare output data from a key-derivation operation to an expected value.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to read from. expected_output Buffer containing the expected derivation output.

output_length Length of the expected output. This is also the number of bytes that

will be read.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The output of the key-derivation operation matches

expected_output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with all required input steps complete.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

• The library requires initializing by a can to psa_crypto_init().

The output of the key-derivation operation does not match the value in expected_output.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
```

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA

The operation's capacity was less than output_length bytes. In this case, the operation's capacity is set to zero.

```
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

This function calculates output bytes from a key-derivation algorithm and compares those bytes to an expected value. If the key derivation's output is viewed as a stream of bytes, this function destructively reads output_length bytes from the stream before comparing them with expected_output. The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.

A request to extract more data than the remaining capacity — output_length > psa_key_derivation_get_capacity() — fails with PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, and sets the remaining capacity to zero.

If the operation's capacity is zero, and output_length is zero, then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this function returns PSA_SUCCESS or PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA.

If this function returns an error status other than PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

Note:

A call to psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() is functionally equivalent to the following code:

```
uint8_t tmp[output_length];
psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length);
if (memcmp(expected_output, tmp, output_length) != 0)
    return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
```

However, calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() works even if an input key's policy does not include PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

Implementation note

Implementations must make the best effort to ensure that the comparison between the actual key-derivation output and the expected output is performed in constant time.

psa_key_derivation_verify_key (function)

Compare output data from a key-derivation operation to an expected value stored in a key.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to read from.

expected A key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH containing the expected

output. The key must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, and the permitted algorithm must

match the operation's algorithm.

The value of this key is typically computed by a previous call to

psa_key_derivation_output_key() Or
psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The output of the key-derivation operation matches the

expected key value.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active, with all

required input steps complete.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE expected is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The expected key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION

flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE The output of the key-derivation operation does not match the value

of the expected key.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA The operation's capacity was less than the length of the expected key.

In this case, the operation's capacity is set to zero.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The key type is not PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

This function calculates output bytes from a key-derivation algorithm and compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. If the key derivation's output is viewed as a stream of bytes, this function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the length of the expected key from the stream before comparing them with the key value. The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.

A request that needs to extract more data than the remaining capacity fails with PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, and sets the remaining capacity to zero.

If this function returns an error status other than PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

Note:

A call to psa_key_derivation_verify_key() is functionally equivalent to exporting the expected key and calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it works when the key cannot be exported.

Implementation note

Implementations must make the best effort to ensure that the comparison between the actual key-derivation output and the expected output is performed in constant time.

psa_key_derivation_abort (function)

Abort a key-derivation operation.

psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation);

Parameters

operation The operation to abort.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again.

This function can be called at any time after the operation object has been initialized as described in psa_key_derivation_operation_t.

In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up.

10.6.4 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a key-stretching or password-hashing algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a key-stretching or password-hashing algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm algorithm identifier.

Description

A key-stretching or password-hashing algorithm is a key-derivation algorithm that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password. Equivalently, it's a key-derivation algorithm that uses a PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.

PSA ALG IS HKDF (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm (PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg)).

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

Description

HKDF is a family of key-derivation algorithms that are based on a hash function and the HMAC construction.

PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)).

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)).

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a key-derivation algorithm constructed using PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(hash_alq).

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(alg) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a key-derivation algorithm constructed using PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(), 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm identifier.

PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY (macro)

Use the maximum possible capacity for a key-derivation operation.

```
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation to specify that the operation will use the maximum possible capacity. The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key-derivation algorithm.

PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE (macro)

This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation.

```
#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

This implementation-defined value specifies the maximum length for the PSK input used with a PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_T0_MS() key-agreement algorithm.

Quoting Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC4279] §5.3:

TLS implementations supporting these cipher suites MUST support arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and keys is RECOMMENDED.

Therefore, it is recommended that implementations define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE with a value greater than or equal to 64.

PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

The size of the output from the TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS key-derivation algorithm, in bytes.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_OUTPUT_SIZE 32
```

This value can be used when extracting the result of a key-derivation operation that was set up with the PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS algorithm.

10.7 Asymmetric signature

An asymmetric signature algorithm provides two functions:

- Sign: Calculate a message signature using a private, or secret, key.
- Verify: Check that a signature matches a message using a public key.

Successful verification indicates that the message signature was calculated using the private key that is associated with the public key.

In the Crypto API, an asymmetric-sign function requires an asymmetric key pair; and an asymmetric-verify function requires an asymmetric public key or key pair.

Signature schemes

The Crypto API supports the following signature schemes:

- RSA signature algorithms on page 249
- ECDSA signature algorithms on page 253
- EdDSA signature algorithms on page 257

Types of signature algorithm

There are three categories of asymmetric signature algorithm in the Crypto API:

- Hash-and-sign algorithms, that have two distinct phases:
 - Calculate a hash of the message
 - Calculate a signature over the hash

For these algorithms, the asymmetric signature API allows applications to either calculate the full message signature, or calculate the signature of a pre-computed hash. For example, this enables the application to use a multi-part hash operation to calculate the hash of a large message, prior to calculating or verifying a signature on the calculated hash.

The following algorithms are in this category:

PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS
PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT
PSA_ALG_ECDSA
PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA
PSA_ALG_ED25519PH
PSA_ALG_ED448PH

• Message signature algorithms that do not separate the message processing from the signature calculations. This approach can provide better security against certain types of attack.

For these algorithms, it is not possible to inject a pre-computed hash into the middle of the algorithm. An application can choose to calculate a message hash, and sign that instead of the message — but this is not functionally equivalent to signing the message, and eliminates the security benefits of signing the message directly.

Some of these algorithms still permit the signature of a large message to be calculated, or verified, by providing the message data in fragments. This is possible when the algorithm only processes the message data once. See the individual algorithm descriptions for details.

The following algorithms are in this category:

```
PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA
```

• Specialized signature algorithms, that use part of a standard signature algorithm within a specific protocol. It is recommended that these algorithms are only used for that purpose, with inputs as specified by the higher-level protocol. See the individual algorithm descriptions for details on their usage.

The following algorithms are in this category:

```
PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
```

Signature functions

The Crypto API provides several functions for calculating and verifying signatures:

- The single-part signature and verification functions, psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message(), take a message as one of their inputs, and perform the sign or verify algorithm.
 - These functions can be used on any hash-and-sign, or message signature, algorithms. See also PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE().
- The single-part functions, psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash(), typically take a message hash as one of their inputs, and perform the sign or verify algorithm.

These functions can be used on any hash-and-sign signature algorithm. It is recommended that the input to these functions is a hash, computed using the corresponding hash algorithm. To determine which hash algorithm to use, the macro PSA_ALG_GET_HASH() can be called on the signature algorithm identifier.

These functions can also be used on the specialized signature algorithms, with a hash or encoded-hash as input. See also PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH().

See Asymmetric signature functions on page 260.

10.7.1 RSA signature algorithms

PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN (macro)

The RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 message signature scheme, with hashing.

#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. This includes PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH when specifying the algorithm in a key policy.

Returns

The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

This signature scheme is defined by PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 [RFC8017] §8.2 under the name RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.

When used with $psa_sign_hash()$ or $psa_verify_hash()$, the provided hash parameter is used as H from step 2 onwards in the message encoding algorithm EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE() in [RFC8017] §9.2. H is the message digest, computed using the hash_alg hash algorithm.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (macro)

The raw RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm, without hashing.

```
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
```

This specialized signature algorithm can only be used with the psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash() functions.

This signature scheme is defined by PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 [RFC8017] §8.2 under the name RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.

The hash parameter to $psa_sign_hash()$ or $psa_verify_hash()$ is used as T from step 3 onwards in the message encoding algorithm EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE() in [RFC8017] §9.2. T is normally the DER encoding of the DigestInfo structure produced by step 2 in the message encoding algorithm, but it can be any byte string within the available length.

The wildcard key policy PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) also permits a key to be used with the PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW signature algorithm.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS (macro)

The RSA PSS message signature scheme, with hashing.

#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. This includes PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH when specifying the algorithm in a key policy.

Returns

The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

This algorithm is randomized: each invocation returns a different, equally valid signature.

This is the signature scheme defined by [RFC8017] §8.1 under the name RSASSA-PSS, with the following options:

- The mask generation function is MGF1 defined by [RFC8017] Appendix B.
- When creating a signature, the salt length is equal to the length of the hash, or the largest possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is smaller than the hash length.
- When verifying a signature, the salt length must be equal to the length of the hash, or the largest possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is smaller than the hash length.
- The specified hash algorithm, hash_alg, is used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and for the mask generation.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the message digest, computed using the hash alg hash algorithm.

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The PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT() algorithm is equivalent to PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS() when creating a signature, but permits any salt length when verifying a signature.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT (macro)

The RSA PSS message signature scheme, with hashing. This variant permits any salt length for signature verification.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. This includes PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH when specifying the algorithm in a key policy.

Returns

The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

This algorithm is randomized: each invocation returns a different, equally valid signature.

This is the signature scheme defined by [RFC8017] §8.1 under the name RSASSA-PSS, with the following options:

- The mask generation function is MGF1 defined by [RFC8017] Appendix B.
- When creating a signature, the salt length is equal to the length of the hash, or the largest possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is smaller than the hash length.
- When verifying a signature, any salt length permitted by the RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is accepted.
- The specified hash algorithm, hash_alg, is used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and for the mask generation.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the message digest, computed using the hash_alg hash algorithm.

Note:

The PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS() algorithm is equivalent to PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT() when creating a signature, but is strict about the permitted salt length when verifying a signature.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an RSA PSS signature algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an RSA PSS signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

This macro returns 1 for algorithms constructed using either PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS() or PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT().

PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an RSA PSS signature algorithm that permits any salt length.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an RSA PSS signature algorithm that permits any salt length, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

An RSA PSS signature algorithm that permits any salt length is constructed using PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT().

See also PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS() and PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT().

PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an RSA PSS signature algorithm that requires the standard salt length.

Added in version 1.1.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an RSA PSS signature algorithm that requires the standard salt length, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

An RSA PSS signature algorithm that requires the standard salt length is constructed using PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS().

See also PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS() and PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT().

10.7.2 ECDSA signature algorithms

PSA_ALG_ECDSA (macro)

The randomized ECDSA signature scheme, with hashing.

#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. This includes PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH when specifying the algorithm in a key policy.

Returns

The corresponding randomized ECDSA signature algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the message digest, computed using the hash_alg hash algorithm.

This algorithm is randomized: each invocation returns a different, equally valid signature.

Note:

When based on the same hash algorithm, the verification operations for PSA_ALG_ECDSA and PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA are identical. A signature created using PSA_ALG_ECDSA can be verified with the same key using either PSA_ALG_ECDSA or PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. Similarly, a signature created using PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA can be verified with the same key using either PSA_ALG_ECDSA or PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.

In particular, it is impossible to determine whether a signature was produced with deterministic ECDSA or with randomized ECDSA: it is only possible to verify that a signature was made with ECDSA with the private key corresponding to the public key used for the verification.

This signature scheme is defined by SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1], and also by Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [X9-62], with a random per-message secret number k.

The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of the concatenation of the signature values r and s. Each of r and s is encoded as an N-octet string, where N is the length of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented in big-endian order, with the most significant octet first.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family) (signature verification only)
```

where family is a Weierstrass Elliptic curve family. That is, one of the following values:

- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1

PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (macro)

The randomized ECDSA signature scheme, without hashing.

```
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
```

This specialized signature algorithm can only be used with the psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash() functions.

This algorithm is randomized: each invocation returns a different, equally valid signature.

This is the same signature scheme as PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but without specifying a hash algorithm, and skipping the message hashing operation.

Warning

This algorithm is only recommended to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that are a pre-computed hash. Note that the input is padded with zeros on the left or truncated on the right as required to fit the curve size.

This algorithm cannot be used with the wildcard key policy PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH). It is only permitted when PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY is the key's permitted-algorithm policy.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family) (signature verification only)
```

where family is a Weierstrass Elliptic curve family. That is, one of the following values:

- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1

PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA (macro)

Deterministic ECDSA signature scheme, with hashing.

#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. This includes PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH when specifying the algorithm in a key policy.

Returns

The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the message digest, computed using the hash_alg hash algorithm.

This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [RFC6979].

The representation of a signature is the same as with PSA_ALG_ECDSA().

Note:

When based on the same hash algorithm, the verification operations for PSA_ALG_ECDSA and PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA are identical. A signature created using PSA_ALG_ECDSA can be verified with the same key using either PSA_ALG_ECDSA or PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA. Similarly, a signature created using PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA can be verified with the same key using either PSA_ALG_ECDSA or PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.

In particular, it is impossible to determine whether a signature was produced with deterministic ECDSA or with randomized ECDSA: it is only possible to verify that a signature was made with ECDSA with the private key corresponding to the public key used for the verification.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family) (signature verification only)
```

where family is a Weierstrass Elliptic curve family. That is, one of the following values:

- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1

PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is ECDSA.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an ECDSA algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is deterministic ECDSA.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a deterministic ECDSA algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See also PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA() and PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA().

PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is randomized ECDSA.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a randomized ECDSA algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

See also PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA() and PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA().

10.7.3 EdDSA signature algorithms

PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA (macro)

Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without pre-hashing (PureEdDSA), using standard parameters. Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
```

This message signature algorithm can only be used with the psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message() functions.

This is the PureEdDSA digital signature algorithm defined by *Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm* (*EdDSA*) [RFC8032], using standard parameters.

PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve. The following curves are supported:

- Edwards25519: the Ed25519 algorithm is computed. The output signature is a 64-byte string: the concatenation of R and S as defined by [RFC8032] §5.1.6.
- Edwards448: the Ed448 algorithm is computed with an empty string as the context. The output signature is a 114-byte string: the concatenation of R and S as defined by [RFC8032] §5.2.6.

Note:

To sign or verify the pre-computed hash of a message using EdDSA, the HashEdDSA algorithms (PSA_ALG_ED25519PH and PSA_ALG_ED448PH) can be used.

The signature produced by HashEdDSA is distinct from that produced by PureEdDSA.

Note:

Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS)

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS) (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_ED25519PH (macro)

Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with pre-hashing (HashEdDSA), using the Edwards25519 curve. *Added in version 1.1.*

```
#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0600090B)
```

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

This calculates the Ed25519ph algorithm as specified in *Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)* [RFC8032] §5.1, and requires an Edwards25519 curve key. An empty string is used as the context. The pre-hash function is SHA-512, see PSA_ALG_SHA_512.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the SHA-512 message digest.

Implementation note

When used with $psa_sign_hash()$ or $psa_verify_hash()$, the hash parameter to the call should be used as PH(M) in the algorithms defined in [RFC8032] §5.1.

Usage

This is a hash-and-sign algorithm. To calculate a signature, use one of the following approaches:

- Call psa_sign_message() with the message.
- Calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message with psa_hash_compute(), or with a multi-part hash operation, using the hash algorithm PSA_ALG_SHA_512. Then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().

Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS) PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS) (signature verification only)

PSA_ALG_ED448PH (macro)

Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with pre-hashing (HashEdDSA), using the Edwards448 curve. Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000915)
```

This hash-and-sign signature algorithm can be used with both the message and hash signature functions.

This calculates the Ed448ph algorithm as specified in Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) [RFC8032] §5.2, and requires an Edwards448 curve key. An empty string is used as the context. The pre-hash function is the first 64 bytes of the output from SHAKE256, see PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512.

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the provided hash parameter is the truncated SHAKE256 message digest.

Implementation note

When used with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), the hash parameter to the call should be used as PH(M) in the algorithms defined in [RFC8032] §5.2.

Usage

This is a hash-and-sign algorithm. To calculate a signature, use one of the following approaches:

- Call psa_sign_message() with the message.
- Calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message with psa_hash_compute(), or with a multi-part hash operation, using the hash algorithm PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512. Then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().

Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS) (signature verification only)
```

PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is HashEdDSA.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a HashEdDSA algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

10.7.4 Asymmetric signature functions

psa_sign_message (function)

Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, this includes the hashing step.

Parameters

| key | Identifier | of the key to | use for the operation. | It must be an asymmetric |
|-----|------------|---------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| | | | | |

key pair. The key must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.

alg An asymmetric signature algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t

such that PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) is true.

input The input message to sign.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.

signature_size Size of the signature buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

• The required signature size is PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are the type and

bit-size respectively of key.

• PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum signature size

of any supported signature algorithm.

signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned signature

value.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*signature_length) bytes of signature contain the

signature value.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA ERROR BUFFER TOO SMALL

The size of the signature buffer is too small. PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits signing a message.
- key is not an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alg.
- input_length is too large for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported, or is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits signing a message.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Note:

To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm to use.

psa_verify_message (function)

Verify the signature of a message with a public key. For hash-and-sign algorithms, this includes the hashing step.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must be a public key or

an asymmetric key pair. The key must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.

alg An asymmetric signature algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t

such that PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) is true.

input The message whose signature is to be verified.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
signature_length Size of the signature buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The signature is valid.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE flag, or it

does not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE signature is not the result of signing the input message with algorithm

alg using the private key corresponding to key.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits

verifying a message.

• key is not a public key or an asymmetric key pair, that is

compatible with alg.

• input_length is too large for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported, or is not an asymmetric signature algorithm

that permits verifying a message.

key is not supported for use with alq.

• input_length is too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

Note:

To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash().

PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm to use.

psa_sign_hash (function)

Sign a pre-computed hash with a private key.

Parameters

| key | Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must be an asymmetric |
|-----|--|
| | |

key pair. The key must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.

An asymmetric signature algorithm that separates the hash and sign

operations: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) is true.

hash The input to sign. This is usually the hash of a message.

See the description of this function, or the description of individual

signature algorithms, for details of the acceptable inputs.

hash_length Size of the hash buffer in bytes.

signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.

signature_size Size of the signature buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

• The required signature size is PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) where key_type and key_bits are the type and

bit-size respectively of key.

• PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum signature size

of any supported signature algorithm.

signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned signature

value.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*signature_length) bytes of signature contain the

signature value.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the signature buffer is too small. PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer

size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits signing a pre-computed hash.

• key is not an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alg.

• hash_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.

• hash is not a valid input value for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported, or is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits signing a pre-computed hash.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

For hash-and-sign signature algorithms, the hash input to this function is the hash of the message to sign. The algorithm used to calculate this hash is encoded in the signature algorithm. For such algorithms, hash_length must equal the length of the hash output: hash_length == PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg)).

Specialized signature algorithms can apply a padding or encoding to the hash. In such cases, the encoded hash must be passed to this function. For example, see PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW.

psa_verify_hash (function)

Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key.

Parameters

key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must be a public key or

an asymmetric key pair. The key must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.

An asymmetric signature algorithm that separates the hash and sign

operations: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) is true.

hash The input whose signature is to be verified. This is usually the hash of

a message.

See the description of this function, or the description of individual

signature algorithms, for details of the acceptable inputs.

hash_length Size of the hash buffer in bytes.

signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.

signature_length Size of the signature buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The signature is valid.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does

not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE signature is not the result of signing hash with algorithm alg using the

private key corresponding to key.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

alg is not an asymmetric signature algorithm that permits
 verifying a pro-computed back

verifying a pre-computed hash.

• key is not a public key or an asymmetric key pair, that is

compatible with alg.

• hash_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.

• hash is not a valid input value for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported, or is not an asymmetric signature algorithm

that permits verifying a pre-computed hash.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

For hash-and-sign signature algorithms, the hash input to this function is the hash of the message to verify. The algorithm used to calculate this hash is encoded in the signature algorithm. For such algorithms, hash_length must equal the length of the hash output: hash_length == PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg)).

Specialized signature algorithms can apply a padding or encoding to the hash. In such cases, the encoded hash must be passed to this function. For example, see PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW.

10.7.5 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a message. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used to sign a pre-computed hash. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

This macro evaluates to 1 for hash-and-sign and message-signature algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

This macro evaluates to 1 for hash-and-sign and specialized signature algorithms.

PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm that signs exactly the hash value.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm that signs exactly the hash value, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

A wildcard signature algorithm policy, using PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, returns the same value as the signature algorithm parameterized with a valid hash algorithm.

Description

This macro identifies algorithms that can be used with psa_sign_hash() that use the exact message hash value as an input the signature operation. For example, if PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) is true, the following call sequence is equivalent to psa_sign_message(key, alg, msg, msg_len, ...):

PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH (macro)

When setting a hash-and-sign algorithm in a key policy, permit any hash algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff)
```

This value can be used to form the permitted-algorithm attribute of a key policy for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. A key with this policy can then be used to perform operations using the same signature algorithm parametrized with any supported hash. A signature algorithm created using this macro is a wildcard algorithm, and PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD() will return true.

This value must not be used to build other algorithms that are parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build an algorithm alg, PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) is true.

This value cannot be used to build an algorithm specification to perform an operation. If used in this way, the operation will fail with an error.

Usage

For example, suppose that PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE is one of the following macros:

- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT
- PSA_ALG_ECDSA

• PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA

The following sequence of operations shows how PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH can be used in a key policy:

1. Set the key usage flags using PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:

```
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE); // or VERIFY_MESSAGE
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
```

- 2. Import or generate key material.
- 3. Call psa_sign_message() or psa_verify_message(), passing an algorithm built from PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE and a specific hash. Each call to sign or verify a message can use a different hash algorithm.

```
psa_sign_message(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
psa_sign_message(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
psa_sign_message(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
```

PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_message() and psa_sign_hash().

```
#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type An asymmetric key type. This can be a key-pair type or a public-key

type.

The size of the key in bits.

The signature algorithm.

Returns

A sufficient signature buffer size for the specified asymmetric signature algorithm and key parameters. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for an asymmetric signature algorithm and key parameters that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the signature buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_sign_message() and psa_sign_hash() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA SIGNATURE MAX SIZE.

PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_message() and psa_sign_hash(), for any of the supported key types and asymmetric signature algorithms.

```
#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the signature buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_sign_message() and psa_sign_hash() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE().

10.8 Asymmetric encryption

Asymmetric encryption is provided through the functions psa_asymmetric_encrypt() and psa_asymmetric_decrypt().

