PSA Certified
Secure Storage API 1.0¶
Document number: |
IHI 0087 |
Release Quality: |
Final |
Issue Number: |
3 |
Confidentiality: |
Non-confidential |
Date of Issue: |
22/01/2024 |
Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Architecture
- 3. Requirements
- 4. Theory of Operation
- 5. API Reference
- 5.1. Status codes
- 5.2. General Definitions
- 5.2.1.
psa_storage_info_t
(struct) - 5.2.2.
psa_storage_create_flags_t
(typedef) - 5.2.3.
psa_storage_uid_t
(typedef) - 5.2.4.
PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE
(macro) - 5.2.5.
PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_WRITE_ONCE
(macro) - 5.2.6.
PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NO_CONFIDENTIALITY
(macro) - 5.2.7.
PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NO_REPLAY_PROTECTION
(macro) - 5.2.8.
PSA_STORAGE_SUPPORT_SET_EXTENDED
(macro)
- 5.2.1.
- 5.3. Internal Trusted Storage API
- 5.4. Protected Storage API
- 5.4.1.
PSA_PS_API_VERSION_MAJOR
(macro) - 5.4.2.
PSA_PS_API_VERSION_MINOR
(macro) - 5.4.3.
psa_ps_set
(function) - 5.4.4.
psa_ps_get
(function) - 5.4.5.
psa_ps_get_info
(function) - 5.4.6.
psa_ps_remove
(function) - 5.4.7.
psa_ps_create
(function) - 5.4.8.
psa_ps_set_extended
(function) - 5.4.9.
psa_ps_get_support
(function)
- 5.4.1.
- A. Example header files
- B. Security Risk Assessment
- B.1. About this assessment
- B.2. Feature definition
- B.3. Threats
- B.3.1. T.INTERFACE_ABUSE: Illegal inputs to the API
- B.3.2. T.SPOOF_READ: Use the API to read another caller’s data
- B.3.3. T.SPOOF_WRITE: Use the API to modify another caller’s data
- B.3.4. T.EAVESDROPPING: Eavesdropping
- B.3.5. T.MITM: Man In The Middle
- B.3.6. T.DIRECT_READ: Bypassing the API to directly read data
- B.3.7. T.DIRECT_WRITE: Bypassing the API to directly modify data
- B.3.8. T.REPLACE: Physical replacement of the storage medium
- B.3.9. T.GLITCH_READ: Glitching during a read
- B.3.10. T.GLITCH_WRITE: Glitching during a write
- B.4. Mitigation Summary
- C. Document history