10.8.1 Asymmetric encryption algorithms

PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT (macro)

The RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 asymmetric encryption algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200)
```

This encryption scheme is defined by PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2 [RFC8017] §7.2 under the name RSAES-PKCS-v1 5.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (asymmetric encryption only)

PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP (macro)

The RSA OAEP asymmetric encryption algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true. The hash algorithm is used for MGF1.

Returns

The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This encryption scheme is defined by [RFC8017] §7.1 under the name RSAES-OAEP, with the following options:

- The mask generation function MGF1 defined in [RFC8017] Appendix B.2.1.
- The specified hash algorithm is used to hash the label, and for the mask generation function.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY (asymmetric encryption only)

10.8.2 Asymmetric encryption functions

psa_asymmetric_encrypt (function)

Encrypt a short message with a public key.

Parameters

| key | , | dentifer | of the ke | v to use for | the operatio | n. It must be a | public key | y or |
|-----|---|----------|-----------|--------------|--------------|-----------------|------------|------|
| | | | | | | | | |

an asymmetric key pair. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.

alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm to compute: a value of type

psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) is

true.

input The message to encrypt.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

salt A salt or label, if supported by the encryption algorithm. If the

algorithm does not support a salt, pass NULL. If the algorithm supports

an optional salt, pass NULL to indicate that there is no salt.

salt_length Size of the salt buffer in bytes. If salt is NULL, pass 0.

output Buffer where the encrypted message is to be written.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

selected algorithm and key:

• The required output size is PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)

respectively of key.

• PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported asymmetric encryption.

where key_type and key_bits are the type and bit-size

output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the

encrypted output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not

permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not an asymmetric encryption algorithm.

• key is not a public key or an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alq.

• input_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.

salt_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

• alg is not supported or is not an asymmetric encryption algorithm.

• key is not supported for use with alg.

• input_length or salt_length are too large for the implementation.

PSA ERROR INSUFFICIENT ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

• For PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is supported.

psa_asymmetric_decrypt (function)

Decrypt a short message with a private key.

(continues on next page)

(continued from previous page)

size_t salt_length, uint8_t * output, size_t output_size, size_t * output_length);

Parameters

Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It must be an asymmetric key

key pair. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.

The asymmetric encryption algorithm to compute: a value of type alq

psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) is

true.

The message to decrypt. input

Size of the input buffer in bytes. input_length

A salt or label, if supported by the encryption algorithm. If the salt

algorithm does not support a salt, pass NULL. If the algorithm supports

an optional salt, pass NULL to indicate that there is no salt.

Size of the salt buffer in bytes. If salt is NULL, pass 0. salt_length

Buffer where the decrypted message is to be written. output

Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the output_size

selected algorithm and key:

• The required output size is

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg)

where key_type and key_bits are the type and bit-size

respectively of key.

• PSA ASYMMETRIC DECRYPT OUTPUT MAX SIZE evaluates to the

maximum output size of any supported asymmetric decryption.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output. output_length

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the PSA_SUCCESS

decrypted output.

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

key is not a valid key identifier. PSA ERROR INVALID HANDLE

The key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

permit the requested algorithm.

The size of the output buffer is too small. PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE() or

PSA ASYMMETRIC DECRYPT OUTPUT MAX SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING The algorithm uses padding, and the input does not contain valid

padding.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

- alg is not an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- key is not an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alg.
- input_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.
- salt_length is not valid for the algorithm and key type.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not an asymmetric encryption algorithm.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- input_length or salt_length are too large for the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

• For PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is supported.

10.8.3 Support macros

PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.

```
\hbox{\tt\#define PSA\_ALG\_IS\_RSA\_OAEP(alg) /* specification-defined value */}
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an RSA OAEP algorithm, 0 otherwise.

This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt().

```
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type An asymmetric key type, either a key pair or a public key.

key_bits The size of the key in bits.

alq An asymmetric encryption algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t

such that PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient output buffer size for the specified asymmetric encryption algorithm and key parameters. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for an asymmetric encryption algorithm and key parameters that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPT OUTPUT MAX SIZE.

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any of the supported key types and asymmetric encryption algorithms.

```
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt().

```
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type An asymmetric key type, either a key pair or a public key.

key_bits The size of the key in bits.

An asymmetric encryption algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t

such that PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient output buffer size for the specified asymmetric encryption algorithm and key parameters. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for an asymmetric encryption algorithm and key parameters that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any of the supported key types and asymmetric encryption algorithms.

```
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

10.9 Key agreement

Three functions are provided for a Diffie-Hellman-style key agreement where each party combines its own private key with the peer's public key, to produce a shared secret value:

- A call to psa_key_agreement() will compute the shared secret and store the result in a new derivation kev.
- If the resulting shared secret will be used for a single key derivation, a key-derivation operation can be used with the psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() input function. This calculates the shared secret and inputs it directly to the key-derivation operation.
- Where an application needs direct access to the shared secret, it can call psa_raw_key_agreement() instead.

Using psa_key_agreement() or psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() is recommended, as these do not expose the shared secret to the application.

Note:

In general the shared secret is not directly suitable for use as a key because it is biased.

10.9.1 Key-agreement algorithms

PSA_ALG_FFDH (macro)

The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-agreement algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000)
```

This standalone key-agreement algorithm can be used directly in a call to psa_key_agreement() or psa_raw_key_agreement(), or combined with a key-derivation operation using PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT() for use with psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

When used as a key's permitted-algorithm policy, the following uses are permitted:

- In a call to psa_key_agreement() or psa_raw_key_agreement(), with algorithm PSA_ALG_FFDH.
- In a call to psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(), with any combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm constructed with PSA_ALG_FFDH.

When used as part of a multi-part key-derivation operation, this implements a Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme using a single Diffie-Hellman key pair for each participant. This includes the *dhEphem*, *dhOneFlow*, and *dhStatic* schemes. The input step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when providing the secret and peer keys to the operation.

The shared secret produced by this key-agreement algorithm is g^{ab} in big-endian format. It is $\lceil (m/8) \rceil$ bytes long where m is the size of the prime p in bits.

This key-agreement scheme is defined by NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.7.1.1 under the name FFC DH.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR()

PSA_ALG_ECDH (macro)

The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key-agreement algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000)
```

This standalone key-agreement algorithm can be used directly in a call to psa_key_agreement() or psa_raw_key_agreement(), or combined with a key-derivation operation using PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT() for use with psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

When used as a key's permitted-algorithm policy, the following uses are permitted:

- In a call to psa_key_agreement() or psa_raw_key_agreement(), with algorithm PSA_ALG_ECDH.
- In a call to psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(), with any combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm constructed with PSA_ALG_ECDH.

When used as part of a multi-part key-derivation operation, this implements a Diffie-Hellman key-agreement scheme using a single elliptic curve key pair for each participant. This includes the *Ephemeral unified model*, the *Static unified model*, and the *One-pass Diffie-Hellman* schemes. The input step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when providing the secret and peer keys to the operation.

The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of the shared secret point. It is always $\lceil (m/8) \rceil$ bytes long where m is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the order of the curve's coordinate field. When m is not a multiple of 8, the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian or big-endian depending on the curve type.

- For Montgomery curves (curve family PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY), the shared secret is the x-coordinate of $Z=d_AQ_B=d_BQ_A$ in little-endian byte order.
 - For Curve25519, this is the X25519 function defined in *Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records* [Curve25519]. The bit size m is 255.

- For Curve448, this is the X448 function defined in *Ed448-Goldilocks*, a new elliptic curve [Curve448]. The bit size m is 448.
- For Weierstrass curves (curve families PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 and PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP) the shared secret is the x-coordinate of $Z = hd_AQ_B = hd_BQ_A$ in big-endian byte order. This is the Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman primitive defined by SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1] §3.3.2 as, and also as ECC CDH by NIST Special Publication 800-56A: Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography [SP800-56A] §5.7.1.2.
 - Over prime fields (curve families PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 and PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP), the bit size is $m = \lceil \log_2(p) \rceil$ for the field \mathbb{F}_p .
 - Over binary fields (curve families PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX), the bit size is m for the field \mathbb{F}_{2^m} .

Note:

The cofactor Diffie-Hellman primitive is equivalent to the standard elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman calculation $Z=d_AQ_B=d_BQ_A$ ([SEC1] §3.3.1) for curves where the cofactor h is 1. This is true for all curves in the PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1, and PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP families.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family)

where family is a Weierstrass or Montgomery Elliptic curve family. That is, one of the following values:

- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY

PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT (macro)

Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with a key derivation.

```
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

| ka_alg | A key-agreement algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg) is true. |
|---------|---|
| kdf_alg | A key-derivation algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(kdf_alg) is true. |

Returns

The corresponding key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm.

Unspecified if ka_alg is not a supported key-agreement algorithm or kdf_alg is not a supported key-derivation algorithm.

Description

A combined key-agreement algorithm is used with a multi-part key-derivation operation, using a call to psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

The component parts of a key-agreement algorithm can be extracted using PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE() and PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF().

Compatible key types

The resulting combined key-agreement algorithm is compatible with the same key types as the standalone key-agreement algorithm used to construct it.

10.9.2 Standalone key agreement

psa_key_agreement (function)

Perform a key agreement and return the shared secret as a derivation key.

Added in version 1.2.

Parameters

private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key data is parsed with the type

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) where type is the type of private_key, and with the same bit-size as private_key. The peer key must be in the format that psa_import_key() accepts for this public-key type. These formats are described with the public-key type in Key

types on page 51.

peer_key_length Size of peer_key in bytes.

The standalone key-agreement algorithm to compute: a value of type

psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)

is true.

attributes The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

 The key type, which must be one of PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC, or PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
 Implementations must support the PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE and PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA key types.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see *Key lifetimes* on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

• If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the output size of the key agreement, in bits.

The output size, in bits, of the key agreement is 8 * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(type, bits), where type and bits are the type and bit-size of private_key.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_qet_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

Success. The new key contains the share secret. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

private_key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- private_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

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- alg is not a key-agreement algorithm.
- private_key is not compatible with alg.
- peer_key is not a valid public key corresponding to private_key.
- The output key attributes in attributes are not valid:
 - The key type is not valid for key-agreement output.
 - The key size is nonzero, and is not the size of the shared secret.
 - The key lifetime is invalid.
 - The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
 - The key usage flags include invalid values.
 - The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
 - The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not a key-agreement algorithm.
- private_key is not supported for use with alg.
- The output key attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

A key-agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key private_key, and a public key peer_key. The result of this function is a shared secret, returned as a derivation key.

The new key's location, policy, and type are taken from attributes.

The size of the returned key is always the bit-size of the shared secret, rounded up to a whole number of bytes.

This key can be used as input to a key-derivation operation using psa_key_derivation_input_key().

Warning

The shared secret resulting from a key-agreement algorithm such as finite-field Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases. This makes it unsuitable for use as key material, for example, as an AES key. Instead, it is recommended that a key-derivation algorithm is applied to the result, to derive unbiased cryptographic keys.

psa_raw_key_agreement (function)

Perform a key agreement and return the shared secret.

Parameters

The standalone key-agreement algorithm to compute: a value of type

psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)

is true.

private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key data is parsed with the type

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) where type is the type of private_key, and with the same bit-size as private_key. The peer key must be in the format that psa_import_key() accepts for this public-key type. These formats are described with the public-key type in Key

types on page 51.

peer_key_length Size of peer_key in bytes.

output Buffer where the shared secret is to be written.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the

keys:

• The required output size is PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(type, bits), where type and

• PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported standalone

bits are the type and bit-size of private_key.

key-agreement algorithm.

output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up the returned output.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the shared

secret.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE private_key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED private_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does

not permit the requested algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL The size of the output buffer is too small.

PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() Or

PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not a key-agreement algorithm.
- private_key is not compatible with alg.
- peer_key is not a valid public key corresponding to private_key.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not a key-agreement algorithm.
- private_key is not supported for use with alg.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
```

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

A key-agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key private_key, and a public key peer_key. The result of this function is a shared secret, returned in the output buffer.

Warning

The result of a key-agreement algorithm such as finite-field Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases, and is not suitable for direct use as key material, for example, as an AES key. Instead it is recommended that the result is used as input to a key-derivation algorithm.

To chain a key agreement with a key derivation, either use psa_key_agreement() to obtain the result of the key agreement as a derivation key, or use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other functions from the key-derivation interface.

10.9.3 Combining key agreement and key derivation

psa_key_derivation_key_agreement (function)

Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key derivation.

```
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                              psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                              psa_key_id_t private_key,
                                              const uint8_t * peer_key,
                                              size_t peer_key_length);
```

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Parameters

operation The key-derivation operation object to use. It must have been set up

with psa_key_derivation_setup() with a combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm alg: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is true and PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is false.

The operation must be ready for an input of the type given by step.

step Which step the input data is for.

private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must permit the usage

PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key data is parsed with the type

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) where type is the type of private_key, and with the same bit-size as private_key. The peer key must be in the format that psa_import_key() accepts for this public-key type. These formats are described with the public-key type in Key

types on page 51.

peer_key_length Size of peer_key in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid for this key-agreement step.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE private_key is not a valid key identifier.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED private_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does

not permit the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation's algorithm is not a key-agreement algorithm.

- step does not permit an input resulting from a key agreement.
- private_key is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
- peer_key is not a valid public key corresponding to private_key.

private_key is not supported for use with the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

A key-agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key private_key, and a public key peer_key. The result of this function is a shared secret, which is directly input to the key-derivation operation. Output from the key-derivation operation can then be used as keys and other cryptographic material.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().

Note:

This function cannot be used when the resulting shared secret is required for multiple key derivations.

Instead, the application can call psa_key_agreement() to obtain the shared secret as a derivation key. This key can be used as input to as many key-derivation operations as required.

10.9.4 Support macros

PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE (macro)

Get the standalone key-agreement algorithm from a combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alg

A key-agreement algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is true.

Returns

The underlying standalone key-agreement algorithm if alg is a key-agreement algorithm.

Unspecified if alg is not a key-agreement algorithm or if it is not supported by the implementation.

Description

See also PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT() and PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF().

PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF (macro)

Get the key-derivation algorithm used in a combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithm.

#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

A key-agreement algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) is true.

Returns

The underlying key-derivation algorithm if alg is a key-agreement algorithm.

Unspecified if alq is not a key-agreement algorithm or if it is not supported by the implementation.

Description

See also PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT() and PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE().

PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a standalone key-agreement algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a standalone key-agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported algorithm identifier.

Description

A standalone key-agreement algorithm is one that does not specify a key-derivation function. Usually, standalone key-agreement algorithms are constructed directly with a PSA_ALG_xxx macro while combined key-agreement algorithms are constructed with PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().

The standalone key-agreement algorithm can be extracted from a combined key-agreement algorithm identifier using PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE().

PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a standalone key-agreement algorithm.

Deprecated since version 1.2: Use PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT() instead.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
    PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-agreement algorithm identifier.

Description

This includes the standalone finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, as well as finite-field Diffie-Hellman combined with any supported key-derivation algorithm.

PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm.

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported key-agreement algorithm identifier.

Description

This includes the standalone elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm, as well as elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman combined with any supported key-derivation algorithm.

PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement().

```
#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A supported key type.
key_bits The size of the key in bits.

Returns

A sufficient output buffer size for the specified key type and size. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for a key type and size that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement(), for any of the supported key types and key-agreement algorithms.

```
#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE().

10.10 Key encapsulation

A key-encapsulation algorithm can be used by two participants to establish a shared secret key over a public channel. The shared secret key can then be used with symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms. Key-encapsulation algorithms are often referred to as 'key-encapsulation mechanisms' or KEMs.

In a key-encapsulation algorithm, participants A and B establish a shared secret as follows:

- 1. Participant A generates a key pair: a private decapsulation key, and a public encapsulation key.
- 2. The public encapsulation key is made available to participant B.
- 3. Participant B uses the encapsulation key to generate one copy of a shared secret, and some ciphertext.
- 4. The ciphertext is transferred to participant A.
- 5. Participant A uses the private decapsulation key to compute another copy of the shared secret.

Typically, the shared secret is used as input to a key-derivation function, to create keys for secure communication between participants A and B. However, some key-encapsulation algorithms result in a uniformly pseudorandom shared secret, which is suitable to be used directly as a cryptographic key.

Applications can use the resulting keys for different use cases. For example:

- Encrypting and authenticating a single non-interactive message from participant B to participant A.
- Securing an interactive communication channel between participants A and B.

10.10.1 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme

The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) was first proposed by Shoup, then improved by Ballare and Rogaway.

The original specification permitted a number of variants. The Crypto API uses the version specified in SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1].

The full ECIES scheme uses an elliptic-curve key agreement between the recipient's static public key and an ephemeral private key, to establish encryption and authentication keys for secure transmission of arbitrary-length messages to the recipient.

An application using ECIES must select all of the following parameters:

• The elliptic curve for the initial key agreement.

- The KDF to derive the symmetric keys, and any label used in that derivation.
- The encryption and MAC algorithms.
- The additional data to include when computing the authentication.

The Crypto API presents the key-agreement step of ECIES as a key-encapsulation algorithm. The key derivation, encryption, and authentication steps are left to the application.

Implementation note

It is possible that some applications may need to use alternative versions of ECIES to interoperate with legacy systems.

While the application can implement this using key agreement functions, an implementation can choose to add these as a convenience with an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED key-encapsulation algorithm identifier.

PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 (macro)

The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES).

Added in version 1.3.

#define PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0c000100)

This key-encapsulation algorithm is defined by SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1] §5.1 under the name Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme.

A call to psa_encapsulate() carries out steps 1 to 4 of the ECIES encryption process described in [SEC1] §5.1.3:

- The elliptic curve to use is determined by the key.
- The public-key part of the input key is used as Q_V .
- Cofactor ECDH is used to perform the key agreement.
- The octet string Z is output as the shared secret key.
- ullet The ephemeral public key \overline{R} is output as the ciphertext.

A call to psa_decapsulate() carries out steps 2 to 5 of the ECIES decryption process described in [SEC1] §5.1.4:

- The elliptic curve to use is determined by the key.
- The ciphertext is decoded as \overline{R} .
- The private key of the input key is used as d_V .
- Cofactor ECDH is used to perform the key agreement.
- The octet string Z is output as the shared secret key.

The ciphertext produced by PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 is not authenticated. In the full ECIES scheme, the authentication of the encrypted message using a key derived from the shared secret provides assurance that the message has not been manipulated.

The shared secret key that is produced by PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 is not suitable for use as an encryption key. It must be used as an input to a key derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

Compatible key types

```
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family)
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family) (encapsulation only)
```

where family is a Weierstrass or Montgomery Elliptic curve family. That is, one of the following values:

- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_XX
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1
- PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY

10.10.2 Key-encapsulation functions

psa_encapsulate (function)

Use a public key to generate a new shared secret key and associated ciphertext.

Added in version 1.3.

Parameters

key

Identifier of the key to use for the encapsulation. It must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.

alg

The key-encapsulation algorithm to use: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) is true.

attributes

The attributes for the output key. This function uses the attributes as follows:

• The key type. All key-encapsulation algorithms can output a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. Key-encapsulation algorithms that produce a uniformly pseudorandom shared secret, can also output block-cipher key types, for example PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES. Refer to the documentation of individual key-encapsulation algorithms for more information.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

 If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the size, in bits, of the shared secret.

Note:

PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

output_key

ciphertext

ciphertext_size

ciphertext_length

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

Buffer where the ciphertext output is to be written.

On success, an identifier for the newly created shared secret key.

Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:

- A sufficient ciphertext size is PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE(type, bits, alg), where type and bits are the type and bit-size of key.
- PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum ciphertext size of any supported key-encapsulation algorithm.

On success, the number of bytes that make up the ciphertext value.

other participant, and output_key contains the identifier for the shared secret key.

Success. The bytes of ciphertext contain the data to be sent to the

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

key is not a valid key identifier.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

persistent key with the given identifier.

The size of the ciphertext buffer is too small. PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

PSA ENCAPSULATE CIPHERTEXT SIZE() or

PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a

sufficient buffer size.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA ERROR INVALID ARGUMENT

- alg is not a key-encapsulation algorithm.
- key is not a public key or an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alg.
- The output key attributes in attributes are not valid:
 - The key type is not valid for the shared secret.
 - The key size is nonzero, and is not the size of the shared secret.
 - The key lifetime is invalid.
 - The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
 - The key usage flags include invalid values.
 - The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
 - The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not a key-encapsulation algorithm.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- The output key attributes in attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The output_key location, policy, and type are taken from attributes.

The size of the returned key is always the bit-size of the shared secret, rounded up to a whole number of bytes. The size of the shared secret is dependent on the key-encapsulation algorithm and the type and size of key.

It is recommended that the shared secret key is used as an input to a key derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys. For some key-encapsulation algorithms, the shared secret key is also suitable for use as a key in cryptographic operations such as encryption. Refer to the documentation of individual

key-encapsulation algorithms for more information.

The output ciphertext is to be sent to the other participant, who uses the decapsulation key to extract another copy of the shared secret key.

psa_decapsulate (function)

Use a private key to decapsulate a shared secret key from a ciphertext.

Added in version 1.3.

Parameters

key

alg

ciphertext

 $ciphertext_length$

attributes

Identifier of the key to use for the decapsulation. It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.

The key-encapsulation algorithm to use: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) is true.

The ciphertext received from the other participant.

Size of the ciphertext buffer in bytes.

The attributes for the output key. This function uses the attributes as follows:

The key type. All key-encapsulation algorithms can output a key
of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC.
Key-encapsulation algorithms that produce a uniformly
pseudorandom shared secret, can also output block-cipher key
types, for example PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES. Refer to the documentation
of individual key-encapsulation algorithms for more information.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

• If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the size, in bits, of the shared secret.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

output_key

On success, an identifier for the newly created shared secret key. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

Success. output_key contains the identifier for the shared secret key.

Note:

In some key-encapsulation algorithms, decapsulation failure is not reported with a explicit error code. Instead, an incorrect, pseudorandom key is output.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). key is not a valid key identifier.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT flag, or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
- The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE

Authentication of the ciphertext fails.

Note:

Some key-encapsulation algorithms do not report an authentication failure explicitly. Instead, an incorrect, pseudorandom key is output.

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not a key-encapsulation algorithm.
- key is not an asymmetric key pair, that is compatible with alg.
- The output key attributes in attributes are not valid:
 - The key type is not valid for the shared secret.
 - The key size is nonzero, and is not the size of the shared secret.
 - The key lifetime is invalid.
 - The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.
 - The key usage flags include invalid values.
 - The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.

- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.
- ciphertext is obviously invalid for the selected algorithm and key. For example, the implementation can detect that it has an incorrect length.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- alg is not supported or is not a key-encapsulation algorithm.
- key is not supported for use with alg.
- The output key attributes in attributes, as a whole, are not supported, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The output_key location, policy, and type are taken from attributes.

The size of the returned key is always the bit-size of the shared secret, rounded up to a whole number of bytes. The size of the shared secret is dependent on the key-encapsulation algorithm and the type and size of key.

It is recommended that the shared secret key is used as an input to a key derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys. For some key-encapsulation algorithms, the shared secret key is also suitable for use as a key in cryptographic operations such as encryption. Refer to the documentation of individual key-encapsulation algorithms for more information.

If the key-encapsulation protocol is executed correctly then, with overwhelming probability, the two copies of the shared secret are identical. However, the protocol does not protect one participant against the other participant executing it incorrectly, or against a third party modifying data in transit.

Warning

A PSA_SUCCESS result from psa_decapsulate() does not guarantee that the output key is identical to the key produced by the call to psa_encapsulate(). For example, PSA_SUCCESS can be returned with a mismatched shared secret key value in the following situations:

- The key-encapsulation algorithm does not authenticate the ciphertext. Manipulated or corrupted ciphertext will not be detected during decapsulation.
- The key-encapsulation algorithm reports authentication failure implicitly, by returning a pseudorandom key value. This is done to prevent disclosing information to an attacker that has

manipulated the ciphertext.

• The key-encapsulation algorithm is probablistic, and will *extremely* rarely result in non-identical key values.

It is strongly recommended that the application uses the output key in a way that will confirm that the shared secret keys are identical.

Implementation note

For key-encapsulation algorithms which involve data padding when computing the ciphertext, the decapsulation algorithm **must not** report a distinct error status if invalid padding is detected.

Instead, it is recommended that the decapsulation fails implicitly when invalid padding is detected, returning a pseudorandom key.

10.10.3 Support macros

PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_encapsulate(), in bytes.

Added in version 1.3.

```
#define PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

key_type A key type that is compatible with algorithm alg.

key_bits The size of the key in bits.

A key-encapsulation algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) is true.

Returns

A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the specified algorithm, key type, and size. An implementation can return either 0 or a correct size for an algorithm, key type, and size that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_encapsulate() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the ciphertext might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE.

PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_encapsulate(), for any of the supported key types and key-encapsulation algorithms.

Added in version 1.3.

```
#define PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_encapsulate() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA ENCAPSULATE CIPHERTEXT SIZE().

10.11 Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)

PAKE protocols provide an interactive method for two or more parties to establish cryptographic keys based on knowledge of a low entropy secret, such as a password.

These can provide strong security for communication from a weak password, because the password is not directly communicated as part of the key exchange.

This chapter is divided into the following sections:

- Common API for PAKE the common interface elements, including the PAKE operation.
- The J-PAKE protocol on page 323 the J-PAKE protocol, and the associated interface elements.
- The SPAKE2+ protocol on page 328 the SPAKE2+ protocols, and the associated interface elements.

10.11.1 Common API for PAKE

This section defines all of the common interfaces used to carry out a PAKE protocol:

- PAKE primitives
- PAKE cipher suites on page 300
- PAKE roles on page 305
- PAKE step types on page 307
- Multi-part PAKE operations on page 308
- PAKE support macros on page 321

10.11.2 PAKE primitives

A PAKE algorithm specifies a sequence of interactions between the participants. Many PAKE algorithms are designed to allow different cryptographic primitives to be used for the key establishment operation, so long as all the participants are using the same underlying cryptography.

The cryptographic primitive for a PAKE operation is specified using a psa_pake_primitive_t value, which can be constructed using the PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE() macro, or can be provided as a numerical constant value.

A PAKE primitive is required when constructing a PAKE cipher-suite object, psa_pake_cipher_suite_t, which fully specifies the PAKE operation to be carried out.

psa_pake_primitive_t (typedef)

Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
```

PAKE primitive values are constructed using PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

Figure 2 shows how the components of the primitive are encoded into a psa_pake_primitive_t value.




Figure 2 PAKE primitive encoding

The components of a PAKE primitive value can be extracted using the PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(), PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(), and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(). These can be used to set key attributes for keys used in PAKE algorithms. SPAKE2+ registration on page 329 provides an example of this usage.

psa_pake_primitive_type_t (typedef)

Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t;
```

The range of PAKE primitive type values is divided as follows:

0x00 Reserved as an invalid primitive type.

 $0 \times 01 - 0 \times 7f$

Specification-defined primitive type. Primitive types defined by this standard always have bit 7 clear. Unallocated primitive type values in this range are reserved for future use.

0x80 - 0xff

Implementation-defined primitive type. Implementations that define additional primitive types must use an encoding with bit 7 set.

For specification-defined primitive types, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC (macro)

The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x01)
```

The values of the family and bits components of the PAKE primitive identify a specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC keys. See the definition of psa_ecc_family_t. Here family and bits refer to the values used to construct the PAKE primitive using PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar values:

- The format for group elements is the same as that for public keys on the specific elliptic curve. See *Key format* within the definition of PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY().
- The format for scalars is the same as that for private keys on the specific elliptic curve. See *Key format* within the definition of PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR().

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH (macro)

The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x02)
```

The values of the family and bits components of the PAKE primitive identify a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for Diffie-Hellman keys. See the definition of psa_dh_family_t. Here family and bits refer to the values used to construct the PAKE primitive using PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar values:

- The format for group elements is the same as that for public keys in the specific Diffie-Hellman group. See Key format within the definition of PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY().
- The format for scalars is the same as that for private keys in the specific Diffie-Hellman group. See Key format within the definition of PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY().

psa_pake_family_t (typedef)

Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t;
```

For more information on the family values, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE (macro)

Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
    /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

The type of the primitive: a value of type psa_pake_primitive_type_t. pake_type The family of the primitive. The type and interpretation of this pake_family parameter depends on pake_type. For more information, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

pake_bits

The bit-size of the primitive: a value of type size_t. The interpretation of this parameter depends on pake_type and family. For more information, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

Returns: psa_pake_primitive_t

The constructed primitive value. Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as psa_pake_primitive_t.

Description

A PAKE primitive value is used to specify a PAKE operation, as part of a PAKE cipher suite.

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE (macro)

Extract the PAKE primitive type from a PAKE primitive.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(pake_primitive) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

pake_primitive

A PAKE primitive: a value of type psa_pake_primitive_t.

Returns: psa_pake_primitive_type_t

The PAKE primitive type, if pake_primitive is a supported PAKE primitive. Unspecified if pake_primitive is not a supported PAKE primitive.

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY (macro)

Extract the family from a PAKE primitive.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(pake_primitive) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

pake_primitive

A PAKE primitive: a value of type psa_pake_primitive_t.

Returns: psa_pake_family_t

The PAKE primitive family, if pake_primitive is a supported PAKE primitive. Unspecified if pake_primitive is not a supported PAKE primitive.

Description

For more information on the family values, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS (macro)

Extract the bit-size from a PAKE primitive.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(pake_primitive) \
   /* specification-defined value */
```

Parameters

pake_primitive

A PAKE primitive: a value of type psa_pake_primitive_t.

Returns: size_t

The PAKE primitive bit-size, if pake_primitive is a supported PAKE primitive. Unspecified if pake_primitive is not a supported PAKE primitive.

Description

For more information on the bit-size values, see PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC and PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH.

10.11.3 PAKE cipher suites

Most PAKE algorithms have parameters that must be specified by the application. These parameters include the following:

- The cryptographic primitive used for key establishment, specified using a PAKE primitive.
- A cryptographic hash algorithm.
- Whether the application requires the shared secret before, or after, it is confirmed.

The hash algorithm is encoded into the PAKE algorithm identifier. The psa_pake_cipher_suite_t object is used to fully specify a PAKE operation, combining the PAKE protocol with all of the above parameters.

A PAKE cipher suite is required when setting up a PAKE operation in psa_pake_setup().

psa_pake_cipher_suite_t (typedef)

The type of an object describing a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t;
```

This is the object that represents the cipher suite used for a PAKE algorithm. The PAKE cipher suite specifies the PAKE algorithm, and the options selected for that algorithm. The cipher suite includes the following attributes:

- The PAKE algorithm itself.
- The hash algorithm, encoded within the PAKE algorithm.
- The PAKE primitive, which identifies the prime order group used for the key exchange operation. See *PAKE primitives* on page 296.

• Whether to confirm the shared secret.

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

Before calling any function on a PAKE cipher suite object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite;
memset(&cipher_suite, 0, sizeof(cipher_suite));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT, for example:

```
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_pake_cipher_suite_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite;
cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init();
```

Following initialization, the cipher-suite object contains the following values:

| Attribute | Value |
|------------------|---|
| algorithm | PSA_ALG_NONE — an invalid algorithm identifier. |
| primitive | 0 — an invalid PAKE primitive. |
| key confirmation | PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY — requesting that the secret key is confirmed before it can be returned. |

Valid algorithm, primitive, and key confirmation values must be set when using a PAKE cipher suite.

Implementation note

Implementations are recommended to define the cipher-suite object as a simple data structure, with fields corresponding to the individual cipher suite attributes. In such an implementation, each function psa_pake_cs_set_xxx() sets a field and the corresponding function psa_pake_cs_get_xxx() retrieves the value of the field.

An implementation can report attribute values that are equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. For example, an implementation can use a more compact representation for attributes where many bit-patterns are invalid or not supported, and store all values that it does not support as a special marker value. In such an implementation, after setting an invalid value, the

corresponding get function returns an invalid value which might not be the one that was originally stored.

PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type psa_pake_cipher_suite_t. Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_pake_cipher_suite_init (function)

Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_pake_cipher_suite_t

psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm (function)

Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);
```

Parameters

cipher_suite

The cipher suite object to query.

Returns: psa_algorithm_t

The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm (function)

Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite.

Added in version 1.1.

```
void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite,
                               psa_algorithm_t alg);
```

Parameters

cipher_suite The cipher suite object to write to.

alg The PAKE algorithm to write: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such

that PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) is true.

Returns: void Description

This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm previously set in cipher_suite.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

psa_pake_cs_get_primitive (function)

Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);
```

Parameters

cipher_suite

The cipher suite object to query.

Returns: psa_pake_primitive_t

The primitive stored in the cipher suite object.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

psa_pake_cs_set_primitive (function)

Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

cipher_suite The cipher suite object to write to.

primitive The PAKE primitive to write: a value of type psa_pake_primitive_t. If

this is 0, the primitive type in cipher_suite becomes unspecified.

Returns: void

Description

This function overwrites any primitive previously set in cipher_suite.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY (macro)

A key confirmation value that indicates an confirmed key in a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY 0

This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm exchanging data to verify that the shared key is identical for both parties. This is the default key confirmation value in an initialized PAKE cipher suite object.

Some algorithms do not include confirmation of the shared key.

PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY (macro)

A key confirmation value that indicates an unconfirmed key in a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA PAKE UNCONFIRMED KEY 1

This key confirmation value will result in the PAKE algorithm terminating prior to confirming that the resulting shared key is identical for both parties.

Some algorithms do not support returning an unconfirmed shared key.



Warning

When the shared key is not confirmed as part of the PAKE operation, the application is responsible for mitigating risks that arise from the possible mismatch in the output keys.

psa_pake_cs_get_key_confirmation (function)

Retrieve the key confirmation from a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.2.

uint32_t psa_pake_cs_get_key_confirmation(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);

Parameters

cipher_suite The cipher suite object to query.

Returns: uint32_t

A key confirmation value: either PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY or PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY.

Description

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

psa_pake_cs_set_key_confirmation (function)

Declare the key confirmation from a PAKE cipher suite.

Added in version 1.2.

Parameters

cipher_suite The cipher suite object to write to.

key_confirmation The key confirmation value to write: either PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY or

PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY.

Returns: void Description

This function overwrites any key confirmation previously set in cipher_suite.

The documentation of individual PAKE algorithms specifies which key confirmation values are valid for the algorithm.

Implementation note

This is a simple accessor function that is not required to validate its inputs. It can be efficiently implemented as a static inline function or a function-like macro.

10.11.4 PAKE roles

Some PAKE algorithms need to know which role each participant is taking in the algorithm. For example:

- Augmented PAKE algorithms typically have a client and a server participant.
- Some symmetric PAKE algorithms assign an order to the two participants.

psa_pake_role_t (typedef)

Encoding of the application role in a PAKE algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t;
```

This type is used to encode the application's role in the algorithm being executed. For more information see the documentation of individual PAKE role constants.

PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE (macro)

A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t)0x00)
```

This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE algorithms which do not assign roles.

PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST (macro)

The first peer in a balanced PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t)0x01)
```

Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need the peers to be ordered for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not need a specific ordering, then either do not call psa_pake_set_role(), or use PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE as the role parameter.

PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND (macro)

The second peer in a balanced PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t)0x02)
```

Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them need the peers to be ordered for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not need a specific ordering, then either do not call psa_pake_set_role(), or use PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE as the role parameter.

PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT (macro)

The client in an augmented PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t)0x11)
```

Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.

PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER (macro)

The server in an augmented PAKE.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t)0x12)
```

Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.

10.11.5 PAKE step types

psa_pake_step_t (typedef)

Encoding of input and output steps for a PAKE algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t;
```

Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than a single key share. This type encodes additional input and output steps for such algorithms.

PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE (macro)

The key share being sent to or received from the peer.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t)0x01)
```

The format for both input and output using this step is the same as the format for public keys on the group specified by the PAKE operation's primitive.

The public-key formats are defined in the documentation for psa_export_public_key().

For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the documentation PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC (macro)

A Schnorr NIZKP public key.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t)0x02)
```

This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof, this is the value denoted by V in [RFC8235].

The format for both input and output at this step is the same as that for public keys on the group specified by the PAKE operation's primitive.

For more information on the format, consult the documentation of psa_export_public_key().

For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the documentation PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF (macro)

A Schnorr NIZKP proof.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t)0x03)
```

This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof, this is the value denoted by r in [RFC8235].

Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than the order of the group specified by the PAKE operation's primitive. The format depends on the group as well:

- For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian.
- For other elliptic curves, and for Diffie-Hellman groups, the encoding is big endian. See [SEC1] §2.3.8.

In both cases leading zeroes are permitted as long as the length in bytes does not exceed the byte length of the group order.

For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the documentation PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE().

PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM (macro)

The key confirmation value.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ((psa_pake_step_t)0x04)
```

This value is used during the key confirmation phase of a PAKE protocol. The format of the value depends on the algorithm and cipher suite:

• For PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P, the format for both input and output at this step is the same as the output of the MAC algorithm specified in the cipher suite.

10.11.6 Multi-part PAKE operations

psa_pake_operation_t (typedef)

The type of the state object for PAKE operations.

Added in version 1.1.

```
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_pake_operation_t;
```

Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application must initialize it by any of the following means:

• Set the object to all-bits-zero, for example:

```
psa_pake_operation_t operation;
memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
```

• Initialize the object to logical zero values by declaring the object as static or global without an explicit initializer, for example:

```
static psa_pake_operation_t operation;
```

• Initialize the object to the initializer PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT, for example:

```
psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
```

• Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init() to the object, for example:

```
psa_pake_operation_t operation;
operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
```

This is an implementation-defined type. Applications that make assumptions about the content of this object will result in implementation-specific behavior, and are non-portable.

PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT (macro)

This macro returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type psa_pake_operation_t.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
```

psa_pake_operation_init (function)

Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
```

Returns: psa_pake_operation_t

psa_pake_setup (function)

Setup a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

Changed in version 1.2: Added key to the operation setup.

Parameters

operation The operation object to set up. It must have been initialized as per the

documentation for psa_pake_operation_t and not yet in use.

password_key Identifier of the key holding the password or a value derived from the

password. It must remain valid until the operation terminates.

The valid key types depend on the PAKE algorithm, and participant role. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

The key must permit the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.

cipher_suite

The cipher suite to use. A PAKE cipher suite fully characterizes a PAKE algorithm, including the PAKE algorithm.

The cipher suite must be compatible with the key type of password_key.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

Success. The operation is now active.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be inactive.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

password_key is not a valid key identifier.

psssword_key does not have the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not permit the algorithm in cipher_suite.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The algorithm in cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or encodes an invalid hash algorithm.
- The PAKE primitive in cipher_suite is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm.
- The key confirmation value in cipher_suite is not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive.
- The key type or key size of password_key is not compatible with cipher_suite.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The algorithm in cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm, or encodes an unsupported hash algorithm.
- The PAKE primitive in cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm.
- The key confirmation value in cipher_suite is not supported, or not compatible, with the PAKE algorithm and primitive.
- The key type or key size of password_key is not supported with cipher suite.

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange operation is as follows:

- 1. Allocate a PAKE operation object which will be passed to all the functions listed here.
- 2. Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the documentation for psa_pake_operation_t. For example, using PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT.
- 3. Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite.
- 4. Call psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the setup. The exact sequence of psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs to be called depends on the algorithm in use.

A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key exchange:

- 1. Call psa_pake_output(operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the key share that needs to be sent to the peer.
- 2. Call psa_pake_input(operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide the key share that was received from the peer.
- 3. Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and psa_pake_input() might be necessary.
- 4. Call psa_pake_get_shared_key() to access the shared secret.

Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for details on the required set up and operation for each algorithm, and for constraints on the format and content of valid passwords.

After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the operation is active, and the application must eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an operation:

- A successful call to psa_pake_get_shared_key().
- A call to psa_pake_abort().

If psa_pake_setup() returns an error, the operation object is unchanged. If a subsequent function call with an active operation returns an error, the operation enters an error state.

To abandon an active operation, or reset an operation in an error state, call psa_pake_abort().

See Multi-part operations on page 25.

psa_pake_set_role (function)

Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation Active PAKE operation.

role A value of type psa_pake_role_t indicating the application role in the

PAKE algorithm. See PAKE roles on page 305.

Returns: psa_status_t

| PSA | SUCCESS | Success. |
|-----|---------|----------|
| | | |

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, and psa_pake_set_role(), psa_pake_input(), and psa_pake_output() must not have been called yet.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

- role is not a valid PAKE role in the operation's algorithm.
- role is not compatible with the operation's key type.

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

- role is not a valid PAKE role, or is not supported for the operation's algorithm.
- role is not supported with the operation's key type.

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating participants. For PAKE algorithms that do not require a role to be specified, the application can do either of the following:

- Not call psa_pake_set_role() on the PAKE operation.
- Call psa_pake_set_role() with the PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE role.

Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

psa_pake_set_user (function)

Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * user_id,
                               size_t user_id_len);
```

Parameters

Active PAKE operation. operation

The user ID to authenticate with. user_id Size of the user_id buffer in bytes. user_id_len

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. PSA_SUCCESS

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, and psa_pake_set_user(), psa_pake_input(), and psa_pake_output() must not have been called yet.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

user_id is not valid for the operation's algorithm and cipher suite.

The value of user_id is not supported by the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

Description

Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a user identifier with both participants in the session, also call psa_pake_set_peer() with the peer ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only.

Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

psa_pake_set_peer (function)

Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

```
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * peer_id,
                               size_t peer_id_len);
```

Parameters

Active PAKE operation. operation

The peer's ID to authenticate. peer_id

Size of the peer_id buffer in bytes. peer_id_len

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. PSA_SUCCESS

The following conditions can result in this error: PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, and psa_pake_set_peer(), psa_pake_input(), and psa_pake_output() must not have been called yet.
- Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the operation's algorithm.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

peer_id is not valid for the operation's algorithm and cipher suite. PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED The value of peer_id is not supported by the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms that associate a user identifier with both participants in the session. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only.

Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

psa_pake_set_context (function)

Set the context data for a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.2.

Parameters

operation Active PAKE operation.

context The peer's ID to authenticate.

context_len Size of the context buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

- The operation state is not valid: it must be active, and psa_pake_set_context(), psa_pake_input(), and psa_pake_output() must not have been called yet.
- Calling psa_pake_set_context() is invalid with the operation's algorithm.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

context is not valid for the operation's algorithm and cipher suite.

The value of context is not supported by the implementation.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Call this function for PAKE algorithms that accept additional context data as part of the protocol setup. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

psa_pake_output (function)

Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation Active PAKE operation.

step The step of the algorithm for which the output is requested.

output

Buffer where the output is to be written. The format of the output

depends on the step, see PAKE step types on page 307.

output_size Size of the output buffer in bytes. This must be appropriate for the cipher suite and output step:

• A sufficient output size is PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, step) where alg and primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive in the operation's cipher suite, and step is the output step.

• PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the maximum output size of any supported PAKE algorithm, primitive and step.

On success, the number of bytes of the returned output.

output_length

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

Success. The first (*output_length) bytes of output contain the output.

The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active and fully set up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements for ordering of input and output steps.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL

The size of the output buffer is too small. PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE() or PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine a sufficient buffer size.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm. step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

```
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this function several times or you might not need to call this at all.

The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().

psa_pake_input (function)

Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.

Added in version 1.1.

Parameters

operation Active PAKE operation.

step The step for which the input is provided.

input Buffer containing the input. The format of the input depends on the

step, see PAKE step types on page 307.

input_length Size of the input buffer in bytes.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The following conditions can result in this error:

• The operation state is not valid: it must be active and fully set up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements for ordering of input and output steps.

• The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE The verification fails for a PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF or

PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM input step.

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT The following conditions can result in this error:

• step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.

• The input is not valid for the operation's algorithm, cipher suite or step.

PSA ERROR NOT SUPPORTED

The following conditions can result in this error:

- step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
- The input is not supported for the operation's algorithm, cipher suite or step.

```
PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT

PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
```

Description

Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this function several times or you might not need to call this at all.

The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE() or PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to allocate buffers of sufficient size to transfer inputs that are received from the peer into the operation.

If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().

psa_pake_get_shared_key (function)

Extract the shared secret from the PAKE as a key.

Added in version 1.2.

Parameters

operation

Active PAKE operation.

attributes

The attributes for the new key.

The following attributes are required for all keys:

• The key type. All PAKE algorithms can output a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC. PAKE algorithms that produce a pseudorandom shared secret, can also output block-cipher key types, for example PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

The following attributes must be set for keys used in cryptographic operations:

- The key permitted-algorithm policy, see *Permitted algorithms* on page 94.
- The key usage flags, see Key usage flags on page 95.

The following attributes must be set for keys that do not use the default PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE lifetime:

- The key lifetime, see Key lifetimes on page 83.
- The key identifier is required for a key with a persistent lifetime, see *Key identifiers* on page 91.

The following attributes are optional:

• If the key size is nonzero, it must be equal to the size of the PAKE shared secret.

Note:

This is an input parameter: it is not updated with the final key attributes. The final attributes of the new key can be queried by calling psa_get_key_attributes() with the key's identifier.

key

On success, an identifier for the newly created key. PSA_KEY_ID_NULL on failure.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA SUCCESS

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED

PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS

PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT

Success. If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata have been saved to persistent storage.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The state of PAKE operation operation is not valid: it must be ready to return the shared secret.
 For an unconfirmed key, this will be when the key-exchange output and input steps are complete, but prior to any key-confirmation output and input steps.
 For a confirmed key, this will be when all key-exchange and key-confirmation output and input steps are complete.
- The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

The implementation does not permit creating a key with the specified attributes due to some implementation-specific policy.

This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is already a persistent key with the given identifier.

The following conditions can result in this error:

- The key type is not valid for output from this operation's algorithm.
- The key size is nonzero.
- The key lifetime is invalid.
- The key identifier is not valid for the key lifetime.

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- The key usage flags include invalid values.
- The key's permitted-usage algorithm is invalid.
- The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid.

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

The key attributes, as a whole, are not supported for creation from a PAKE secret, either by the implementation in general or in the specified storage location.

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID

Description

The shared secret is retrieved as a key. Its location, policy, and type are taken from attributes.

The size of the returned key is always the bit-size of the PAKE shared secret, rounded up to a whole number of bytes. The size of the shared secret is dependent on the PAKE algorithm and cipher suite.

This is the final call in a PAKE operation, which retrieves the shared secret as a key. It is recommended that this key is used as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys. For some PAKE algorithms, the shared secret is also suitable for use as a key in cryptographic operations such as encryption. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

Depending on the key confirmation requested in the cipher suite, psa_pake_get_shared_key() must be called either before or after the key-confirmation output and input steps for the PAKE algorithm. The key confirmation affects the guarantees that can be made about the shared key:

Unconfirmed key

If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested an unconfirmed key, the application must call <code>psa_pake_get_shared_key()</code> after the key-exchange output and input steps are completed. The PAKE algorithm provides a cryptographic guarantee that only a peer who used the same password, and identity inputs, is able to compute the same key. However, there is no guarantee that the peer is the participant it claims to be, and was able to compute the same key.

Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted resources on the peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.

Note:

Some PAKE algorithms do not enable the output of the shared secret until it has been confirmed.

Confirmed key

If the cipher suite used to set up the operation requested a confirmed key, the application must call psa_pake_get_shared_key() after the key-exchange and key-confirmation output and input steps are completed.

Following key confirmation, the PAKE algorithm provides a cryptographic guarantee that the peer used the same password and identity inputs, and has computed the identical shared secret key.

Since the peer is not authenticated, no action should be taken that assumes that the peer is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted resources on the peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.

Note:

Some PAKE algorithms do not include any key-confirmation steps.

The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithms for more information.

When this function returns successfully, operation becomes inactive. If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().

psa_pake_abort (function)

Abort a PAKE operation.

Added in version 1.1.

psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation);

Parameters

operation Initialized PAKE operation.

Returns: psa_status_t

PSA_SUCCESS Success. The operation object can now be discarded or reused.

PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init().

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description

Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the operation object itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again.

This function can be called any time after the operation object has been initialized as described in psa_pake_operation_t.

In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_qet_shared_key() is safe and has no effect.

10.11.7 PAKE support macros

PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output(), in bytes.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg A PAKE algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) is true.

primitive A primitive of type psa_pake_primitive_t that is compatible with

algorithm alg.

output_step A value of type psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the algorithm alg.

Returns

A sufficient output buffer size for the specified PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. An implementation can return either ø or a correct size for a PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.

See also PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE

PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE algorithms, primitives and output steps.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.

See also PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE().

PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient buffer size for inputs to psa_pake_input().

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
```

Parameters

alg A PAKE algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that

PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) is true.

primitive A primitive of type psa_pake_primitive_t that is compatible with

algorithm alg.

input_step A value of type psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the algorithm alg.

Returns

A sufficient buffer size for the specified PAKE algorithm, primitive, and input step. An implementation can return either ø or a correct size for a PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step that it recognizes, but does not support. If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.

Description

The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified parameters.

This macro can be useful when transferring inputs from the peer into the PAKE operation.

See also PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE

PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE (macro)

Sufficient buffer size for inputs to psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE algorithms, primitives and input steps.

Added in version 1.1.

```
#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
```

This macro can be useful when transferring inputs from the peer into the PAKE operation.

See also PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE().

10.11.8 The J-PAKE protocol

J-PAKE is the password-authenticated key exchange by juggling protocol, defined by *J-PAKE*: *Password-Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling* [RFC8236]. This protocol uses the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (NIZKP), as defined by *Schnorr Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof* [RFC8235].

J-PAKE is a balanced PAKE, without key confirmation.

J-PAKE cipher suites

When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the J-PAKE protocol:

- Use the PSA_ALG_JPAKE() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash algorithm.
- Use a PAKE primitive for the required elliptic curve, or finite field group.
- J-PAKE does not confirm the shared secret key that results from the key exchange.

For example, the following code creates a cipher suite to select J-PAKE using P-256 with the SHA-256 hash function:

More information on selecting a specific elliptic curve or Diffie-Hellman field is provided with the PSA PAKE PRIMITIVE TYPE ECC and PSA PAKE PRIMITIVE TYPE DH constants.

J-PAKE password processing

The PAKE operation for J-PAKE expects a key of type type PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. The same key value must be provided to the PAKE operation in both participants.

The key can be the password text itself, in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password, as required by a higher level protocol. For low-entropy passwords, it is recommended that a key-stretching derivation algorithm, such as PBKDF2, is used, and the resulting password hash is used as the key input to the PAKE operation.

J-PAKE operation

The J-PAKE operation follows the protocol shown in Figure 3 on page 324.

Setup

J-PAKE does not assign roles to the participants, so it is not necessary to call psa_pake_set_role().

J-PAKE requires both an application and a peer identity. If the peer identity provided to psa_pake_set_peer() does not match the data received from the peer, then the call to psa_pake_input() for the PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF step will fail with PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.

J-PAKE does not use a context. A call to psa_pake_set_context() for a J-PAKE operation will fail with PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE.




Figure 3 The J-PAKE protocol

The variable names x1, g1, and so on, are taken from the finite field implementation of J-PAKE in [RFC8236] §2. Details of the computation for the key shares and zero-knowledge proofs are in [RFC8236] and [RFC8235].

The following steps demonstrate the application code for 'User' in Figure 3. The code flow for the 'Peer' is the same as for 'User', as J-PAKE is a balanced PAKE.

1. To prepare a J-PAKE operation, initialize and set up a psa_pake_operation_t object by calling the following functions:

```
psa_pake_setup(&jpake, pake_key, &cipher_suite);
psa_pake_set_user(&jpake, ...);
psa_pake_set_peer(&jpake, ...);
```

See *J-PAKE cipher suites* on page 323 and *J-PAKE password processing* on page 323 for details on the requirements for the cipher suite and key.

The key material is used as an array of bytes, which is converted to an integer as described in SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography [SEC1] §2.3.8, before reducing it modulo q. Here, q' is the order of the group defined by the cipher-suite primitive. $psa_pake_setup()$ will return an error if the result of the conversion and reduction is \emptyset .

Key exchange

After setup, the key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows:

2. Round one.

The application can either extract the round one output values first, and then provide the round one inputs that are received from the Peer; or provide the peer inputs first, and then extract the outputs.

• To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, make the following calls to psa_pake_output(), in the order shown:

```
// Get g1
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Get V1, the ZKP public key for x1
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Get r1, the ZKP proof for x1
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
// Get g2
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Get V2, the ZKP public key for x2
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Get r2, the ZKP proof for x2
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
```

• To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation, make the following calls to psa_pake_input(), in the order shown:

```
// Set g3
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Set V3, the ZKP public key for x3
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Set r3, the ZKP proof for x3
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
// Set g4
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Set V4, the ZKP public key for x4
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Set r4, the ZKP proof for x4
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
```

3. Round two.

The application can either extract the round two output values first, and then provide the round two inputs that are received from the Peer; or provide the peer inputs first, and then extract the outputs.

• To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, make the following calls to psa_pake_output(), in the order shown:

```
// Get A
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Get V5, the ZKP public key for x2*s
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Get r5, the ZKP proof for x2*s
psa_pake_output(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
```

• To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation, make the following calls to psa_pake_input(), in the order shown:

```
// Set B
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Set V6, the ZKP public key for x4*s
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
// Set r6, the ZKP proof for x4*s
psa_pake_input(&jpake, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
```

4. To use the shared secret, extract it as a key-derivation key. For example, to extract a derivation key for HKDF-SHA-256:

```
// Set up the key attributes
psa_key_attributes_t att = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_set_key_type(&att, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE);
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&att, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&att, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256));

// Get Ka=Kb=K
psa_key_id_t shared_key;
psa_pake_get_shared_key(&jpake, &att, &shared_key);
```

For more information about the format of the values which are passed for each step, see *PAKE step types* on page 307.

If the verification of a Zero-knowledge proof provided by the peer fails, then the corresponding call to psa_pake_input() for the PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF step will return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.

The shared secret that is produced by J-PAKE is not suitable for use as an encryption key. It must be used as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

Warning

At the end of this sequence there is a cryptographic guarantee that only a peer that used the same password is able to compute the same key. But there is no guarantee that the peer is the participant it claims to be, or that the peer used the same password during the exchange.

At this point, authentication is implicit — material encrypted or authenticated using the computed key can only be decrypted or verified by someone with the same key. The peer is not authenticated at this point, and no action should be taken by the application which assumes that the peer is authenticated, for example, by accessing restricted resources.

To make the authentication explicit, there are various methods to confirm that both parties have the same key. See [RFC8236] §5 for two examples.

10.11.9 J-PAKE algorithms

PSA_ALG_JPAKE (macro)

Macro to build the Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm.

Added in version 1.1.

Changed in version 1.2: Parameterize J-PAKE algorithm by hash.

#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

A J-PAKE algorithm, parameterized by a specific hash.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is J-PAKE as defined by [RFC8236], instantiated with the following parameters:

- The primitive group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field.
- The Schnorr NIZKP, using the same group as the J-PAKE algorithm.
- The cryptographic hash function, hash_alg.

J-PAKE does not confirm the shared secret key that results from the key exchange.

The shared secret that is produced by J-PAKE is not suitable for use as an encryption key. It must be used as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

See *The J-PAKE protocol* on page 323 for the J-PAKE protocol flow and how to implement it with the Crypto API.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD
PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH

PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a J-PAKE algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a J-PAKE algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported PAKE algorithm identifier.

Description

J-PAKE algorithms are constructed using PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg).

10.11.10 The SPAKE2+ protocol

SPAKE2+ is the augmented password-authenticated key exchange protocol, defined by SPAKE2+, an Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) Protocol [RFC9383]. SPAKE2+ includes confirmation of the shared secret key that results from the key exchange.

SPAKE2+ is required by *Matter Specification*, *Version 1.2* [MATTER], as MATTER_PAKE. [MATTER] uses an earlier draft of the SPAKE2+ protocol, *SPAKE2+*, an Augmented PAKE (Draft 02) [SPAKE2P-2].

Although the operation of the PAKE is similar for both of these variants, they have different key schedules for the derivation of the shared secret.

SPAKE2+ cipher suites

SPAKE2+ is instantiated with the following parameters:

- An elliptic curve group.
- A cryptographic hash function.
- A key-derivation function.
- A keyed MAC function.

Valid combinations of these parameters are defined in the table of cipher suites in [RFC9383] §4.

When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol defined in [RFC9383]:

- For cipher-suites that use HMAC for key confirmation, use the PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash algorithm.
- For cipher-suites that use CMAC-AES-128 for key confirmation, use the PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC() algorithm, parameterized by the required hash algorithm.
- Use a PAKE primitive for the required elliptic curve.

For example, the following code creates a cipher suite to select SPAKE2+ using edwards25519 with the SHA-256 hash function:

When setting up a PAKE cipher suite to use the SPAKE2+ protocol used by [MATTER]:

- Use the PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER algorithm.
- Use the PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) PAKE primitive.

The following code creates a cipher suite to select the [MATTER] variant of SPAKE2+:

SPAKE2+ registration

The SPAKE2+ protocol has distinct roles for the two participants:

- The *Prover* takes the role of client. It uses the protocol to prove that it knows the secret password, and produce a shared secret.
- The *Verifier* takes the role of server. It uses the protocol to verify the client's proof, and produce a shared secret.

The registration phase of SPAKE2+ provides the initial password processing, described in [RFC9383] §3.2. The result of registration is two pairs of values -(w0, w1) and (w0, L) — that need to be provided during the authentication phase to the Prover and Verifier, respectively. The design of SPAKE2+ ensures that knowledge of (w0, L) does not enable an attacker to determine the password, or to compute w1.

In the Crypto API, the registration output values are managed as an asymmetric key pair:

- The Prover values, (w0, w1), are stored in a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR().
- The Verifier values, (w0, L), are stored in a key of type PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(), or derived from the matching PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR().

The SPAKE2+ key types are parameterized by the same elliptic curve as the SPAKE2+ cipher suite.

The key pair is derived from the initial SPAKE2+ password prior to starting the PAKE operation. It is recommended to use a key-stretching derivation algorithm, for example PBKDF2. This process can take place immediately before the PAKE operation, or derived at some earlier point and stored by the participant. Alternatively, the Verifier can be provisioned with the PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY() for the protocol, by the Prover, or some other agent. Figure 4 on page 330 illustrates some example SPAKE2+ key-derivation flows.

The resulting SPAKE2+ key pair must be protected at least as well as the password. The public key, exported from the key pair, does not need to be kept confidential. It is recommended that the Verifier stores only the public key, because disclosure of the public key does not enable an attacker to impersonate the Prover.




Figure 4 Examples of SPAKE2+ key-derivation procedures

The variable names w0, w1, and L are taken from the description of SPAKE2+ in [RFC9383]. Details of the computation for the key-derivation values are in [RFC9383] §3.2.

The following steps demonstrate the derivation of a SPAKE2+ key pair using PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, for use with a SPAKE2+ cipher suite, cipher_suite. See SPAKE2+ cipher suites on page 328 for an example of how to construct the cipher suite object.

1. Allocate and initialize a key-derivation object:

```
psa_key_derivation_operation_t pbkdf = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
```

2. Setup the key derivation from the SPAKE2+ password, password_key, and parameters pbkdf2_params:

3. Allocate and initialize a key attributes object:

```
psa_key_attributes_t att = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
```

4. Set the key type, size, and policy from the cipher_suite object:

5. Derive the key:

```
psa_key_id_t spake2p_key;
psa_key_derivation_output_key(&att, &pbkdf, &spake2p_key);
psa_key_derivation_abort(&pbkdf);
```

See SPAKE2+ keys on page 78 for details of the key types, key-pair derivation, and public-key format.

SPAKE2+ operation

The SPAKE2+ operation follows the protocol shown in Figure 5 on page 332.

Setup

In SPAKE2+, the Prover uses the PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT role, and the Verifier uses the PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER role.

The key passed to the Prover must be a SPAKE2+ key pair, which is derived as recommended in SPAKE2+ registration on page 329. The key passed to the Verifier can either be a SPAKE2+ key pair, or a SPAKE2+ public key. A SPAKE2+ public key is imported from data that is output by calling psa_export_public_key() on a SPAKE2+ key pair.

Both participants in SPAKE2+ have an optional identity. If no identity value is provided, then a zero-length string is used for that identity in the protocol. If the participants do not supply the same identity values to the protocol, the computed secrets will be different, and key confirmation will fail.

Participants in SPAKE2+ can optionally provide a context:

- If psa_pake_set_context() is called, then the context and its encoded length are included in the SPAKE2+ transcript computation. This includes the case of a zero-length context.
- If psa_pake_set_context() is not called, then the context and its encoded length are omitted entirely from the SPAKE2+ transcript computation. See [RFC9383] §3.3.

If the participants do not supply the same context value to the protocol, the computed secrets will be different, and key confirmation will fail.

The following steps demonstrate the application code for both Prover and Verifier in Figure 5 on page 332.

Prover To prepare a SPAKE2+ operation for the Prover, initialize and set up a psa_pake_operation_t object by calling the following functions:




Figure 5 The SPAKE2+ authentication and key confirmation protocol

The variable names w0, w1, L, and so on, are taken from the description of SPAKE2+ in [RFC9383]. Details of the computation for the key shares is in [RFC9383] §3.3 and confirmation values in [RFC9383] §3.4.

```
psa_pake_operation_t spake2p_p = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;

psa_pake_setup(&spake2p_p, pake_key_p, &cipher_suite);
psa_pake_set_role(&spake2p_p, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT);
```

The key pake_key_p is a SPAKE2+ key pair, PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(). See SPAKE2+ cipher suites on page 328 for details on constructing a suitable cipher suite.

Prover

Provide any additional, optional, parameters:

```
psa_pake_set_user(&spake2p_p, ...);  // Prover identity
psa_pake_set_peer(&spake2p_p, ...);  // Verifier identity
psa_pake_set_context(&spake2p_p, ...);  // Optional context
```

Verifier

To prepare a SPAKE2+ operation for the Verifier, initialize and set up a psa_pake_operation_t object by calling the following functions:

```
psa_pake_operation_t spake2p_v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;

psa_pake_setup(&spake2p_v, pake_key_v, &cipher_suite);
psa_pake_set_role(&spake2p_v, PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER);
```

The key pake_key_v is a SPAKE2+ key pair, PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(), or public key, PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(). See SPAKE2+ cipher suites on page 328 for details on constructing a suitable cipher suite.

Verifier

Provide any additional, optional, parameters:

```
psa_pake_set_user(&spake2p_v, ...);  // Verifier identity
psa_pake_set_peer(&spake2p_v, ...);  // Prover identity
psa_pake_set_context(&spake2p_v, ...);  // Optional context
```

Key exchange

After setup, the key exchange and confirmation flow for SPAKE2+ is as follows.

Note:

The sequence of calls for the Prover, and the sequence for the Verifier, must be in exactly this order.

Prover To get the key share to send to the Verifier, call:

```
// Get shareP
psa_pake_output(&spake2p_p, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
```

Verifier To provide and validate the key share received from the Prover, call:

```
// Set shareP
psa_pake_input(&spake2p_v, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
```

Verifier

To get the Verifier key share and confirmation value to send to the Prover, call:

```
// Get shareV
psa_pake_output(&spake2p_v, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Get confirmV
psa_pake_output(&spake2p_v, PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
```

Prover

To provide and validate the key share and verify the confirmation value received from the Verifier, call:

```
// Set shareV
psa_pake_input(&spake2p_p, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
// Set confirmV
psa_pake_input(&spake2p_p, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_CONFIRM, ...);
```

Prover

To get the Prover key confirmation value to send to the Verifier, call:

```
// Get confirmP
psa_pake_output(&spake2p_p, PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
```

Verifier

To verify the confirmation value received from the Prover, call:

```
// Set confirmP
psa_pake_input(&spake2p_v, PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM, ...);
```

Prover

To use the shared secret, extract it as a key-derivation key. For example, to extract a derivation key for HKDF-SHA-256:

```
// Set up the key attributes
psa_key_attributes_t att = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_set_key_type(&att, PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE);
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&att, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&att, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256));

// Get K_shared
psa_key_id_t shared_key;
psa_pake_get_shared_key(&spake2p_p, &att, &shared_key);
```

Verifier

To use the shared secret, extract it as a key-derivation key. The same key attributes can be used as the Prover:

```
// Get K_shared
psa_key_id_t shared_key;
psa_pake_get_shared_key(&spake2p_v, &att, &shared_key);
```

The shared secret that is produced by SPAKE2+ is pseudorandom. Although it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use the shared secret as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

For more information about the format of the values which are passed for each step, see *PAKE step types* on page 307.

If the validation of a key share fails, then the corresponding call to psa_pake_input() for the PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE step will return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. If the verification of a key

confirmation value fails, then the corresponding call to psa_pake_input() for the PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM step will return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.

10.11.11 SPAKE2+ algorithms

PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC (macro)

Macro to build the SPAKE2+ algorithm, using HMAC-based key confirmation.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

A SPAKE2+ algorithm, using HMAC for key confirmation, parameterized by a specific hash.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is SPAKE2+, as defined by SPAKE2+, an Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) Protocol [RFC9383], for cipher suites that use HMAC for key confirmation. SPAKE2+ cipher suites are specified in [RFC9383] §4. The cipher suite's hash algorithm is used as input to PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC().

The shared secret that is produced by SPAKE2+ is pseudorandom. Although it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use the shared secret as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

See *The SPAKE2+ protocol* on page 328 for the SPAKE2+ protocol flow and how to implement it with the Crypto API.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY (verification only)

PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC (macro)

Macro to build the SPAKE2+ algorithm, using CMAC-based key confirmation.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

hash_alg

A hash algorithm: a value of type psa_algorithm_t such that PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash_alg) is true.

Returns

A SPAKE2+ algorithm, using CMAC for key confirmation, parameterized by a specific hash.

Unspecified if hash_alg is not a supported hash algorithm.

Description

This is SPAKE2+, as defined by SPAKE2+, an Augmented Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) Protocol [RFC9383], for cipher suites that use CMAC-AES-128 for key confirmation. SPAKE2+ cipher suites are specified in [RFC9383] §4. The cipher suite's hash algorithm is used as input to PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC().

The shared secret that is produced by SPAKE2+ is pseudorandom. Although it can be used directly as an encryption key, it is recommended to use the shared secret as an input to a key-derivation operation to produce additional cryptographic keys.

See *The SPAKE2+ protocol* on page 328 for the SPAKE2+ protocol flow and how to implement it with the Crypto API.

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY (verification only)

PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER (macro)

The SPAKE2+ algorithm, as used by the Matter v1 specification.

Added in version 1.2.

```
#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER ((psa_algoirithm_t)0x0A000609)
```

This is the PAKE algorithm specified as MATTER_PAKE in *Matter Specification*, *Version 1.2* [MATTER]. This is based on draft-02 of the SPAKE2+ protocol, *SPAKE2+*, *an Augmented PAKE* (*Draft 02*) [SPAKE2P-2]. [MATTER] specifies a single SPAKE2+ cipher suite, P256-SHA256-HKDF-HMAC-SHA256.

The shared secret that is produced by this operation must be processed as directed by the [MATTER] specification.

This algorithm uses the same SPAKE2+ key types, key derivation, protocol flow, and the API usage described in *The SPAKE2+ protocol* on page 328. However, the following aspects are different:

- The key schedule is different. This affects the computation of the shared secret and key confirmation values.
- The protocol inputs and outputs have been renamed between draft-02 and the final RFC, as follows:

| Draft-02 |
|----------|
| рА |
| рВ |
| cA |
| сВ |
| Ke |
| |

Compatible key types

PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR
PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY (verification only)

PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a SPAKE2+ algorithm.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a SPAKE2+ algorithm, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported PAKE algorithm identifier.

Description

SPAKE2+ algorithms are constructed using PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg), PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg), or PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER.

PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a SPAKE2+ algorithm that uses a HMAC-based key confirmation. *Added in version 1.2.*

#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a SPAKE2+ algorithm that uses a HMAC-based key confirmation, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported PAKE algorithm identifier.

Description

SPAKE2+ algorithms, using HMAC-based key confirmation, are constructed using PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg).

PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC (macro)

Whether the specified algorithm is a SPAKE2+ algorithm that uses a CMAC-based key confirmation.

Added in version 1.2.

#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */

Parameters

alq

An algorithm identifier: a value of type psa_algorithm_t.

Returns

1 if alg is a SPAKE2+ algorithm that uses a CMAC-based key confirmation, 0 otherwise. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a supported PAKE algorithm identifier.

Description

SPAKE2+ algorithms, using CMAC-based key confirmation, are constructed using PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg).

10.12 Other cryptographic services

10.12.1 Random number generation

psa_generate_random (function)

Generate random bytes.

```
psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t * output,
                                  size_t output_size);
```

Parameters

Output buffer for the generated data. output Number of bytes to generate and output. output_size

Returns: psa_status_t

Success. output contains output_size bytes of generated random data. PSA_SUCCESS

The library requires initializing by a call to psa_crypto_init(). PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE

PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY

PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY

PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE

PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED

Description



Warning

This function can fail! Callers MUST check the return status and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return status is not PSA_SUCCESS.

Note:

Appendix A: Example header file

Each implementation of the Crypto API must provide a header file named psa/crypto.h, in which the API elements in this specification are defined.

This appendix provides a example of the psa/crypto.h header file with all of the API elements. This can be used as a starting point or reference for an implementation.

Note:

Not all of the API elements are fully defined. An implementation must provide the full definition.

The header will not compile without these missing definitions, and might require reordering to satisfy C compilation rules.

A.1 psa/crypto.h

```
/* This file is a reference template for implementation of the
 * PSA Certified Crypto API v1.3
#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H
#define PSA_CRYPTO_H
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include "psa/error.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1
#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 3
psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148)
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150)
typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_key_attributes_t;
#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t;
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t)0x0000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t)0x1001)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t)0x1100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t)0x1200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t)0x1203)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t)0x1205)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t)0x1206)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2400)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2406)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t)0x2301)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t)0x2403)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2405)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2002)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2004)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t)0x2007)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t)0x7001)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t)0x4001)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) /* specification-defined value */
typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t;
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x33)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t;
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) /* specification-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(curve) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY(type) /* specification-defined value */
void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                      psa_key_type_t type);
psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                      size_t bits);
typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t;
typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t;
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_PRIMARY_SECURE_ELEMENT ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000001)
void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                          psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime);
psa_key_lifetime_t psa_qet_key_lifetime(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \
    ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \
    ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \
    (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
    ((location) << 8 | (persistence))</pre>
#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0)
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x00000001)
#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x3fffffff)
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t)0x40000000)
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t)0x7fffffff)
void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                    psa_key_id_t id);
psa_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                           psa_algorithm_t alg);
```

```
psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000001)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000002)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000004)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000100)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000200)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000400)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00000800)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00001000)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00002000)
#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t)0x00004000)
#define PSA KEY USAGE VERIFY DERIVATION ((psa key usage t)0x00008000)
void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                             psa_key_usage_t usage_flags);
psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes);
psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                            const uint8_t * data,
                            size_t data_length,
                            psa_key_id_t * key);
typedef struct psa_custom_key_parameters_t {
   uint32_t flags;
} psa_custom_key_parameters_t;
#define PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 }
psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                              psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_generate_key_custom(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                                     const psa_custom_key_parameters_t * custom,
                                     const uint8_t * custom_data,
                                     size_t custom_data_length,
                                     psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_copy_key(psa_key_id_t source_key,
                          const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                          psa_key_id_t * target_key);
psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(psa_key_id_t key);
psa_status_t psa_purge_key(psa_key_id_t key);
psa_status_t psa_export_key(psa_key_id_t key,
                            uint8_t * data,
                            size_t data_size,
                            size_t * data_length);
psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_id_t key,
                                   uint8_t * data,
                                   size_t data_size,
                                   size_t * data_length);
#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_MD2 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000001)
#define PSA_ALG_MD4 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000002)
#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000003)
#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000004)
#define PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000007)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000005)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000008)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000009)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000a)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000b)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000c)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0200000d)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000010)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000011)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000012)
#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000013)
#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000015)
#define PSA_ALG_SM3 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x02000014)
psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * input,
                              size_t input_length,
                              uint8_t * hash,
                              size_t hash_size,
                              size_t * hash_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * input,
                              size_t input_length,
                              const uint8_t * hash,
                              size_t hash_length);
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_hash_operation_t;
#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
```

```
psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                            psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * input,
                             size_t input_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                             uint8_t * hash,
                             size_t hash_size,
                             size_t * hash_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * hash,
                             size_t hash_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t * operation);
psa_status_t psa_hash_suspend(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                              uint8_t * hash_state,
                              size_t hash_state_size,
                              size_t * hash_state_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_resume(psa_hash_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * hash_state,
                             size_t hash_state_length);
psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t * source_operation,
                            psa_hash_operation_t * target_operation);
#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH ((size_t)4)
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00100)
#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x03c00200)
#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \
    /* specification-defined value */
psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(psa_key_id_t key,
                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
                             const uint8_t * input,
                             size_t input_length,
                             uint8_t * mac,
                             size_t mac_size,
                             size_t * mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(psa_key_id_t key,
```

```
psa_algorithm_t alg,
                            const uint8_t * input,
                            size_t input_length,
                            const uint8_t * mac,
                            size_t mac_length);
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_mac_operation_t;
#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                                psa_key_id_t key,
                                psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                                  psa key id t key,
                                  psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                            const uint8_t * input,
                            size_t input_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                                 uint8_t * mac,
                                 size_t mac_size,
                                 size_t * mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t * operation,
                                   const uint8_t * mac,
                                   size_t mac_length);
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t * operation);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04800100)
#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01000)
#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01300)
#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01100)
#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c01200)
#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0440ff00)
#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404400)
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404000)
#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04404100)
psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                const uint8_t * input,
                                size_t input_length,
                                uint8_t * output,
                                size_t output_size,
                                size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
```

```
const uint8_t * input,
                                size_t input_length,
                                uint8_t * output,
                                size_t output_size,
                                size_t * output_length);
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_cipher_operation_t;
#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                                      psa_key_id_t key,
                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                                      psa key id t key,
                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                                    uint8_t * iv,
                                    size_t iv_size,
                                    size_t * iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * iv,
                               size_t iv_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * input,
                               size_t input_length,
                               uint8_t * output,
                               size_t output_size,
                               size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation,
                               uint8_t * output,
                               size_t output_size,
                               size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t * operation);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t)0x04c09300)
#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500100)
#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05500200)
#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100500)
#define PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x05100600)
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
   /* specification-defined value */
psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * nonce,
                              size_t nonce_length,
                              const uint8_t * additional_data,
                              size_t additional_data_length,
                              const uint8_t * plaintext,
                              size_t plaintext_length,
                              uint8_t * ciphertext,
                              size_t ciphertext_size,
                              size_t * ciphertext_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * nonce,
                              size_t nonce_length,
                              const uint8_t * additional_data,
                              size_t additional_data_length,
                              const uint8_t * ciphertext,
                              size_t ciphertext_length,
                              uint8_t * plaintext,
                              size_t plaintext_size,
                              size_t * plaintext_length);
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_aead_operation_t;
#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                    psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                    psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                  size_t ad_length,
```

```
size_t plaintext_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                     uint8_t * nonce,
                                     size_t nonce_size,
                                     size_t * nonce_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                const uint8_t * nonce,
                                size_t nonce_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                                const uint8_t * input,
                                size_t input_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                             const uint8_t * input,
                             size_t input_length,
                             uint8_t * output,
                             size_t output_size,
                             size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                             uint8_t * ciphertext,
                             size_t ciphertext_size,
                             size_t * ciphertext_length,
                             uint8_t * tag,
                             size_t taq_size,
                             size_t * tag_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t * operation,
                             uint8_t * plaintext,
                             size_t plaintext_size,
                             size_t * plaintext_length,
                             const uint8_t * taq,
                             size_t tag_length);
psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t * operation);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(hash_alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000800)
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08000609)
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x08800200)
typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST /* implementation-defined value */
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_key_derivation_operation_t;
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                      psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(const psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                             size_t * capacity);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                             size_t capacity);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                            psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                            const uint8_t * data,
                                            size_t data_length);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                              psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                              uint64_t value);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                          psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                          psa_key_id_t key);
```

```
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                             uint8_t * output,
                                             size_t output_length);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                                           psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                           psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                                                  psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                                  const psa_custom_key_parameters_t * custom,
                                                  const uint8_t * custom_data,
                                                  size_t custom_data_length,
                                                  psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                             const uint8_t * expected_output,
                                             size_t output_length);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                           psa_key_id_t expected);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alq) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_OUTPUT_SIZE 32
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alq) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alq) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0600090B)
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#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000915)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) /* specification-defined value */
psa_status_t psa_sign_message(psa_key_id_t key,
                              psa_algorithm_t alg,
                              const uint8_t * input,
                              size_t input_length,
                              uint8_t * signature,
                              size_t signature_size,
                              size_t * signature_length);
psa_status_t psa_verify_message(psa_key_id_t key,
                                psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                const uint8_t * input,
                                size t input length,
                                const uint8_t * signature,
                                size_t signature_length);
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(psa_key_id_t key,
                           psa_algorithm_t alg,
                           const uint8_t * hash,
                           size_t hash_length,
                           uint8_t * signature,
                           size_t signature_size,
                           size_t * signature_length);
psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(psa_key_id_t key,
                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
                             const uint8_t * hash,
                             size_t hash_length,
                             const uint8_t * signature,
                             size_t signature_length);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x020000ff)
#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t)0x07000200)
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                    const uint8_t * input,
                                    size_t input_length,
                                    const uint8_t * salt,
                                    size_t salt_length,
                                    uint8_t * output,
                                    size_t output_size,
                                    size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(psa_key_id_t key,
                                    psa_algorithm_t alg,
```

```
const uint8_t * input,
                                    size_t input_length,
                                    const uint8_t * salt,
                                    size_t salt_length,
                                    uint8_t * output,
                                    size_t output_size,
                                    size_t * output_length);
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
   /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09010000)
#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t)0x09020000)
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
    /* specification-defined value */
psa_status_t psa_key_agreement(psa_key_id_t private_key,
                               const uint8_t * peer_key,
                               size_t peer_key_length,
                               psa_algorithm_t alg,
                               const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                               psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg,
                                   psa_key_id_t private_key,
                                   const uint8_t * peer_key,
                                   size_t peer_key_length,
                                   uint8_t * output,
                                   size_t output_size,
                                   size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t * operation,
                                              psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
                                              psa_key_id_t private_key,
                                              const uint8_t * peer_key,
                                              size_t peer_key_length);
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alq) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
   PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
   /* implementation-defined value */
```

```
#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 ((psa_algorithm_t)0x0c000100)
psa_status_t psa_encapsulate(psa_key_id_t key,
                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
                             const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                             psa_key_id_t * output_key,
                             uint8_t * ciphertext,
                             size_t ciphertext_size,
                             size_t * ciphertext_length);
psa_status_t psa_decapsulate(psa_key_id_t key,
                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
                             const uint8_t * ciphertext,
                             size_t ciphertext_length,
                             const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                             psa_key_id_t * output_key);
#define PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ENCAPSULATE_CIPHERTEXT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x01)
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)0x02)
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(pake_primitive) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(pake_primitive) \
    /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(pake_primitive) \
    /* specification-defined value */
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void);
psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);
void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite,
                               psa_algorithm_t alg);
psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_qet_primitive(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);
void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite,
                               psa_pake_primitive_t primitive);
#define PSA_PAKE_CONFIRMED_KEY 0
#define PSA_PAKE_UNCONFIRMED_KEY 1
uint32_t psa_pake_cs_get_key_confirmation(const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite);
void psa_pake_cs_set_key_confirmation(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t* cipher_suite,
                                      uint32_t key_confirmation);
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t)0x00)
```

```
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t)0x01)
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t)0x02)
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t)0x11)
#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t)0x12)
typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t)0x01)
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t)0x02)
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t)0x03)
#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_CONFIRM ((psa_pake_step_t)0x04)
typedef /* implementation-defined type */ psa_pake_operation_t;
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT /* implementation-defined value */
psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                            psa_key_id_t password_key,
                            const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t * cipher_suite);
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                               psa_pake_role_t role);
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * user_id,
                               size_t user_id_len);
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                               const uint8_t * peer_id,
                               size_t peer_id_len);
psa_status_t psa_pake_set_context(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                                  const uint8_t * context,
                                  size_t context_len);
psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                             psa_pake_step_t step,
                             uint8_t * output,
                             size_t output_size,
                             size_t * output_length);
psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                            psa_pake_step_t step,
                            const uint8_t * input,
                            size_t input_length);
psa_status_t psa_pake_get_shared_key(psa_pake_operation_t * operation,
                                     const psa_key_attributes_t * attributes,
                                     psa_key_id_t * key);
psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation);
#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \
    /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE /* implementation-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE(alg) /* specification-defined value */
#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg) /* specification-defined value */
```

Appendix B: Algorithm and key type encoding

Algorithm identifiers (psa_algorithm_t) and key types (psa_key_type_t) in the Crypto API are structured integer values.

- Algorithm identifier encoding describes the encoding scheme for algorithm identifiers
- Key type encoding on page 365 describes the encoding scheme for key types

B.1 Algorithm identifier encoding

Algorithm identifiers are 32-bit integer values of the type psa_algorithm_t. Algorithm identifier values have the structure shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6 Encoding of psa_algorithm_t

Table 15 on page 357 describes the meaning of the bit-fields — some of the bit-fields are used in different ways by different algorithm categories.

Table 15 Bit fields in an algorithm identifier

| Field | Bits | Description |
|--------|---------|--|
| V | [31] | Flag to indicate an implementation-defined algorithm identifier, when V=1. Algorithm identifiers defined by this specification always have V=0. |
| CAT | [30:24] | Algorithm category. See Algorithm categories. |
| S | [23] | For a cipher algorithm, this flag indicates a stream cipher when S=1. For a key-derivation algorithm, this flag indicates a key-stretching or password-hashing algorithm when S=1. |
| В | [22] | Flag to indicate an algorithm built on a block cipher, when B=1. |
| LEN/T2 | [21:16] | LEN is the length of a MAC or AEAD tag, T2 is a key-agreement algorithm sub-type. |
| T1 | [15:8] | Algorithm sub-type for most algorithm categories. |
| Н | [7:0] | Hash algorithm sub-type, also used in any algorithm that is parameterized by a hash. |

B.1.1 Algorithm categories

The CAT field in an algorithm identifier takes the values shown in Table 16.

 Table 16 Algorithm identifier categories

| Algorithm category | CAT | Category details | |
|-----------------------|------|--|--|
| None | 0×00 | See PSA_ALG_NONE | |
| Hash | 0×02 | See Hash algorithm encoding | |
| MAC | 0x03 | See MAC algorithm encoding on page 358 | |
| Cipher | 0×04 | See Cipher algorithm encoding on page 359 | |
| AEAD | 0x05 | See AEAD algorithm encoding on page 360 | |
| Key derivation | 0x08 | See Key-derivation algorithm encoding on page 361 | |
| Asymmetric signature | 0x06 | See Asymmetric signature algorithm encoding on page 362 | |
| Asymmetric encryption | 0×07 | See Asymmetric encryption algorithm encoding on page 362 | |
| Key agreement 0x09 | | 99 See Key-agreement algorithm encoding on page 363 | |
| Key encapsulation | 0×0C | See Key-encapsulation algorithm encoding on page 364 | |
| PAKE | 0×0A | See PAKE algorithm encoding on page 364 | |

B.1.2 Hash algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for hash algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 7 on page 358.

The defined values for HASH-TYPE are shown in Table 17 on page 358.

Table 17 Hash algorithm sub-type values




Figure 7 Hash algorithm encoding

| Hash algorithm | HASH-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|
| MD2 | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_MD2 | 0×02000001 |
| MD4 | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_MD4 | 0×02000002 |
| MD5 | 0×03 | PSA_ALG_MD5 | 0×02000003 |
| RIPEMD-160 | 0×04 | PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 | 0×02000004 |
| SHA1 | 0×05 | PSA_ALG_SHA_1 | 0×02000005 |
| AES-MMO (Zigbee) | 0×07 | PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE | 0×02000007 |
| SHA-224 | 0×08 | PSA_ALG_SHA_224 | 0×02000008 |
| SHA-256 | 0×09 | PSA_ALG_SHA_256 | 0×02000009 |
| SHA-384 | 0×0A | PSA_ALG_SHA_384 | 0×0200000A |
| SHA-512 | 0×0B | PSA_ALG_SHA_512 | 0×0200000B |
| SHA-512/224 | 0×0C | PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 | 0×0200000C |
| SHA-512/256 | 0×0D | PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 | 0×0200000D |
| SHA3-224 | 0×10 | PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 | 0×02000010 |
| SHA3-256 | 0×11 | PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 | 0×02000011 |
| SHA3-384 | 0×12 | PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 | 0×02000012 |
| SHA3-512 | 0×13 | PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 | 0×02000013 |
| SM3 | 0×14 | PSA_ALG_SM3 | 0×02000014 |
| SHAKE256-512 | 0×15 | PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 | 0×02000015 |
| wildcard ^a | 0xFF | PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH | 0×020000FF |

a. The wildcard hash PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH can be used to parameterize a signature algorithm which defines a key usage policy, permitting any hash algorithm to be specified in a signature operation using the key.

B.1.3 MAC algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for MAC algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 8.




Figure 8 MAC algorithm encoding

The defined values for B and MAC-TYPE are shown in Table 18.

LEN = 0 specifies a default length output MAC, other values for LEN specify a truncated MAC.

W is a flag to indicate a wildcard permitted-algorithm policy:

- W = 0 indicates a specific MAC algorithm and MAC length.
- W = 1 indicates a wildcard key usage policy, which permits the MAC algorithm with a MAC length of at least LEN to be specified in a MAC operation using the key. LEN must not be zero.

H = HASH-TYPE (see Table 17 on page 358) for hash-based MAC algorithms, otherwise H = 0.

Table 18 MAC algorithm sub-type values

| MAC algorithm | В | MAC-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|----------------------|---|----------|------------------------|---------------------------|
| HMAC | 0 | 0×00 | PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) | 0x038000hh ^{a b} |
| CBC-MAC ^c | 1 | 0x01 | PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC | 0x03c00100 ^a |
| CMAC ^c | 1 | 0x02 | PSA_ALG_CMAC | 0x03c00200 ^a |

- a. This is the default algorithm identifier, specifying a standard length tag. PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC() generates identifiers with non-default LEN values. PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC() generates permitted-algorithm policies with W = 1.
- b. hh is the HASH-TYPE for the hash algorithm, hash_alg, used to construct the MAC algorithm.
- c. This is a MAC constructed using an underlying block cipher. The block cipher is determined by the key type that is provided to the MAC operation.

B.1.4 Cipher algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for CIPHER algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure




Figure 9 CIPHER algorithm encoding

The defined values for S, B, and CIPHER-TYPE are shown in Table 19 on page 360.

Table 19 Cipher algorithm sub-type values

| Cipher algorithm | S | В | CIPHER-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|--|---|---|-------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| Stream cipher ^a | 1 | 0 | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER | 0×04800100 |
| CTR mode ^b | 1 | 1 | 0×10 | PSA_ALG_CTR | 0×04C01000 |
| CFB mode ^b | 1 | 1 | 0×11 | PSA_ALG_CFB | 0×04C01100 |
| OFB mode ^b | 1 | 1 | 0×12 | PSA_ALG_OFB | 0×04C01200 |
| CCM* with zero-length tag ^b | 1 | 1 | 0×13 | PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG | 0×04C01300 |
| CCM* wildcard ^c | 1 | 1 | 0×93 | PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG | 0x04c09300 |
| XTS mode ^b | Ο | 1 | 0×FF | PSA_ALG_XTS | 0×0440FF00 |
| CBC mode without padding ^b | Ο | 1 | 0×40 | PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING | 0×04404000 |
| CBC mode with PKCS#7 padding b | 0 | 1 | 0×41 | PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 | 0×04404100 |
| ECB mode without padding ^b | 0 | 1 | 0×44 | PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING | 0×04404400 |

- a. The stream cipher algorithm identifier PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER is used with specific stream cipher key types, such as PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20.
- b. This is a cipher mode of an underlying block cipher. The block cipher is determined by the key type that is provided to the cipher operation.
- c. The wildcard algorithm PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_ANY_TAG permits a key to be used with any CCM* algorithm: unauthenticated cipher PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, and AEAD algorithm PSA_ALG_CCM.

B.1.5 AEAD algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for AEAD algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10 AEAD algorithm encoding

The defined values for B and AEAD-TYPE are shown in Table 20 on page 361.

LEN = 1..31 specifies the output tag length.

W is a flag to indicate a wildcard permitted-algorithm policy:

- W = 0 indicates a specific AEAD algorithm and tag length.
- W = 1 indicates a wildcard key usage policy, which permits the AEAD algorithm with a tag length of at least LEN to be specified in an AEAD operation using the key.

Table 20 AEAD algorithm sub-type values

| AEAD algorithm | В | AEAD-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|--------------------|---|-----------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| CCM ^a | 1 | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_CCM | 0x05500100 ^b |
| GCM ^a | 1 | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_GCM | 0x05500200 ^b |
| ChaCha20-Poly1305 | Ο | 0×05 | PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 | 0x05100500 ^b |
| XChaCha20-Poly1305 | 0 | 0×06 | PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305 | 0×05100600 ^b |

- a. This is an AEAD mode of an underlying block cipher. The block cipher is determined by the key type that is provided to the AEAD operation.
- b. This is the default algorithm identifier, specifying the default tag length for the algorithm.

 PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG() generates identifiers with alternative LEN values.

 PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG() generates wildcard permitted-algorithm policies with W = 1.

B.1.6 Key-derivation algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for key-derivation algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11 Key-derivation algorithm encoding

The defined values for S and KDF-TYPE are shown in Table 21.

The permitted values of HASH-TYPE (see Table 17 on page 358) depend on the specific KDF algorithm.

Table 21 Key-derivation algorithm sub-type values

| Key-derivation algorithm | S | KDF- TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| HKDF | 0 | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash) | 0x080001hh ^a |
| TLS-1.2 PRF | 0 | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash) | 0x080002hh ^a |
| TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret | 0 | 0x03 | PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_T0_MS(hash) | 0x080003hh ^a |
| HKDF-Extract | 0 | 0×04 | PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash) | 0x080004hh ^a |
| HKDF-Expand | 0 | 0x05 | PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash) | 0x080005hh ^a |
| TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS | 0 | 0x06 | PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS | 0×08000609 |
| SP 800-108 Counter HMAC | 0 | 0×07 | PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(hash) | 0x080007hh ^a |
| SP 800-108 Counter CMAC | 0 | 0×08 | PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC | 0×08000800 |
| PBKDF2-HMAC | 1 | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash) | 0x088001hh ^a |
| PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF- 128 | 1 | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 | 0×08800200 |

a. hh is the HASH-TYPE for the hash algorithm, hash, used to construct the key-derivation algorithm.

B.1.7 Asymmetric signature algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for asymmetric signature algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12 Asymmetric signature algorithm encoding

The defined values for SIGN-TYPE are shown in Table 22.

H = HASH-TYPE (see Table 17 on page 358) for message signature algorithms that are parameterized by a hash algorithm, otherwise H = 0.

Signature algorithm SIGN-TYPE Algorithm identifier Algorithm value RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 0x060002hh ^a 0x02 PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 no hash b 0x02 0x06000200 PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW RSA PSS PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) 0x060003hh a 0x03 RSA PSS any salt length PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) 0x060013hh a 0x13 Randomized ECDSA 0x06 PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) 0x060006hh a Randomized ECDSA no hash b 0x06 PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 0x06000600 Deterministic ECDSA 0×07 0x060007hh a PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) PureEdDSA 0x08 PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA 0x06000800 HashEdDSA 0x09 PSA_ALG_ED25519PH and PSA_ALG_ED448PH 0x060009hh c

Table 22 Asymmetric signature algorithm sub-type values

B.1.8 Asymmetric encryption algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for asymmetric encryption algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 13 on page 363.

The defined values for ENCRYPT-TYPE are shown in Table 23 on page 363.

H = HASH-TYPE (see Table 17 on page 358) for asymmetric encryption algorithms that are parameterized by a hash algorithm, otherwise H = 0.

a. hh is the HASH-TYPE for the hash algorithm, hash_alq, used to construct the signature algorithm.

b. Asymmetric signature algorithms without hashing can only be used with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().

c. The HASH-TYPE for HashEdDSA is determined by the curve. SHA-512 is used for Ed25519ph, and the first 64 bytes of output from SHAKE256 is used for Ed448ph.




Figure 13 Asymmetric encryption algorithm encoding

Table 23 Asymmetric encryption algorithm sub-type values

| Asymmetric encryption algorithm | ENCRYPT-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|---------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT | 0×07000200 |
| RSA OAEP | 0x03 | PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) | 0x070003hh ^a |

a. hh is the HASH-TYPE for the hash algorithm, hash_alg, used to construct the encryption algorithm.

B.1.9 Key-agreement algorithm encoding

A key-agreement algorithm identifier can either be for the standalone key-agreement algorithm, or for a combined key-agreement with key-derivation algorithm. The former can only be used with psa_key_agreement() and psa_raw_key_agreement(), while the latter are used with psa_key_derivation_key_agreement().

The algorithm identifier for standalone key-agreement algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 14.




Figure 14 Standalone key-agreement algorithm encoding

The defined values for KA-TYPE are shown in Table 24.

Table 24 Key-agreement algorithm sub-type values

| Key-agreement algorithm | KA-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|-------------------------|---------|----------------------|-----------------|
| FFDH | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_FFDH | 0×09010000 |
| ECDH | 0×02 | PSA_ALG_ECDH | 0×09020000 |

A combined key agreement is constructed by a bitwise OR of the standalone key-agreement algorithm identifier and the key-derivation algorithm identifier. This operation is provided by the PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT() macro.

The underlying standalone key-agreement algorithm can be extracted from the KA-TYPE field, and the key-derivation algorithm from the KDF-TYPE and HASH-TYPE fields.




Figure 15 Combined key-agreement algorithm encoding

B.1.10 Key-encapsulation algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for key-encapsulation algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 16.




Figure 16 Encapsulation algorithm encoding

The defined values for ENCAPS-TYPE are shown in Table 25.

Table 25 Encapsulation algorithm sub-type values

| Encapsulation algorithm | ENCAPS-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|-------------------------|-------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| ECIES (SEC1) | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 | 0×0C000100 |

B.1.11 PAKE algorithm encoding

The algorithm identifier for PAKE algorithms defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 17.




Figure 17 PAKE algorithm encoding

The defined values for PAKE-TYPE are shown in Table 26.

The permitted values of HASH-TYPE (see Table 17 on page 358) depend on the specific PAKE algorithm.

 Table 26 PAKE algorithm sub-type values

| PAKE algorithm | PAKE-TYPE | Algorithm identifier | Algorithm value |
|--------------------|-----------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| J-PAKE | 0×01 | PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash) | 0x0A0001hh ^a |
| SPAKE2+ with HMAC | 0×04 | PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash) | 0x0A0004hh ^a |
| SPAKE2+ with CMAC | 0x05 | PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash) | 0x0A0005hh ^a |
| SPAKE2+ for Matter | 0×06 | PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_MATTER | 0×0A000609 |

a. hh is the HASH-TYPE for the hash algorithm, hash, used to construct the key-derivation algorithm.

B.2 Key type encoding

Key types are 16-bit integer values of the type psa_key_type_t. Key type values have the structure shown in Figure 18.



Figure 18 Encoding of psa_key_type_t

Table 27 describes the meaning of the bit-fields — some of bit-fields are used in different ways by different key type categories.

Table 27 Bit fields in a key type

| Field | Bits | Description |
|------------------------|---------|--|
| V | [15] | Flag to indicate an implementation-defined key type, when V=1. Key types defined by this specification always have V=0. |
| А | [14] | Flag to indicate an asymmetric key type, when A=1. |
| CAT | [13:12] | Key type category. See Key type categories. |
| category-specific type | [11:1] | The meaning of this field is specific to each key category. |
| Р | [O] | Parity bit. Valid key type values have even parity. |

B.2.1 Key type categories

The A and CAT fields in a key type take the values shown in Table 28.

Table 28 Key type categories

| Key type category | Α | CAT | Category details |
|-----------------------|---|-----|---|
| None | 0 | 0 | See PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE |
| Raw data | 0 | 1 | See Raw key encoding |
| Symmetric key | Ο | 2 | See Symmetric key encoding on page 366 |
| Asymmetric public key | 1 | 0 | See Asymmetric key encoding on page 367 |
| Asymmetric key pair | 1 | 3 | See Asymmetric key encoding on page 367 |

B.2.2 Raw key encoding

The key type for raw keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 19 on page 366.

The defined values for RAW-TYPE, SUB-TYPE, and P are shown in Table 29 on page 366.

Table 29 Raw key sub-type values




Figure 19 Raw key encoding

| Raw key type | RAW-TYPE | SUB-TYPE | Р | Key type | Key type value |
|-------------------|----------|----------|---|----------------------------|----------------|
| Raw data | 0 | 0 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA | 0×1001 |
| HMAC | 1 | 0 | Ο | PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC | 0×1100 |
| Derivation secret | 2 | 0 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE | 0x1200 |
| Password | 2 | 1 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD | 0x1203 |
| Password hash | 2 | 2 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH | 0×1205 |
| Derivation pepper | 2 | 3 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER | 0x1206 |

B.2.3 Symmetric key encoding

The key type for symmetric keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 20.




Figure 20 Symmetric key encoding

For block-based cipher keys, the block size for the cipher algorithm is 2^{BLK}.

The defined values for BLK, SYM-TYPE and P are shown in Table 30.

Table 30 Symmetric key sub-type values

| Symmetric key type | BLK | SYM-TYPE | Р | Key type | Key type value |
|--------------------|-----|----------|---|------------------------|----------------|
| ARC4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4 | 0×2002 |
| ChaCha20 | 0 | 2 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 | 0×2004 |
| XChaCha20 | 0 | 3 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 | 0×2007 |
| DES | 3 | 0 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES | 0×2301 |
| AES | 4 | 0 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES | 0×2400 |
| CAMELLIA | 4 | 1 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA | 0×2403 |
| SM4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4 | 0×2405 |
| ARIA | 4 | 3 | 0 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA | 0×2406 |

B.2.4 Asymmetric key encoding

The key type for asymmetric keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 21.




Figure 21 Asymmetric key encoding

PAIR is either 0 for a public key, or 3 for a key pair.

The defined values for ASYM-TYPE are shown in Table 31.

The defined values for FAMILY depend on the ASYM-TYPE value. See the details for each asymmetric key sub-type.

Table 31 Asymmetric key sub-type values

| Asymmetric key type | ASYM-TYPE | Details |
|---------------------|-----------|---|
| Non-parameterized | 0 | See Non-parameterized asymmetric key encoding |
| Elliptic Curve | 2 | See Elliptic curve key encoding on page 368 |
| Diffie-Hellman | 4 | See Diffie Hellman key encoding on page 368 |
| SPAKE2+ | 8 | See SPAKE2+ key encoding on page 369 |

Non-parameterized asymmetric key encoding

The key type for non-parameterized asymmetric keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 22.




Figure 22 Non-parameterized asymmetric keys encoding

PAIR is either 0 for a public key, or 3 for a key pair.

The defined values for NP-FAMILY and P are shown in Table 32.

Table 32 Non-parameterized asymmetric key family values

| Key family | Public/pair | PAIR | NP-FAMILY | Р | Key type | Key value |
|------------|-------------|------|-----------|---|-----------------------------|-----------|
| RSA | Public key | 0 | 0 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY | 0×4001 |
| | Key pair | 3 | 0 | 1 | PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR | 0×7001 |

Elliptic curve key encoding

The key type for elliptic curve keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 23.




Figure 23 Elliptic curve key encoding

PAIR is either 0 for a public key, or 3 for a key pair.

The defined values for ECC-FAMILY and P are shown in Table 33.

Table 33 ECC key family values

| ECC key family | ECC-FAMILY | Р | ECC family ^a | Public-key value | Key-pair value |
|-----------------|------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| SECP K1 | 0x0B | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 | 0×4117 | 0×7117 |
| SECP R1 | 0x09 | Ο | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 | 0×4112 | 0×7112 |
| SECP R2 | 0x0D | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 | 0×411B | 0x711B |
| SECT K1 | 0x13 | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 | 0×4127 | 0×7127 |
| SECT R1 | 0x11 | Ο | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 | 0×4122 | 0x7122 |
| SECT R2 | 0x15 | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 | 0×412B | 0x712B |
| Brainpool-P R1 | 0x18 | Ο | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 | 0×4130 | 0x7130 |
| FRP | 0x19 | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP | 0×4133 | 0x7133 |
| Montgomery | 0x20 | 1 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY | 0×4141 | 0×7141 |
| Twisted Edwards | 0x21 | 0 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS | 0×4142 | 0x7142 |

a. The elliptic curve family values defined in the API also include the parity bit. The key type value is constructed from the elliptic curve family using either PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family) or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) as required.

Diffie Hellman key encoding

The key type for Diffie Hellman keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 24.




Figure 24 Diffie Hellman key encoding

PAIR is either 0 for a public key, or 3 for a key pair.

The defined values for DH-FAMILY and P are shown in Table 34 on page 369.

Table 34 Diffie Hellman key group values

| DH key group | DH-FAMILY | Р | DH group ^a | Public-key value | Key-pair value |
|--------------|-----------|---|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|
| RFC7919 | 0x01 | 1 | PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 | 0x4203 | 0x7203 |

a. The Diffie Hellman family values defined in the API also include the parity bit. The key type value is constructed from the Diffie Hellman family using either PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(family) or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(family) as required.

SPAKE2+ key encoding

The key type for SPAKE2+ keys defined in this specification are encoded as shown in Figure 25.




Figure 25 SPAKE2+ key encoding

PAIR is either 0 for a public key, or 3 for a key pair.

The defined values for ECC-FAMILY and P are shown in Table 35.

Table 35 SPAKE2+ key family values

| SPAKE2+ group | ECC-FAMILY | Р | ECC family ^a | Public-key value | Key-pair value |
|-----------------|------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| SECP R1 | 0x09 | 0 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 | 0x4412 | 0×7412 |
| Twisted Edwards | 0x21 | 0 | PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS | 0x4442 | 0x7442 |

a. The elliptic curve family values defined in the API also include the parity bit. The key type value is constructed from the elliptic curve family using either PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(family) or PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(family) as required.

Appendix C: Example macro implementations

This appendix provides example implementations of the function-like macros that have specification-defined values.

Note:

In a future version of this specification, these example implementations will be replaced with a pseudo-code representation of the macro's computation in the macro description.

The examples here provide correct results for the valid inputs defined by each API, for an implementation that supports all of the defined algorithms and key types. An implementation can provide alternative definitions of these macros:

- If the implementation does not support all of the algorithms or key types, it can provide a simpler definition of applicable macros.
- If the implementation provides vendor-specific algorithms or key types, it needs to extend the definitions of applicable macros.

C.1 Algorithm macros

```
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \
    ((((aead\_alq) \& ~0x003f8000) == 0x05400100) ? PSA\_ALG\_CCM : \
     (((aead\_alg) \& ~0x003f8000) == 0x05400200) ? PSA\_ALG\_GCM : \
     (((aead\_alg) \& ~0x003f8000) == 0x05000500) ? PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 : \
     PSA_ALG_NONE)
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
    ( PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | 0x00008000 )
#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (((aead_alg) & ~0x003f8000) | (((tag_length) & 0x3f) << 16)))</pre>
#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \
    ( PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | 0x00008000 )
#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x06000700 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x06000600 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) ((mac_alg) & ~0x003f8000))
#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x0000000ff) == 0 ? PSA\_ALG\_NONE : 0x020000000 | ((alg) \& 0x0000000ff))
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000100 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff))))
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000500 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff))))
#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000400 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x03800000 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \
```

```
(((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x05000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \
    (((alq) \& 0x7f400000) == 0x05400000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x07000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \
    (((alq) \& 0x7fc00000) == 0x03c00000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x04000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06000700)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
    (((alq) \& 0x7fff0000) == 0x09020000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 000001ff) == 0 \times 06000600)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7fff0000) == 0x09010000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \
    (((alq) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x02000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \
    (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \
     PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg))
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06000900)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08000100)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08000500)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08000400)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7fc0ff00) == 0x03800000)
```

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_JPAKE(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 0a000100)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x09000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x08000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f800000) == 0x08800000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_ENCAPSULATION(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x0c000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x03000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x0a000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \
    (((alq) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08800100)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \
    (((alq) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06000600)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 07000300)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06000200)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 000010ff) == 0 \times 06000300)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06001300)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 06000300)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f000000) == 0x06000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \
    PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg)
```

```
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \
    (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) && \
     (alg) != PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY && (alg) != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC(alg) \
    (((alq) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08000700)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 000003ff) == 0 \times 0a000400)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_CMAC(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 0a000500)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_SPAKE2P_HMAC(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 0a0000400)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f00ffff) == 0x09000000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \
    (((alg) \& 0x7f800000) == 0x04800000)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000 ff) == 0 \times 08000200)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \
    (((alg) \& \sim 0 \times 0000000ff) == 0 \times 08000300)
#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \
    ((PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) || \
     (((alg) \& 0x7f008000) == 0x03008000) || \
     (((alg) \& 0x7f008000) == 0x05008000))
#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x0a000100 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
    ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)((alg) & 0xff7f0000))
#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)((alg) & 0xfe80ffff))
#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)(0x08800100 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
```

```
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)(0x07000300 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)(0x06000200 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)(0x06000300 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t)(0x06001300 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA ALG SP800 108 COUNTER HMAC(hash alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000700 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff))))
#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_CMAC(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x0a000500 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_SPAKE2P_HMAC(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x0a000400 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff)))
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000200 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff))))
#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (0x08000300 | ((hash_alg) & 0x000000ff))))
#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
    ((psa_algorithm_t) (((mac_alg) & ~0x003f8000) | (((mac_length) & 0x3f) << 16)))</pre>
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
    ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 :
    ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 |</pre>
                                                               \
            (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits)))</pre>
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_BITS(pake_primitive) \
    ((size_t)(pake_primitive & 0xFFFF))
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_FAMILY(pake_primitive) \
    ((psa_pake_family_t)((pake_primitive >> 16) & 0xFF))
#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_GET_TYPE(pake_primitive) \
    ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t)((pake_primitive >> 24) & 0xFF))
```

C.2 Key type macros

```
#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \
    (1u << (((type) >> 8) & 7))
#define PSA KEY TYPE DH GET FAMILY(type) \
    ((psa_dh_family_t) ((type) & 0x007f))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x7200 | ((group) & 0x007f)))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x4200 | ((group) & 0x007f)))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \
   ((psa_ecc_family_t) ((type) & 0x007f))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x7100 | ((curve) & 0x007f)))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x4100 | ((curve) & 0x007f)))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \
   (((type) & 0x4000) == 0x4000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \
   ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & 0xff80) == 0x4200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    (((type) & 0xff80) == 0x7200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
    (((type) & 0xff80) == 0x4200)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \
    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & 0xff80) == 0x4100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \
   (((type) & 0xff80) == 0x7100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
    (((type) & 0xff80) == 0x4100)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    (((type) & 0x7000) == 0x7000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
   (((type) & 0x7000) == 0x4000)
```

```
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
   (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == 0x4001)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P(type) \
    ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & 0xff80) == 0x4400)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    (((type) \& 0xff80) == 0x7400)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
   (((type) & 0xff80) == 0x4400)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
    (((type) \& 0x7000) == 0x1000 || ((type) \& 0x7000) == 0x2000)
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
   ((psa_key_type_t) ((type) | 0x3000))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) ((type) & ~0x3000))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_GET_FAMILY(type) \
    ((psa_ecc_family_t) ((type) & 0x007f))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x7400 | ((curve) & 0x007f)))
#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_SPAKE2P_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
    ((psa_key_type_t) (0x4400 | ((curve) & 0x007f)))
```

C.3 Hash suspend state macros

```
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
    ((alg)==PSA\_ALG\_MD2 ? 64 : \
     (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_MD4 \mid | (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_MD5 ? 16 : \
     (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_RIPEMD160 \mid | (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_SHA\_1 ? 20 : 
     (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_SHA\_224 \mid | (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_SHA\_256 ? 32 : 
     (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_SHA\_512 \mid | (alg) = PSA\_ALG\_SHA\_384 \mid | 
         (alg)==PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 || (alg)==PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 64 : \
     0)
#define PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH(alg) \
    ((alg)==PSA\_ALG\_MD2 ? 1 : \
     (alg)==PSA_ALG_MD4 || (alg)==PSA_ALG_MD5 || (alg)==PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 || \
         (alg)==PSA_ALG_SHA_1 || (alg)==PSA_ALG_SHA_224 || (alg)==PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 8 : \
```

Appendix D: Security Risk Assessment

This Security Risk Assessment (SRA) analyses the security of the Crypto API itself, not of any specific implementation of the API, or any specific use of the API. However, the security of an implementation of the Crypto API depends on the implementation design, the capabilities of the system in which it is deployed, and the need to address some of the threats identified in this assessment.

To enable the Crypto API to be suitable for a wider range of security use cases, this SRA considers a broad range of adversarial models and threats to the application and the implementation, as well as to the API.

This approach allows the assessment to identify API design requirements that affect the ability for an implementation to mitigate threats that do not directly attack the API.

The scope is described in Adversarial models on page 380.

D.1 Architecture

D.1.1 System definition

Figure 26 shows the Crypto API as the defined interface that an Application uses to interact with the Cryptoprocessor.



Figure 26 Crypto API

Assumptions, constraints, and interacting entities

This SRA makes the following assumptions about the Crypto API design:

- The API does not provide arguments that identify the caller, because they can be spoofed easily, and cannot be relied upon. It is assumed that the implementation of the API can determine the caller identity, where this is required. See *Optional isolation* on page 19.
- The API does not prevent the use of mitigations that are required by an implementation of the API. See *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

• The API follows best-practices for C interface design, reducing the risk of exploitable errors in the application and implementation code. See *Ease of use* on page 20.

Trust boundaries and information flow

The Crypto API is the interface available to the programmer, and is the main attack surface that is analyzed here. However, to ensure that the API enables the mitigation of other threats to an implementation, we also consider the system context in which the Crypto API is used.

Figure 27 shows the data flow for a typical application usage of the Crypto API, for example, to exchange ciphertext with an external system, or for at rest protection in system non-volatile storage. The Application uses the Crypto API to interact with the Cryptoprocessor. The Cryptoprocessor stores persistent keys in a Key Store.




Figure 27 Crypto API dataflow diagram for an implementation with no isolation

For some adversarial models, *Cryptoprocessor isolation* or *Caller isolation* is required in the implementation to achieve the security goals. See *Security goals* on page 380, and remediations R.1 and R.2 in *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

The Cryptoprocessor can optionally include a trust boundary within its implementation of the API. The trust boundary shown in Figure 28 on page 379 corresponds to Cryptoprocessor isolation. The Cryptoprocessor boundary protects the confidentiality and integrity of the Cryptoprocessor and Key Store state from system components that are outside of the boundary.

If the implementation supports multiple, independent client Applications within the system, each Application has its own view of the Cryptoprocessor and key store. The additional trust boundaries required for a caller isolated implementation are shown in Figure 29 on page 379. The Application boundary restricts the capabilities of the Application, and protects the confidentiality and integrity of system state from the Application.

D.1.2 Assets and stakeholders

1. Cryptographic keys and key-related assets. This includes the key properties, such as the key type, identity and policies.

Stakeholders can include the SiP, the OEM, the system or application owner. Owners of a key need to be able to use the key for cryptographic operations, such as encryption or signature, and where permitted, delete, copy or extract the key.




Figure 28 Crypto API dataflow diagram for an implementation with cryptoprocessor isolation




Figure 29 Crypto API dataflow diagram for an implementation with caller isolation

Disclosure of the cryptographic key material to an attacker defeats the protection that the use of cryptography provides. Modification of cryptographic key material or key properties by an attacker has

- the same end result. These allow an attacker access to the assets that are protected by the key.
- 2. Other cryptographic assets, for example, intermediate calculation values and RNG state. Disclosure or modification of these assets can enable recovery of cryptographic keys, and loss of cryptographic protection.
- 3. Application input/output data and cryptographic operation state.

 Application data is only provided to the Cryptoprocessor for cryptographic operations, and its stakeholder is the application owner.
 - Disclosure of this data whether it is plaintext, or other data or state to an attacker defeats the protection that the use of cryptography provides. Modification of this data can have the same effect.

D.1.3 Security goals

Cryptography is used as a mitigation to the risk of disclosure or tampering with data assets that require protection, where isolation of the attacker from the data asset is unavailable or inadequate. Using cryptography introduces new threats related to the incorrect use of cryptography and mismanagement of cryptographic keys. Table 36 lists the security goals for the Crypto API to address these threats.

Table 36 Security goals

| Id | Description |
|-----|--|
| G.1 | An attacker shall not be able to disclose the plaintext corresponding to a ciphertext for which they do not own the correct key. |
| G.2 | An attacker shall not be able to generate authenticated material for which they do not own the correct key. |
| G.3 | An attacker shall not be able to exfiltrate keys or other private information stored by the Crypto API. |
| G.4 | An attacker shall not be able to alter any state held by the implementation of the Crypto API, such as internal keys or other private information (for example, certificates, signatures, etc.). |

D.2 Threat Model

D.2.1 Adversarial models

The API itself has limited ability to mitigate threats. However, mitigation of some of the threats within the cryptoprocessor can place requirements on the API design. This analysis considers a broad attack surface, to also identify requirements that enable the mitigation of specific threats within a cryptoprocessor implementation.

Table 37 on page 381 describes the adversarial models that are considered in this assessment.

A specific implementation of the Crypto API might not include all of these adversarial models within its own threat model. In this case, the related threats, risks, and mitigations might not be required for that implementation.

Id Description

M.O The Adversary is capable of accessing data that is outside the Security Perimeter of the system and on commonly accessible channels, such as messages in transit or data in storage.

This includes, but is not limited to:

- Read any input and output.
- Provide, forge, replay or modify input.
- Attempt to gain read/write access to external storage devices.
- Perform timings on the operations being done by the target machine, either in normal operation or as a response to crafted inputs. For example, timing attacks on web servers.

Once access to data is obtained, we do not make a further case distinction of the Adversarial Model depending on other capabilities. For example, the ability to perform cryptanalysis on intercepted ciphertext.

M.1 The Adversary is capable of mounting attacks from software.

This includes, but is not limited to:

- Software exploitation.
- Side channel analysis that that relies on software-exposed, built-in hardware features to perform physical unit and time measurements.
- Attacks that exploit access to any memory mapped configuration, monitoring, debug register.
- Software-induced glitching of resources, for example Row hammer, or crashing the CPU by running intensive tasks.
- M.2 The Adversary is capable of mounting simple, passive hardware attacks. This Adversary has physical access to the hardware.

This includes, but is not limited to:

- Side channel analyses that require external measurement devices. For example, this can utilize leakage sources such as EM emissions, power consumption, photonic emission, or acoustic channels.
- Plugging malicious hardware into an unmodified system.
- Passive SoC or memory interposition.

Adversarial models that are outside the scope of this assessment are shown in Table 38 on page 382.

| Id | Description |
|-----|--|
| M.3 | The Adversary is capable of mounting sophisticated and active physical attacks. This includes, but is not limited to: |
| | Interposing memory and blocking, replaying, and injecting transactions, this requires a much more precise timing than passive eavesdropping. |
| | Replacing or adding chips on the motherboard. |
| M.4 | The Adversary is capable of performing invasive silicon microsurgery. |

D.2.2 Threats and attacks

Table 39 describes threats to the Security Goals, and provides examples of corresponding attacks. This table identifies which Security goals are affected by the attacks, and which Adversarial model or models are required to execute the attack.

See *Risk assessment* on page 384 for an evaluation of the risks posed by these threats, *Mitigations* on page 385 for mitigation requirements in the API design, and *Implementation remediations* on page 388 for mitigation recommendations in the cryptoprocessor implementation.

Table 39 Threats and attacks

| Threat | | | | Attack (Examples) |
|--------|---|------------|-------------|--|
| Id | Description | Goals | Mod- els | Id: Description |
| T.1 | Use of insecure or incorrectly implemented cryptography | G.1 G.2 | M.0 | A.C1 : Using a cryptographic algorithm that is not adequately secure for the application use case can permit an attacker to recover the application plaintext from attacker-accessible data. |
| | | | | A.C2 : Using a cryptographic algorithm that is not adequately secure for the application use case can permit an attacker to inject forged authenticated material into application data in transit or in storage. |
| | | | | A.C3 : Using an insecure cryptographic algorithm, or one that is incorrectly implemented can permit an attacker to recover the cryptographic key. Key recovery enables the attacker to reveal encrypted plaintexts, and inject forged authenticated data. |
| T.2 | Misuse of cryptographic algorithms | G.1 G.2 | M.0 | A.C4 : Reusing a cryptographic key with different algorithms can result in cryptanalysis attacks on the ciphertexts or signatures which enable an attacker to recover the plaintext, or the key itself. |

Table 39 - continued from previous page

| Threat | | | | Attack (Examples) |
|--------|---|------------|-------------|--|
| Id | Description | Goals | Mod- els | Id: Description |
| T.3 | Recover non-extractable key through the | G.3 | M.1 | A.C5 : The attacker uses an indirect mechanism provided by the API to extract a key that is not intended to be extractable. |
| | API | | | A.C6 : The attacker uses a mechanism provided by the API to enable brute-force recovery of a non-extractable key. For example, <i>On the Security of PKCS #11</i> [CLULOW] describes various flaws in the design of the PKCS #11 interface standard that enable an attacker to recover secret and non-extractable keys. |
| T.4 | Illegal inputs to the API | G.3 G.4 | M.1 | A.60 : Using a pointer to memory that does not belong to the application, in an attempt to make the cryptoprocessor read or write memory that is inaccessible to the application. |
| | | | | A.70 : Passing out-of-range values, or incorrectly formatted data, to provoke incorrect behavior in the cryptoprocessor. |
| | | | | A.61 : Providing invalid buffer lengths to cause out-of-bounds read or write access within the cryptoprocessor. |
| | | | | A.62 : Call API functions in an invalid sequence to provoke incorrect operation of the cryptoprocessor. |
| T.5 | Direct access to cryptoprocessor state | G.3 G.4 | M.1 | A.C7 : Without a cryptoprocessor boundary, an attacker can directly access the cryptoprocessor state from an application. See Figure 27 on page 378. |
| | | | | A.C8 : A misconfigured cryptoprocessor boundary can allow an attacker to directly access the cryptoprocessor state from an Application. |
| T.6 | Access and use another application's assets | G.1 G.2 | M.1 | A.C9 : Without application boundaries, the cryptoprocessor provides a unified view of the application assets. All keys are accessible to all callers of the Crypto API. See Figure 29 on page 379. |
| | | | | A.C10 : The attacker can spoof the application identity within a caller-isolated implementation to gain access to another application's assets. |
| T.7 | Data-dependent timing | G.1 G.3 | M.1 | A.C11 Measuring the time for operations in the cryptoprocessor or the application, and using the differential in results to assist in recovery of the key or plaintext. |

Table 39 - continued from previous page

| Threat | | | | Attack (Examples) |
|--------|------------------------|------------|-------------|--|
| ld | Description | Goals | Mod- els | Id: Description |
| T.8 | Memory manipulation | G.4 | M.2 | A.19 : Corrupt application or cryptoprocessor state via a fault, causing incorrect operation of the cryptoprocessor. |
| | | | M.1 | A.59 : Modifying function parameters in memory, while the cryptoprocessor is accessing the parameter memory, to cause incorrect operation of the cryptoprocessor. |
| T.9 | Side channels | G.1 G.3 | M.2 | A.C12 Taking measurements from physical side-channels during cryptoprocessor operation, and using this data to recover keys or plaintext. For example, using power or EM measurements. |
| | | | M.1 | A.C13 Taking measurements from shared-resource side-channels during cryptoprocessor operation, and using this data to recover keys or plaintext. For example, attacks using a shared cache. |

D.2.3 Risk assessment

The risk ratings in Table 40 follow a version of the risk assessment scheme in NIST Special Publication 800-30 Revision 1: Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments [SP800-30]. Likelihood of an attack and its impact are evaluated independently, and then they are combined to obtain the overall risk of the attack.

The risk assessment is used to prioritize the threats that require mitigation. This helps to identify the mitigations that have the highest priority for implementation. Mitigations are described in *Mitigations* on page 385 and *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

It is recommended that this assessment is repeated for a specific implementation or product, taking into consideration the Adversarial models that are within scope, and re-evaluating the impact based on the assets at risk. Table 40 repeats the association in Table 39 on page 382 between an Adversarial model and the Threats that it enables. This aids filtering of the assessment based on the models that are in scope for a specific implementation.

Table 40 Risk assessment

| Adversarial Model | Threat/Attack | Likelihood | Impact ^a | Risk |
|-------------------|---------------|------------|---------------------|-----------|
| M.0 | T.1 | High | Medium | Medium |
| M.0 | T.2 | High | Medium | Medium |
| M.1 | T.3 | Medium | High | Medium |
| M.1 | T.4 | High | Medium | Medium |
| M.1 | T.5 | High | Very high | Very high |

Table 40 - continued from previous page

| Adversarial Model | Threat/Attack | Likelihood | Impact ^a | Risk |
|-------------------|---------------|------------|---------------------|--------|
| M.1 | T.6 | High | High | High |
| M.1 | T.7 | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| M.1 | T.8/A.59 | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| M.2 | T.8/A.19 | Low | Medium | Low |
| M.2 | T.9/A.C12 | Low | High | Medium |
| M.1 | T.9/A.C13 | Medium | High | Medium |

- a. The impact of an attack is dependent on the impact of the disclosure or modification of the application data that is cryptographically protected. This is ultimately determined by the requirements and risk assessment for the product which is using the Crypto API. Table 40 on page 384 allocates the impact as follows:
 - 'Medium' if unspecified cryptoprocessor state or application data assets are affected.
 - 'High' if an application's cryptographic assets are affected.
 - 'Very High' if all cryptoprocessor assets are affected.

D.3 Mitigations

D.3.1 Objectives

The objectives in Table 41 are a high-level description of what the design must achieve in order to mitigate the threats. Detailed requirements that describe how the API or cryptoprocessor implementation can deliver the objectives are provided in *Requirements* on page 386 and *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

Table 41 Mitigation objectives

| Description | Threats addressed |
|--|--|
| Hide keys from the application | |
| Keys are never directly manipulated by application software. Instead keys are referred to by handle, removing the need to deal with sensitive key material inside applications. This form of API is also suitable for secure elements, based on tamper-resistant hardware, that never reveal cryptographic keys. | T.1 T.2 T.3 — see A keystore interface on page 19. T.5 T.6 — to mitigate T.5 and T.6, the implementation must provide some form of isolation. See Optional isolation on page 19. |
| Limit key usage | |
| Associate each key with a policy that limits the use of the key. The policy is defined by the application when the key is created, after which it is immutable. | T.2 T.3 — see <i>Key policies</i> on page 93. |
| Best-practice cryptography | |
| | Hide keys from the application Keys are never directly manipulated by application software. Instead keys are referred to by handle, removing the need to deal with sensitive key material inside applications. This form of API is also suitable for secure elements, based on tamper-resistant hardware, that never reveal cryptographic keys. Limit key usage Associate each key with a policy that limits the use of the key. The policy is defined by the application when the key is created, after which it is immutable. |

Table 41 - continued from previous page

| ld | Description | Threats addressed |
|-----|---|---|
| | An application developer-oriented API to achieve practical cryptography: the Crypto API offers services that are oriented towards the application of cryptographic methods like encrypt, sign, verify. This enables the implementation to focus on best-practice implementation of the cryptographic primitive, and the application developer on correct selection and use of those primitives. | T.1 T.2 T.7 T.8 — see Ease of use on page 20. |
| 0.4 | Algorithm agility | |
| | Cryptographic functions are not tied to a specific cryptographic algorithm. Primitives are designated at run-time. This simplifies updating an application to use a more secure algorithm, and makes it easier to implement dynamic selection of cryptographic algorithms within an application. | T.1 — see Choice of algorithms on page 20. |

D.3.2 Requirements

The design of the API can mitigate, or enable a cryptoprocessor to mitigate, some of the identified attacks. Table 42 describes these mitigations. Mitigations that are delegated to the cryptoprocessor or application are described in *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

Table 42 Security requirements

| | | | Table 42 Security requirements |
|---------------|---|--|--|
| ld | Description | API impact | Threats/attacks addressed |
| SR.1 (O.1) | Key values are not exposed by the API, except when importing or exporting a key. | The full key policy must be provided at the time a key is created. See <i>Key management</i> on page 22. | T.3/A.C5 — key values are hidden by the API. |
| SR.2 (O.2) | The policy for a key must be set when the key is created, and be immutable afterward. | The full key policy must be provided at the time a key is created. See psa_key_attributes_t. | T.3/A.C5 — once created, the key usage permissions cannot be changed to permit export. T.2/A.C4— once created, a key cannot be repurposed by changing its policy. |
| SR.3 (O.2) | The key policy must control the algorithms that the key can be used with, and the functions of the API that the key can be used with. | The key policy must include usage permissions, and permitted-algorithm attributes. See <i>Key policies</i> on page 93. | T.2/A.C4 — a key cannot be reused with different algorithms. |

Table 42 – continued from previous page

| Id | Description | API impact | Threats/attacks addressed |
|----------------|--|--|---|
| SR.4 (O.1) | Key export must be controlled by the key policy. | See PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT. | T.3/A.C5 — a key can only be extracted from the cryptoprocessor if explicitly permitted by the key creator. |
| SR.5 (O.1) | The policy of a copied key must not provide rights that are not permitted by the original key policy. | See psa_copy_key(). | T.3/A.C5 — a copy of a key cannot be exported if the original could not be exported. T.3/A.C4 — a copy of a key cannot be used in different algorithm to the original. |
| SR.6 (O.3) | Unless explicitly required by the use case, the API must not define cryptographic algorithms with known security weaknesses. If possible, deprecated algorithms should not be included. | Algorithm inclusion is based on use cases. Warnings are provided for algorithms and operations with known security weaknesses, and recommendations made to use alternative algorithms. | T.1/A.C1 A.C2 A.C3 |
| SR.7 (O.4) | The API design must make it easy to change to a different algorithm of the same type. | Cryptographic operation functions select the specific algorithm based on parameters passed at runtime. See <i>Key types</i> on page 51 and <i>Algorithms</i> on page 117. | T.1/A.C1 A.C2 A.C3 |
| SR.8 (O.1) | Key-derivation functions that expose part of the key value, or make part of the key value easily recoverable, must not be provided in the API. | | T.3/A.C6 |
| SR.9 (O.3) | Constant values defined by the API must be designed to resist bit faults. | Key type values explicitly consider single-bit faults, see <i>Key type encoding</i> on page 365. ^a Success and error status codes differ by multiple bits, see <i>Status codes</i> on page 43. ^b | T.8/A.19 — enablement only, mitigation is delegated to the implementation. |
| SR.10 (O.3) | The API design must permit the implementation of operations with data-independent timing. | Provision of comparison functions for MAC, hash and key-derivation operations. | T.7/A.C11 — enablement only, mitigation is delegated to the implementation. |

Table 42 - continued from previous page

| ld | Description | API impact | Threats/attacks addressed |
|-------------------------|---|--|--|
| SR.11 (O.3) | Specify behavior for memory shared between the application and cryptoprocessor, including where multiple parameters overlap. | Standardize the result when parameters overlap, see Overlap between parameters on page 35. | T.8/A.59 — enablement only, mitigation is delegated to the implementation. |
| SR.12 (O.1) (O.2) | The API must permit the implementation to isolate the cryptoprocessor, to prevent access to keys without using the API. | No use of shared memory between application and cryptoprocessor, except as function parameters. | T.5/A.C7 — enablement only, mitigation is delegated to the implementation. |
| SR.13 (O.3) | The API design must permit the implementation of operations using mitigation techniques that resist side-channel attacks. | Operations that use random blinding to resist side-channel attacks, can return RNG-specific error codes. See also SR.12, which enables the cryptoprocessor to be fully isolated, and implemented within a separate security processor. | T.9 — enablement only, mitigation is delegated to the implementation. |

- a. Limited resistance to bit faults is still valuable in systems where memory may be susceptible to single-bit flip attacks, for example, Rowhammer on some types of DRAM.
- b. Unlike key type values, algorithm identifiers used in cryptographic operations are verified against a the permitted-algorithm in the key policy. This provides a mitigation for a bit fault in an algorithm identifier value, without requiring error detection within the algorithm identifier itself.

D.4 Remediation & residual risk

D.4.1 Implementation remediations

Table 43 on page 389 includes all recommended remediations for an implementation, assuming the full adversarial model described in *Adversarial models* on page 380. When an implementation has a subset of the adversarial models, then individual remediations can be excluded from an implementation, if the associated threat is not relevant for that implementation.

| Id | Identified gap | Suggested remediation |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| R.1 (O.1) (O.3) | T.5 — direct access to cryptoprocessor state. | The cryptoprocessor implementation provides <i>cryptoprocessor isolation</i> or <i>caller isolation</i> , to isolate the application from the cryptoprocessor state, and from volatile and persistent key material. |
| R.2 (O.1) (O.3) | T.6 — access and use another application's assets. | The cryptoprocessor implementation provides <i>caller isolation</i> , and maintains separate cryptoprocessor state for each application. Each application must only be able to access its own keys and ongoing operations. Caller isolation requires that the implementation can securely identify the caller of the Crypto API. |
| R.3 (O.3) | T.4/A.60 A.61 — using illegal memory inputs. | The cryptoprocessor implementation validates that memory buffers provided by the application are accessible by the application. |
| R.4 (O.3) | T.4/A.70 — providing invalid formatted data. | The cryptoprocessor implementation checks that imported key data is valid before use. |
| R.5 (O.3) | T.4/A.62 — call the API in an invalid operation sequence. | The cryptoprocessor implementation enforces the correct sequencing of calls in multi-part operations. See <i>Multi-part operations</i> on page 25. |
| R.6 (O.1) (O.3) | T.3/A.C5 A.C6 — indirect key disclosure via the API. | Cryptoprocessor implementation-specific extensions to the API must avoid providing mechanisms that can extract or recover key values, such as trivial key-derivation algorithms. |
| R.8 (O.3) | T.8/A.59 — concurrent modification of parameter memory. | The cryptoprocessor implementation treats application memory as untrusted and volatile, typically by not reading the same memory location twice. See <i>Stability of parameters</i> on page 35. |
| R.9 (O.3) | T.2/A.C4 — incorrect cryptographic parameters. | The cryptoprocessor implementation validates the key attributes and other parameters used for a cryptographic operation, to ensure these conform to the API specification and to the specification of the algorithm itself. |
| R.10 (O.3) | T.1/A.C1 A.C2 A.C3 — insecure cryptographic algorithms. | The cryptoprocessor does not support deprecated cryptographic algorithms, unless justified by specific use case requirements. |
| R.11 (O.3) | T.7/A.C11 — data-independent timing. | The cryptoprocessor implements cryptographic operations with data-independent timing. |
| R.12 (O.3) | T.9 — side-channels. | The cryptoprocessor implements resistance to side-channels. |

D.4.2 Residual risk

Threats T.2-T.4, and T.7-T.9 are fully mitigated in the API design, as described in *Mitigations* on page 385, or the cryptoprocessor implementation, as described in *Implementation remediations* on page 388.

Table 44 describes the remaining risks related to T.1, T.5, and T.6 that cannot be mitigated fully by the API or cryptoprocessor implementation. Responsibility for managing these risks lies with the application developers and system integrators.

Table 44 Residual risk

| Id | Threat/attack | Suggested remediations |
|------|---------------|---|
| RR.1 | T.1 | Selection of appropriately secure protocols, algorithms and key sizes is the responsibility of the application developer. |
| RR.2 | T.5 | Correct isolation of the cryptoprocessor is the responsibility of the cryptoprocessor and system implementation. |
| RR.3 | Т.6 | Correct identification of the application client is the responsibility of the cryptoprocessor and system implementation. |

Appendix E: Changes to the API

E.1 Document change history

This section provides the detailed changes made between published version of the document.

E.1.1 Changes between 1.3.1 and 1.3.2

Other changes

• Updated introduction to reflect GlobalPlatform assuming the governance of the PSA Certified evaluation scheme.

E.1.2 Changes between 1.3.0 and 1.3.1

Clarifications and fixes

- Clarify the way a 'volatile key' is designated, based on a persistence level of PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, to ensure that this is consistent throughout the specification. See *Key lifetimes* on page 83.
- Corrected the type of the key id parameter to psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
- Added missing 'Added in version' information to key derivation macros.

E.1.3 Changes between 1.2.1 and 1.3.0

Changes to the API

- Added PSA_EXPORT_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE to evaluate the export buffer size for any asymmetric key pair or public key.
- Add extended key-generation and key-derivation functions, psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(), that accept additional parameters to control the key creation process.
- Define a key production parameter to select a non-default exponent for RSA key generation.
- Reworked the allocation of bits in the encoding of asymmetric keys, to increase the scope for additional asymmetric key types:
 - Bit 7 was previously an unused indicator for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED family values, and is now allocated to the ASYM-TYPE.
 - ASYM-TYPE 0 is now a category for non-parameterized asymmetric keys, of which RSA is one specific type.

This has no effect on any currently allocated key type values, but affects the correct implementation of macros used to manipulate asymmetric key types.

See Asymmetric key encoding on page 367 and Key type macros on page 375.

- Added key-encapsulation functions, psa_encapsulate() and psa_decapsulate().
 - Added PSA_ALG_ECIES_SEC1 as a key-encapsulation algorithm that implements the key agreement steps of ECIES.

Clarifications and fixes

- Clarified the documentation of key attributes in key creation functions.
- Clarified the constraint on psa_key_derivation_output_key() for algorithms that have a PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
- Removed the redundant key input constraints on psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() and psa_key_derivation_verify_key(). These match the policy already checked in psa_key_derivation_input_key().
- Documented the use of context parameters in J-PAKE and SPAKE2+ PAKE operations. See *J-PAKE* operation on page 323 and *SPAKE2+ operation* on page 331.
- Clarified asymmetric signature support by categorizing the different types of signature algorithm.

Other changes

- Integrated the PAKE Extension with the main specification for the Crypto API.
- Moved the documentation of key formats and key-derivation procedures to sub-sections within each key type.
- Clarified the flexibility for an implementation to return either PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT when provided with unsupported algorithm identifier or key parameters.
- Added API version information to APIs that have been added or changed since version 1.0 of the Crypto API.

E.1.4 Changes between 1.2.0 and 1.2.1

Clarifications and fixes

- Fix the example implementation of PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE() and PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF() in *Example macro implementations* on page 369, to give correct results for key agreements combined with PBKDF2.
- Remove the dependency on the underlying hash algorithm in definition of HMAC keys, and their behavior on import and export. Transferred the responsibility for truncating over-sized HMAC keys to the application. See PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC.
- Rewrite the description of PSA_ALG_CTR, to clarify how to use the API to set the appropriate IV for different application use cases.

E.1.5 Changes between 1.1.2 and 1.2.0

Changes to the API

- Added psa_key_agreement() for standalone key agreement that outputs to a new key object. Also added PSA_ALG_IS_STANDALONE_KEY_AGREEMENT() as a synonym for PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT().
- Added support for the XChaCha20 cipher and XChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithms. See PSA_KEY_TYPE_XCHACHA20 and PSA_ALG_XCHACHA20_POLY1305.
- Added support for *zigbee Specification* [ZIGBEE] cryptographic algorithms. See PSA_ALG_AES_MMO_ZIGBEE and PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG.
- Defined key-derivation algorithms based on the Counter mode recommendations in NIST Special Publication 800-108r1: Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions [SP800-108]. See PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_HMAC() and PSA_ALG_SP800_108_COUNTER_CMAC.
- Added support for TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS key-derivation. See PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS.
- Changed the policy for psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() and psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), so that these functions are also permitted when an input key has the PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE usage flag.
- Removed the special treatment of PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE for key-derivation operations. A verification failure in psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() and psa_key_derivation_verify_key() now puts the operation into an error state.

Clarifications and fixes

- Clarified the behavior of a key-derivation operation when there is insufficient capacity for a call to psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(), psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), Or psa_key_derivation_verify_key().
- Reserved the value of for most enum-like integral types.
- Changed terminology for clarification: a 'raw key agreement' algorithm is now a 'standalone key agreement', and a 'full key agreement' is a 'combined key agreement'.

E.1.6 Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.2

Clarifications and fixes

- Clarified the requirements on the hash parameter in the psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash() functions.
- Explicitly described the handling of input and output in psa_cipher_update(), consistent with the documentation of psa_aead_update().
- Clarified the behavior of operation objects following a call to a setup function. Provided a diagram to illustrate multi-part operation states.
- Clarified the key policy requirement for PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY.
- Clarified PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT: "it permits moving a key outside of its current security boundary". This improves understanding of why it is not only required for psa_export_key(), but can also be required for psa_copy_key() in some situations.

Other changes

• Moved the documentation of supported key import/export formats to a separate section of the specification.

E.1.7 Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.1

Changes to the API

- Extended PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS to support TLS cipher suites that mix a key exchange with a pre-shared key.
- Added a new key-derivation input step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET.
- Added new algorithm families PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT and PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND for protocols that require the two parts of HKDF separately.

Other changes

- Relicensed the document under Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International with a patent license derived from Apache License 2.0. See *License* on page ix.
- Adopted a standard set of Adversarial models for the Security Risk Assessment. See *Adversarial models* on page 380.

E.1.8 Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.1.0

Changes to the API

- Relaxation when a raw key agreement is used as a key's permitted-algorithm policy. This now also permits the key agreement to be combined with any key-derivation algorithm. See PSA_ALG_FFDH and PSA_ALG_ECDH.
- Provide wildcard permitted-algorithm polices for MAC and AEAD that can specify a minimum MAC or tag length. The following elements are added to the API:
 - PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC()

- PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG()
- Added support for password-hashing and key-stretching algorithms, as key-derivation operations.
 - Added key types PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD, PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH and PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER, to support use of these new types of algorithm.
 - Add key-derivation input steps PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD and PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST.
 - Added psa_key_derivation_input_integer() to support numerical inputs to a key-derivation operation.
 - Added functions psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() and psa_key_derivation_verify_key() to compare derivation output data within the cryptoprocessor.
 - Added usage flag PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION for using keys with the new verification functions.
 - Modified the description of existing key-derivation APIs to enable the use of key-derivation functionality.
- Added algorithms PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() and PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 to implement the PBKDF2 password-hashing algorithm.
- Add support for twisted Edwards Elliptic curve keys, and the associated EdDSA signature algorithms. The following elements are added to the API:
 - PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS
 - PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA
 - PSA ALG ED25519PH
 - PSA_ALG_ED448PH
 - PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512
 - PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA()
- Added an identifier for PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA.
- Added PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(), which creates the same signatures as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(), but
 permits any salt length when verifying a signature. Also added the helper macros
 PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT() and PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(), and extended
 PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS() to detect both variants of the RSA-PSS algorithm.

Clarifications and fixes

- Described the use of header files and the general API conventions. See *Library conventions* on page 30.
- Added details for SHA-512/224 to the hash suspend state. See *Hash suspend state* on page 141.
- Removed ambiguities from support macros that provide buffer sizes, and improved consistency of parameter domain definition.
- Clarified the length of salt used for creating PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS() signatures, and that verification requires the same length of salt in the signature.
- Documented the use of PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT when the input data to an operation exceeds the limit specified by the algorithm.
- Clarified how the PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP() algorithm uses the hash algorithm parameter.
- Fixed error in psa_key_derivation_setup() documentation: combined key-agreement and key-derivation algorithms are valid for the Crypto API.

- Added and clarified documentation for error conditions across the API.
- Clarified the distinction between PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN() and PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH().
- Clarified the behavior of PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN() with a wildcard algorithm policy parameter.
- Documented the use of PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW with the PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) wildcard policy.
- Clarified the way that PSA_ALG_CCM determines the value of the CCM configuration parameter *L*. Clarified that nonces generated by psa_aead_generate_nonce() can be shorter than the default nonce length provided by PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH().

Other changes

- Add new appendix describing the encoding of algorithm identifiers and key types. See *Algorithm and key type encoding* on page 356.
- Migrated cryptographic operation summaries to the start of the appropriate operation section, and out of the *Functionality overview* on page 22.
- Included a Security Risk Assessment for the Crypto API.

E.1.9 Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.1

Changes to the API

- Added subtypes psa_key_persistence_t and psa_key_location_t for key lifetimes, and defined standard values for these attributes.
- Added identifiers for PSA_ALG_SM3 and PSA_KEY_TYPE_SM4.

Clarifications and fixes

- Provided citation references for all cryptographic algorithms in the specification.
- Provided precise key size information for all key types.
- Permitted implementations to store and export long HMAC keys in hashed form.
- Provided details for initialization vectors in all unauthenticated cipher algorithms.
- Provided details for nonces in all AEAD algorithms.
- Clarified the input steps for HKDF.
- Provided details of signature algorithms, include requirements when using with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
- Provided details of key-agreement algorithms, and how to use them.
- Aligned terminology relating to key policies, to clarify the combination of the usage flags and permitted algorithm in the policy.
- Clarified the use of the individual key attributes for all of the key creation functions.
- Restructured the description for psa_key_derivation_output_key(), to clarify the handling of the excess bits in ECC key generation when needing a string of bits whose length is not a multiple of 8.
- Referenced the correct buffer size macros for psa_export_key().

- Removed the use of the PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST error.
- Clarified concurrency rules.
- Document that psa_key_derivation_output_key() does not return PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the secret input is the result of a key agreement. This matches what was already documented for PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
- Relax the requirement to use the defined key-derivation methods in psa_key_derivation_output_key(): implementation-specific KDF algorithms can use implementation-defined methods to derive the key material
- Clarify the requirements for implementations that support concurrent execution of API calls.

Other changes

- Provided a glossary of terms.
- Provided a table of references.
- Restructured the Key management reference on page 47 chapter.
 - Moved individual attribute types, values and accessor functions into their own sections.
 - Placed permitted algorithms and usage flags into Key policies on page 93.
 - Moved most introductory material from the Functionality overview on page 22 into the relevant API sections.

E.1.10 Changes between 1.0 beta 3 and 1.0.0

Changes to the API

- Added PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR and PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR to report the Crypto API version.
- Removed PSA_ALG_GMAC algorithm identifier.
- Removed internal implementation macros from the API specification:
 - PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET
 - PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG
 - PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK
 - PSA__ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH__CASE
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK
 - PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN
 - PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG
 - PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE

- PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG
- PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE
- PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
- PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC
- PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK
- PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE
- PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE
- PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT
- PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED
- PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK
- PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK
- PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK
- PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK
- PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
- PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE
- PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE
- PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
- PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES
- PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS
- PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE
- PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED

- PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG
- PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH
- PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET
- PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE
- PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE
- PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS
- PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS
- Remove the definition of implementation-defined macros from the specification, and clarified the implementation requirements for these macros in *Implementation-specific macros* on page 38.
 - Macros with implementation-defined values are indicated by /* implementation-defined value
 */ in the API prototype. The implementation must provide the implementation.
 - Macros for algorithm and key type construction and inspection have specification-defined values. This is indicated by /* specification-defined value */ in the API prototype. Example definitions of these macros is provided in Example macro implementations on page 369.
- Changed the semantics of multi-part operations.
 - Formalize the standard pattern for multi-part operations.
 - Require all errors to result in an error state, requiring a call to psa_xxx_abort() to reset the object.
 - Define behavior in illegal and impossible operation states, and for copying and reusing operation objects.

Although the API signatures have not changed, this change requires modifications to application flows that handle error conditions in multi-part operations.

- Merge the key identifier and key handle concepts in the API.
 - Replaced all references to key handles with key identifiers, or something similar.
 - Replaced all uses of psa_key_handle_t with psa_key_id_t in the API, and removes the psa_key_handle_t type.
 - Removed psa_open_key and psa_close_key.
 - Added PSA_KEY_ID_NULL for the never valid zero key identifier.
 - Document rules related to destroying keys whilst in use.
 - Added the PSA_KEY_USAGE_CACHE usage flag and the related psa_purge_key() API.
 - Added clarification about caching keys to non-volatile memory.
- Renamed PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN to PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE.
- Relax definition of implementation-defined types.
 - This is indicated in the specification by /* implementation-defined type */ in the type definition.
 - The specification only defines the name of implementation-defined types, and does not require that the implementation is a C struct.
- Zero-length keys are not permitted. Attempting to create one will now result in an error.
- Relax the constraints on inputs to key derivation:
 - psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() can be used for secret input steps. This is necessary if a zero-length input is required by the application.
 - psa_key_derivation_input_key() can be used for non-secret input steps.
- Multi-part cipher operations now require that the IV is passed using psa_cipher_set_iv(), the option to provide this as part of the input to psa_cipher_update() has been removed.

The format of the output from psa_cipher_encrypt(), and input to psa_cipher_decrypt(), is documented.

- Support macros to calculate the size of output buffers, IVs and nonces.
 - Macros to calculate a key and/or algorithm specific result are provided for all output buffers. The new macros are:

```
    PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH()
    PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE()
    PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE()
    PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
    PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE()
    PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH()
    PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE()
```

- Macros that evaluate to a maximum type-independent buffer size are provided. The new macros are:
 - PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()

o PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE()

- o PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()
- o PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()
- o PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()
- o PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()
- o PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE()
- o PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
- o PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- AEAD output buffer size macros are now parameterized on the key type as well as the algorithm:

```
o PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE()
```

- o PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- o PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- o PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- o PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH()
- O PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- Some existing macros have been renamed to ensure that the name of the support macros are consistent. The following macros have been renamed:

```
\circ \ \mathsf{PSA\_ALG\_AEAD\_WITH\_DEFAULT\_TAG\_LENGTH()} \to \mathsf{PSA\_ALG\_AEAD\_WITH\_DEFAULT\_LENGTH\_TAG()}
```

 \circ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_TAG_LENGTH() \to PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG()

```
    PSA_KEY_EXPORT_MAX_SIZE() → PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE()
    PSA_HASH_SIZE() → PSA_HASH_LENGTH()
```

- o PSA_MAC_FINAL_SIZE() → PSA_MAC_LENGTH()
- PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE() → PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH()
- \circ PSA_MAX_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE \to PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE
- Documentation of the macros and of related APIs has been updated to reference the related API elements.
- Provide hash-and-sign operations as well as sign-the-hash operations. The API for asymmetric signature has been changed to clarify the use of the new functions.
 - The existing asymmetric signature API has been renamed to clarify that this is for signing a hash that is already computed:

```
\circ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN \to PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH
```

- $\circ \ \mathsf{PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY} \to \mathsf{PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH}$
- o psa_asymmetric_sign() → psa_sign_hash()
- \circ psa_asymmetric_verify() \rightarrow psa_verify_hash()
- New APIs added to provide the complete message signing operation:

```
o PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE
```

- o PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE
- o psa_sign_message()
- o psa_verify_message()
- New Support macros to identify which algorithms can be used in which signing API:
 - o PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH()
 - o PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE()
- Renamed support macros that apply to both signing APIs:
 - \circ PSA ASYMMETRIC SIGN OUTPUT SIZE() \to PSA SIGN OUTPUT SIZE()
 - \circ PSA_ASYMMETRIC_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \to PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
- The usage flag values have been changed, including for PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
- Restructure psa_key_type_t and reassign all key type values.
 - psa_key_type_t changes from 32-bit to 16-bit integer.
 - Reassigned the key type categories.
 - Add a parity bit to the key type to ensure that valid key type values differ by at least 2 bits.
 - 16-bit elliptic curve ids (psa_ecc_curve_t) replaced by 8-bit ECC curve family ids (psa_ecc_family_t). 16-bit Diffie-Hellman group ids (psa_dh_group_t) replaced by 8-bit DH group family ids (psa_dh_family_t).
 - These ids are no longer related to the IANA Group Registry specification.
 - The new key type values do not encode the key size for ECC curves or DH groups. The key bit size from the key attributes identify a specific ECC curve or DH group within the family.
 - The following macros have been removed:
 - o PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE2048
 - o PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE3072
 - o PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE4096
 - o PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE6144
 - o PSA_DH_GROUP_FFDHE8192

- PSA_ECC_CURVE_BITS
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P256R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P384R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_BRAINPOOL_P512R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE25519
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_CURVE448
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP160R2
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP192R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP224R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP384R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R1
- PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT163R2
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R1
- 0 13/1_ECC_CONVE_SECTIOSNI
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT193R2
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT233R1
- PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT239K1PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283K1
- PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT283R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409K1
- PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT409R1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571K1
- o PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECT571R1
- o PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_CURVE
- o PSA_KEY_TYPE_GET_GROUP
- The following macros have been added:
 - o PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2
 - o PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY

- o PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY
- PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY
- The following macros have new values:
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARC4
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY
- The following macros with specification-defined values have new example implementations:
 - o PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY
 - o PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR
- Add ECC family PSA_ECC_FAMILY_FRP for the FRP256v1 curve.
- Restructure psa_algorithm_t encoding, to increase consistency across algorithm categories.
 - Algorithms that include a hash operation all use the same structure to encode the hash algorithm. The following PSA_ALG_XXXX_GET_HASH() macros have all been replaced by a single macro PSA_ALG_GET_HASH():
 - o PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH()
 - o PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH()
 - o PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH()
 - o PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH()
 - o PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH()

- o PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH()
- Stream cipher algorithm macros have been removed; the key type indicates which cipher to use.
 Instead of PSA_ALG_ARC4 and PSA_ALG_CHACHA20, use PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER.

All of the other PSA_ALG_XXX macros have updated values or updated example implementations.

- The following macros have new values:
 - o PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
 - o PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC
 - o PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING
 - o PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7
 - o PSA_ALG_CCM
 - o PSA_ALG_CFB
 - o PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305
 - o PSA ALG CMAC
 - o PSA_ALG_CTR
 - o PSA_ALG_ECDH
 - o PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
 - o PSA_ALG_FFDH
 - o PSA ALG GCM
 - o PSA_ALG_MD2
 - o PSA_ALG_MD4
 - o PSA_ALG_MD5
 - o PSA_ALG_OFB
 - o PSA ALG RIPEMD160
 - o PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
 - o PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_1
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_224
 - o PSA ALG SHA 256
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_384
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_512
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA3_224
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA3_256
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA3_384
 - o PSA_ALG_SHA3_512
 - o PSA_ALG_XTS
- The following macros with specification-defined values have new example implementations:
 - o PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG()
 - o PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG()
 - o PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA()
 - o PSA_ALG_ECDSA()
 - o PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC()

- o PSA_ALG_HKDF()
- o PSA_ALG_HMAC()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER()
- PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_HASH()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_MAC()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER()
- o PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF()
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- o PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD()
- o PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT()
- o PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE()
- o PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF()
- o PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP()
- o PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN()
- o PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS()
- o PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF()
- o PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS()
- o PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC()
- Added ECB block cipher mode, with no padding, as PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING.
- Add functions to suspend and resume hash operations:
 - psa_hash_suspend() halts the current operation and outputs a hash suspend state.
 - psa_hash_resume() continues a previously suspended hash operation.

The format of the hash suspend state is documented in *Hash suspend state* on page 141, and supporting macros are provided for using the Crypto API:

- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_SIZE()
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_ALGORITHM_FIELD_LENGTH
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_INPUT_LENGTH_FIELD_LENGTH()
- PSA_HASH_SUSPEND_HASH_STATE_FIELD_LENGTH()
- PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH()
- Complement PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE with new error codes PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT and PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID. These permit an implementation to distinguish different causes of failure when reading from key storage.
- Added input step PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_CONTEXT for key derivation, supporting obvious mapping from the step identifiers to common KDF constructions.

Clarifications

- Clarified rules regarding modification of parameters in concurrent environments.
- Guarantee that psa_destroy_key(PSA_KEY_ID_NULL) always returns PSA_SUCCESS.
- Clarified the TLS PSK to MS key-agreement algorithm.
- Document the key policy requirements for all APIs that accept a key parameter.
- Document more of the error codes for each function.

Other changes

- Require C99 for this specification instead of C89.
- Removed references to non-standard mbed-crypto header files. The only header file that applications need to include is psa/crypto.h.
- Reorganized the API reference, grouping the elements in a more natural way.
- Improved the cross referencing between all of the document sections, and from code snippets to API element descriptions.

E.1.11 Changes between 1.0 beta 2 and 1.0 beta 3

Changes to the API

- Change the value of error codes, and some names, to align with other PSA Certified APIs. The name changes are:
 - PSA_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR \rightarrow PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR
 - PSA_ERROR_OCCUPIED_SLOT → PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
 - PSA_ERROR_EMPTY_SLOT \rightarrow PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
 - PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_CAPACITY ightarrow PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
 - PSA_ERROR_TAMPERING_DETECTED ightarrow PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
- Change the way keys are created to avoid "half-filled" handles that contained key metadata, but no key material. Now, to create a key, first fill in a data structure containing its attributes, then pass this

structure to a function that both allocates resources for the key and fills in the key material. This affects the following functions:

- psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generator_import_key() and psa_copy_key() now take an attribute structure, as a pointer to psa_key_attributes_t, to specify key metadata. This replaces the previous method of passing arguments to psa_create_key() or to the key material creation function or calling psa_set_key_policy().
- psa_key_policy_t and functions operating on that type no longer exist. A key's policy is now
 accessible as part of its attributes.
- psa_get_key_information() is also replaced by accessing the key's attributes, retrieved with psa_get_key_attributes().
- psa_create_key() no longer exists. Instead, set the key id attribute and the lifetime attribute before creating the key material.
- Allow psa_aead_update() to buffer data.
- New buffer size calculation macros.
- Key identifiers are no longer specific to a given lifetime value. psa_open_key() no longer takes a lifetime parameter.
- Define a range of key identifiers for use by applications and a separate range for use by implementations.
- Avoid the unusual terminology "generator": call them "key-derivation operations" instead. Rename a number of functions and other identifiers related to for clarity and consistency:

```
- psa_crypto_generator_t → psa_key_derivation_operation_t
- PSA_CRYPTO_GENERATOR_INIT → PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT
- psa_crypto_generator_init() → psa_key_derivation_operation_init()
- PSA_GENERATOR_UNBRIDLED_CAPACITY → PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY
- psa_set_generator_capacity() → psa_key_derivation_set_capacity()
- psa_get_generator_capacity() → psa_key_derivation_get_capacity()
- psa_key_agreement() → psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()
- psa_generator_read() → psa_key_derivation_output_bytes()
- psa_generate_derived_key() → psa_key_derivation_output_key()
- psa_generator_abort() → psa_key_derivation_abort()
- psa_key_agreement_raw_shared_secret() → psa_raw_key_agreement()
- PSA_KDF_STEP_xxx → PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx
- PSA_xxx_KEYPAIR → PSA_xxx_KEY_PAIR
```

• Convert TLS1.2 KDF descriptions to multi-part key derivation.

Clarifications

- Specify psa_generator_import_key() for most key types.
- Clarify the behavior in various corner cases.
- Document more error conditions.

E.1.12 Changes between 1.0 beta 1 and 1.0 beta 2

Changes to the API

- Remove obsolete definition PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_SELECTION.
- PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE: remove spurious parameter plaintext_length.

Clarifications

• psa_key_agreement(): document alg parameter.

Other changes

Document formatting improvements.

E.2 Planned changes for version 1.2.x

Future versions of this specification that use a 1.2.x version will describe the same API as this specification. Any changes will not affect application compatibility and will not introduce major features. These updates are intended to add minor requirements on implementations, introduce optional definitions, make corrections, clarify potential or actual ambiguities, or improve the documentation.

These are the changes that might be included in a version 1.2.x:

- Declare identifiers for additional cryptographic algorithms.
- Mandate certain checks when importing some types of asymmetric keys.
- Specify the computation of algorithm and key type values.
- Further clarifications on API usage and implementation.

E.3 Future additions

Major additions to the API will be defined in future drafts and editions of a 1.x or 2.x version of this specification. Features that are being considered include:

- Multi-part operations for hybrid cryptography. For example, this includes hash-and-sign for EdDSA, and hybrid encryption for ECIES.
- Key wrapping mechanisms to extract and import keys in an encrypted and authenticated form.
- Key discovery mechanisms. This would enable an application to locate a key by its name or attributes.
- Implementation capability description. This would enable an application to determine the algorithms, key types and storage lifetimes that the implementation provides.
- An ownership and access control mechanism allowing a multi-client implementation to have privileged clients that are able to manage keys of other clients.

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